THE RISE OF THE MASJUMI PARTY IN INDONESIA AND THE ROLE OF THE ᶜULAMĀ' IN ITS EARLY DEVELOPMENT (1945-1952)

by

Muhammad Asyari

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, McGill University, Montreal, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Institute

of Islamic Studies

McGill University Montreal

October, 1976

© Muhammad Asyari 1977

Muhammad Asyari
M.A.
Islamic Studies

The rise of Indonesia

THE RISE OF THE MASJUMI PARTY IN INDONESIA AND THE ROLE OF THE ᶜULAMĀ' IN ITS EARLY DEVELOPMENT (1945-1952).

RESUMÉ

Auteur : Muhammad Asyari
Pays : Banjarmasin, Kalimantan Selatan, Indonesia.
Date de naissance : le 17 octobre, 1934.
Titre de la thèse : L' Ascension du parti Masjumi en Indonésie et le rôle joué par les ᶜulamā' pendant son développement initial (1945-1952)
Département : L' Institut des études Islamique, l' université de McGill.
Diplôme recherché : M. A.

Cette thèse tente de décrire la montée du parti Masjumi, pendant son développement initial, comme seul parti politique musulman d'Indonésie; aussi que d'évaluer jusqu'à quel point la chefferrie de ce parti, composée des ᶜulamā' et d'intellectuels musulmans, ont-ils réussi à faire de ce dernier le porte-parole de la communauté musulmane. Plusiers musulmans Indonésiens ont placé leurs espoirs et confiance en le parti Masjumi afin de sauvegarder les intérêts islamiques. Le parti Masjumi fut le premier à tenter une expérience nouvelle de premier un parti politique spécifiquement musulman en Indonésie. Le fait que ce parti se développa rapidement en si peu de temps à travers le pays démontre qu'il y avait un besoin de former un parti politique musulman.

ABSTRACT

Author	: Muhammad Asyari
Country of origin	: Banjarmasin, Kalimantan Selatan, Indonesia.
Date of birth	: October 17, 1934.
Title of the thesis	: The Rise of the Masjumi Party in Indonesia and the Role of the ᶜUlamā' in Its Early Development (1945-1952).
Department	: Institute of Islamic Studies McGill University.
Degree Sought	: M. A.

This thesis is an attempt to describe the rise of the Masjumi Party as the only Muslim political party in Indonesia in its early development, and to evaluate to what extent the leadership of this party - composed of ᶜulamā' and Muslim intellectuals - succeeded in making the party the spokesman of the Muslim community. Many Indonesian Muslims placed their hope and confidence in the Masjumi Party to safeguard Islamic interests. The Masjumi Party was the first to attempt the new experiment of a specifically Muslim political party in Indonesia. The fact that this party spread rapidly in a relatively short time throughout the country shows that there was a strong sentiment for an Islamic party in Indonesian politics.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I wish to express my sincere appreciation and deepest gratitude to both Dr C. J. Adams, who started as my thesis supervisor, and to Dr R. N. Verdery, who continued Dr Adams' work, for their academic guidance and encouragement during my study at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. They both have helped me in clarifying my arguments and have enabled me to formulate more specifically the focus of this study. Moreover, by their teaching and supervision, they have not only contributed to my general intellectual growth, but also provided me with many new stimulating and instructive experiences. This thesis, of course, could not have been completed without their cooperation. Thanks are also due to Dr D. P. Little, the acting Director of the Institute during the academic period 1976-1977, Dr A. Abu Hakimah, Dr N. Berkes, Dr T. Izutsu and Dr W. Bijlefeld, who taught me during the academic years 1973-1976.

I am especially indebted to Mr Andy Rippin, Mrs Pat Dubuisson, L. Benbaruk and Pat Locke who, as friends, in one way or another helped me with the English language.

I must also express my thanks to the Canadian International Development Agency (C.I.D.A.). Without its financial support, my desire to continue study at McGill University would have been just an unfulfilled dream. To all its staff members, particularly Mr. R.B. Wilson, Mrs. A. J. Fowle, Mrs F. Gagnon and Miss Claire Lemieux

I express my thanks. I would like to thank the Canadian Government which awarded me this scholarship. Also, I wish to extend my sincere appreciation and thanks to Dr H. A. Mukti Ali who, in his capacity as the Indonesian Minister for Religious Affairs, enabled me to pursue studies abroad. Similarly, my thanks and gratitude are due to Drs H. M. Kafrawie M.A. and Dr Moeljanto Soemardi M.A., the high ranking officials of the Indonesian Ministry for Religious Affairs, for their help and cooperation. My sincere appreciation and thanks go also to the Indonesian Embassy in Canada and its staff members, especially the late Mr Jamin Gintings and Mr Mohammad Choesin, who, in their capacity as Indonesian Ambassadors, have given much help and kindness during my stay in Canada. The same gratitude is also due to its staff members, especially Mrs Titiek Sujono and Mr Harsojo for their cooperation. Similarly my thanks are also given to Prof. Kahin and Mrs Peggy Lush of the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell University, whose kind help enabled me to enjoy a pleasant and valuable experience when I was conducting my library research there in June and July 1975.

Concerning the material used in completing this study, I am fortunate to have obtained important sources, particularly the Masjumi constitution and some of the Party's publications such as <u>Berita Partai Masjumi</u>, <u>Suara Partai Masjumi</u>, <u>Pedoman Perdjuangan Masjumi</u>, as well as the proceedings of successive Masjumi congresses which were published in special booklets. The writings of both Deliar Noer about the political role and organization of the Masjumi

Party and that of Aboebakar about the history of this Party also contributed a great deal to the completion of this study. Similarly, the material which I gained from secondary sources such as the works of George McT. Kahin, Herbert Feith, Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Howard M Federspiel and several others were valuable. My sincere gratitude and thanks go to all these scholars.

In addition, this study could not have been carried out without the assistance of several libraries in both Canada and the United States. In this latter, the Wason Library at Cornell University and Yale University Library all provided material that was of value in the preparation of this study. To the staff of both Libraries, especially Mr G.P. Oey and Mrs Norma Charles, I express my thanks for their kindness. In Canada, my special thanks are due to the late Mr Muzaffar Ali and to Miss S. Ferahian as well as to the other staff members of the Institute of Islamic Studies, mainly Mmes E. Law, C. Korah, J. Simpson, Mr E Wahba and Miss M. Jones. My thanks also go to the staff of the McLennan, Redpath and Religious Studies Libraries of McGill University for their cooperation. To all my former teachers, colleagues and relatives in Indonesia, especially: the late Prof A. Sigit, Zafry Zamzam, H. Abdr.Ismail, A. Sjachdan, Hassan Katjil, A. Amin, Hassan Schoo and my late brother Arsjad, I express my gratitude and respect. Similarly, my thanks also go to H.Hanafie Gobit, H.Mastur Jahri, Sjahran Saleh, Sjukran AM, Sjarifuddin, Alfani, Malikul Adil, Mas'ud, Hasjbullah, Ismail, Busjra, S.U.Bajasut and many others for their kindness. To all my friends in Canada, notably M.S. Zahradeen,

Miren Lash, L. Nothrup, D. Crow, M.A.Samad, M.A. Tawfiq, D. Boyd, R. M. Shoukry, M. B. Mahfudh and several others, I express my gratitude for their sympathetic attitude and friendliness. To all of those people and tose whose names I have not mentioned but who, in one or another way, have contribuetd to the completion of this study, I owe my sincere gratitude and appreciation.

Finally, to both my father Anang Sjahrum and my mother Ratna who always encouraged me and shaped my intellectual curiosity; and to my wife Roosdiana who encouraged me to undertake graduate studies abroad, supported me in my task and who was willing to abide with my absence for several years; and to my three children S. Ahmad Rizhan, Nina Sofia and Erlina Mushlihah who were patient while they longed for their father; and to my mother-in-law H. Djumbrah Thawab who always looked after their grandchildren patiently; to all of them I express my deepest appreciation and great gratitude.

My Allah bless them all and the writer.

Muhammad Asyari
Montreal, October 1976.-

A NOTE ON INDONESIAN SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION.

The official spelling system of the Indonesian language, initially derived from Dutch orthography, underwent several revisions. On August 17, 1972, the most fundamental revision was made. In this new system, Indonesian orthography became similar to that of the English. The main differences from the English practice are the use of c for the English sound ch, e.g., pancharoba (English spelling) becomes pancaroba (turbulent times) in Indonesian, and sy for the English sound sh, e.g., masharakat (English spelling) becomes masyarakat (society) in Indonesian. In this thesis, this system of spelling was adopted. But, technical religious terms and terminology, derived from Arabic, are rendered according to the transliteration system employed by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. However, names of individuals, organizations and some specific Indonesian terms written in the old Indonesian spellings will appear in this thesis as they were because it is commonly accepted to use them. For example names like Sukiman Wirjosandjojo and Sjarifuddin will not be written as Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo and Syarīf al-dīn. Likewise, instead of Masyumi Party or Mashumi Party this thesis adopted its old spelling i.e., Masjumi Party. Similarly, the names of the other organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadijah will not be written as Nahḍah al-ᶜUlamā' and Muhammadiyah. Also, the Indonesian terms like Pantja Sila, Madjelis Sjuro, Kijahi, Sjech, pengadjian and so on will not appear in this thesis as Panca Sila, Majlis al-Shūrā, Kiyahi, Shaykh, pengajian, etc. In such

cases these names are rendered according to the most common usage without regard for the Arabic derivation of those names. Moreover, footnotes and parenthetical notes are used whenever special problems or further clarification was necessary.

Here are examples of the main differences between old and new Indonesian spelling:

Old spelling	New spelling	Example
j	y	Jahja - Yahya (John)
ch	kh	chabar - khabar (news)
dj	j	djam - jam (watch)
sj	sy	Masjumi - Masyumi
tj	c	tjinta - cinta (love)

The main differences between Indonesian Arabic transliteration and English Arabic transliteration as adopted by the Institue of Islamic Studies, McGill University are:

Indonesian	English	Arabic
ts	th	ث
dz	dh	ذ
dh (dl)	ḍ	ض
th	ṭ	ط
h	ḥ	ح
h	h	ه
ch	kh	خ
sy	sh	ش
zh	ẓ	ز

sh	ṣ	ص
h	c	ع
		غ

x

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iv

TRANSLITERATION viii

INTRODUCTION 1

Footnotes 8

CHAPTER I:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 9

Footnotes 34

CHAPTER II:

THE BIRTH OF THE MASJUMI, ITS ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAM 41

1. The birth of the Masjumi 41
2. The structure of the Masjumi organization 65
3. The program of the Masjumi 70

Footnotes 81

CHAPTER III:

MASJUMI LEADERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE ᶜULAMA' 90

1. The leadership of the Masjumi 90
2. The role of the ᶜ<u>ulamā</u>' in the Masjumi leadership 97
3. The internal dissension within the Masjumi leadership and its effect on the role of the ᶜ<u>ulamā</u>' 105

Footnotes 134

CONCLUSION 143

BIBLIOGRAPHY 148

INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century, which brought Western scientific and secular thought to Asia, also brought with it an Islamic religious reform to Indonesia. This religious reform was a result of a confrontation of two cultures i.e., Islamic culture and Western culture, and found its expression in the teachings of Muḥammad ᶜAbduh, in Cairo. According to Gibb, the teachings of Muḥammad ᶜAbduh can be summarized into four main points: (1) the purification of Islam from corrupting influences and practices; (2) the reformation of Muslim higher education; (3) the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought; and (4) the defense of Islam against European influences and Christian attacks ....[1] In other words the main concern of his teachings was "to revitalize the Muslim life by proving the compatibility of the Qur'ān with intellectual and scientific innovation."[2]

It is obvious to one acquainted with Muḥammad ᶜAbduh's teachings that he believed strongly in the dynamic element of Islamic teachings, which provided Muslims with considerable means to encounter the life of the modern world.

This situation, of course, did affect not only the Indonesian people in general but also the Muslim community in particular. This effect can be observed clearly when, after the coming of the new thought, the Indonesian Muslim community divided into two factions i.e., the modernist and the traditionalist. Whereas the former advocated reforms the latter held fast to the traditional practices of Islam. In other words, the first group favored new investigation and interpretation of religious fundamentals,

while the second group believed that religious truth had been already contained in the writings of past Muslim scholars, especially as manifested in the teachings of the four Imāms of the madhāhib which were developed in the Medieval period of Islamic history.

Perhaps it may be said that there were four major problems facing Muslim leaders in Indonesia: first, how to deal with the Muslim community itself; secondly, how to cope with the Indonesian society in general; thirdly, how to counter the Dutch colonial rule; and fourthly, how to compete with other religions. These four problems can also be put in another way, that is: one problem concerning the internal matters of the Muslim community, and the other three problems closely relating to problems outside the Muslim community.

In this situation, the Muslim leaders began to realize the importance of utilizing new methods and devices in their struggle. It was understandable then that they adopted such modern weapons as political and non-political organizations and non-cooperation in their effort to achieve their goal, instead of using military force.

Nevertheless, there were two currents of opinion within the Muslim community in directing its activities to attain the Islamic interests. Whereas one opinion favored the political field as the proper place for carrying out its activities, the other opinion stressed operating in the non-political field. In other words, if in the first opinion political power was the primary method, the reconstruction of the Muslim community was of prime importance in the second opinion. As a result, we can see the emergence of Muslim organizations both political and non-political in the

Indonesian society. Although each of these two kinds of organization strove in its own field, cooperation was achieved. But, as time went by, there was room for rivalry between two positions. This situation was cleverly manipulated by the opponents of Islam, who played Muslim leaders against each other. This of course weakened the Muslim community and also hampered the achievement of its goal.

Realizing that this kind of situation benefited their opponents, the Muslim leaders then began to unite their strength and power. This effort found its expression in the establishment of the Masjumi Party, which functioned as the spokesman of the Muslim community.

It is true that before the establishment of the Masjumi Party as a political party, the Muslim community had undergone a similar experience in having the _Sarekat Islam_ as its only Muslim political party. But in contrast to the _Sarekat Islam_, the Masjumi Party was established at the time when the Muslim leaders had already become members of various Muslim political parties and organizations. Another difference is that in the Masjumi Party both intellectuals and the _culamā'_ were entrusted with the leadership of the party. Moreover, it uniquely embodied the two main streams of thought in the Muslim community that is, the modernist and the traditionalist. Its organizational structure made this party unprecedented in the history of Muslim political organization.

It is also true that before the setting up of the Masjumi Party, the Masjumi as a federation of Muslim socio-religious and educational organizations, was established at the time of the Japanese occupation. But contrasted to this Masjumi Party, that prewar Masjumi was a non-political

party and it was set up by the Japanese authority to support its effort to win the Pacific war. Besides that, no one of the Muslim political leaders was given chance to take part in its leadership. All of the prewar Masjumi leaders were recruited from the Muslim religious leaders or ^{c}ulamā'.

Even though it should not be misleading because the emergence of the Masjumi Party in the Indonesian political scene was not an accidental event, it was really a continuation of a series of Indonesian Muslim community struggles begun centuries ago.[5] So in this respect it may be regarded as one of the lasting efforts on the part of the Muslim community to express its political aspirations.

The importance of this party (besides its function as the spokesman of the Muslim community and the manifestation of its unity, solidarity and political aspirations as was explained above) may also be seen in its political strength in mobilizing the masses of the Indonesian people, especially in the rural areas at the time of the Indonesian revolution. By the influence of its ^{c}ulamā' and kijahis (religious teachers and leaders), this party had proved itself to be able to persuade thousands of Indonesian people in every age of life, especially the young Muslims, to sacrifice their lives in resisting the Dutch and Allied armies on the battle field. This sacrifice had been admitted both by the Indonesian people and by the Dutch authority and its Allies. Besides that, the importance of its political position may also be observed in the fact that its political opponents ceaselessly undertook to utilize every possible effort to diminish its political power and blockade its improvement until the time was ripe for

them to launch the finishing blow. This was honestly acknowledged by one Western scholar who said that much of Indonesian political history may be interpreted in terms of the ceaseless effort of the political opponents of the Masjumi Party to eliminate the political strength of the latter.[4] It is quite understandable because, as long as this party was still powerful and functioned as the only means for the concentration of all Muslim community strength - as was the case at the time of its establishment and briefly in the following years - its political opponents ~~were~~ had difficulty to strengthen their political power.

Those are the reasons why this study centers on the discussion of the Masjumi Party. But this does not mean that this study will concentrate its attention on the political role of this party, because that study had already been done by another writer. While discussing some of its political aspects and organization, this study will concentrate its focus, however, on the internal situation of this party and try to follow its early development and seek the internal forces operating within the party but still hidden below the surface. Therefore, this study will elaborate factors that influenced the development of the party and which are to be found within the party itself. It will further explore the ways in which these factors directed the early years of the party's development.

In other words, this study will discuss in more detail the leadership of this party and to what extent cooperation among its leaders, who were recruited from two elite groups in the Muslim community that is, the Muslim intellectuals and the *ʿulamāʾ*, was maintained during its early development. In addition, this study will try to demonstrate the extent

to which the integrating factors within the party operated successfully in facing the disintegrating factors both inside and outside the party. So by this examination, it is hoped that readers will gain considerable knowledge about some aspects of one of the Muslim political parties in Indonesia, how it worked and why it was regarded as a dreaded rival by its opponents. With this knowledge, readers may also follow the activities of the Indonesian Muslim community through its political organization over a given time and see to what extent the Muslim community succeeded in maintaining its strength and unity throughout this party's early development.

The delimitation of this discussion are based on the following considerations:

The period between 1945-1952 is the period in which the Masjumi Party became an important political factor in Indonesian politics. In this period the Masjumi Party had its representatives in almost all of the Indonesian cabinets and in no less than two of Indonesian cabinets, its leaders became Prime Minister i.e., in Natsir Cabinet and Sukiman Cabinet.

Also this period is marked by the fact that Nahdlatul Ulama, which could be regarded as the spokesman of the traditionalist current of thought in the Muslim community, still joined the party as it's special collective member. Last but not least, the year after 1952 or more precisely since September 1952, the Masjumi Party adopted a new constitution through which the dualistic character of its leadership ended. This new constitution abolished the portfolio of the presidency of the party and

therefore the Dewan Partai or Party Council and Muktamar Partai or Party Congress were no longer presided over by the President of the party but directly by the Chairman of Dewan Pimpinan Partai or the Executive Council of the party. Besides that, on August 30, 1952, the Nahdlatul Ulama had officially declared itself to be an autonomous Muslim political party. By these two important occasions taking place within the party, the Masjumi Party then underwent a new phase in its development.

Thus, this study will be divided into three Chapters. In Chapter One, a preliminary discussion of the Indonesian nationalist movement and Islamic political organization along with the colonial period will be given to illustrate the historical background of this party. In Chapter Two the discussion will concentrate on the history of the emergence of the Masjumi Party, its organization and political program. In the third Chapter the treatment will focus on the party leadership, the role of the ᶜulamā' in this party leadership. It also will discuss the effect that appeared within the party on the role of the ᶜulamā', as a result of such a conflict.

Finally, it is also hoped that this study will contribute, to some extent, a greater understanding about the Masjumi Party and will in some or another way rectify the lack of information that we possess concerning this party.

FOOTNOTES

[1]H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 25. Perhaps this is one of the best books written by a Western scholar in elaborating the contemporary of Islam, especially concerning the main streams of reformist thoughts in Islam. In this connection, he seemed to stress the role of Muhammad ʿAbduh as the foremost spokesman of modernism. According to Gibb, one of ʿAbduh's efforts in introducing his reformist ideas is "to isolate the religious element in the reform movement from the emotional influences of the revolutionary or nationalist program." "The effect of his teaching," Gibb points out, "was to separate the religious issues from the political conflict, so that (even though they might continue to be associated) they were no longer interdependent and each was set free to develop along its own apropriate lines."

[2]See John Bastin and Harry J. Benda, A History of Modern Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 106. This book contains valuable materials about the development of Southeast Asian countries from the time of their colonial period and the rise of Nationalist movements until the period of their decolonization. The authors describe the growth of the colonial regimes, the response of Southeast Asian countries toward the challenge of the West, the crucial period of the Japanese occupation, and the difficulties that appeared as the result of modern decolonization. The extent that the penetration of Western culture into the Southeast Asian countries brought about fundamental changes in their tradition and culture is described by the authors: "Western colonialism, though diverting much of Southeast Asian life from its peculiar, indigenous course, did not necessarily cancel out age-old traditions and institutions."

[3]K. Taufiqurrahman, "Masjumi dimasa lampau (Lima tahun Partai Politik Islam Masjumi)" in Indonesia dalam Pembanguuan (Djakarta: Panitya Muktamar Masjumi ke V, 1951), p.9

[4]See G. J. Pauker, "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," in Far Eastern Survey, XVII, no.9,1958, p. 134.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by a period of upheaval in many parts of African and Asian countries; notably in Egypt, Turkey, China, Japan and the Philippines. This is no wonder since such a situation was nothing but a common phenomenon of the twentieth century; the latter was regarded as the century of the rise of the Eastern nations and may be contrasted with the nineteenth century which was considered the age of technology which Western imperialism utilized for the benefit of its interests. On the other hand this century belonged to the Eastern people who by taking advantage of Western technical knowledge and science wanted to free themselves from the shackles of Western colonialism and imperialism.

This situation also affected Indonesia; although geographically it is separated from the outside world by its surrounding waters, its spiritual and political life were affected by the currents of modern thought prevalent elswhere. In this context it is not far from the truth if we say that the Indonesian nationalist movement intending to free Indonesia from the colonial ties, in reality was a link in a long chain of a revolutionary movement in the world interacting with each other.[1]

This movement may be regarded on the part of the Eastern nations as a rejection of and a reaction to the truth embodied in a view which was held fast by Western imperialist power until nineteenth century.

This opinion, advocating the superiority of the Western colonial over the Eastern people, was based on the assumption that "the colored people were created for the purpose of being slaves and were intended to remain the people of colonized countries."[2]

In the name of spreading Western civilization and leading the colored people toward a more civilized world, the Western colonial nations were able to justify their exploitation of African and Asian countries. It became common among the imperialist camp to legislate social reform in favor of the colonized people whenever they felt their power was in a critical condition. But once this crisis dissipated, they forgot it and began to strengthen their position. Against this background perhaps one can understand the description given by Mohammad Hatta when he wrote pertaining the disappointment of the colored people at the treatment they got from the colonialist rulers promising them the rignt of self determination. To put it in his own words:

> But what a disillusionment this trick policy was to the childish trust of the oppressed peoples! Instead of keeping a promise once so solemnly made, what the world saw was the bloody drama of Amritsar in India and the Dyeristic equivalent in Egypt, the Garut affair in Indonesia, not to speak of the new colonial partition, of England's attempts at new expeditions in Afghanistan and Persia and the private partition of the last remains of Turkey's 'independence' in the form of spheres of influence among the 'big' three, England, France and Italy on the basis of the 'tripartite agreement' ....Even China, which had fought on the side of the Entente in the World War, could scarcely count on being treated decently.[3]

As a result, the colonized people were disillusioned by this unexpected treatment from the colonialist rulers. This in turn brought

about a change in their mentality in the sense that it created in them a feeling of self respect and confidence. Consequently, they wanted to seek their salvation through their own strength and ability.

In this context we can best appreciate the emergence of the Indonesian nationalist movement to free their country from colonial rule. Although it can not be denied that the emergence of this movement was caused by the existing unpleasant conditions prevalent at that time - whether social, political, economical and cultural;[4] however, it is also accurate to say that some of those factors were derived from external forces.

To get a proper insight into the nature of the Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia, perhaps the description given by one of the Dutch leaders is worth of noting. He said that the Dutch government not only ruled Indonesia for the sake of rule, but it also had a moral responsibility to carry out its '<u>mission sacrée</u>' toward the Indonesian people. Thus he says:

> By the 'rule' we must not chiefly understand administration and legislation, and certainly not these alone, but, first and foremost, the guidance of a people along paths that may lead to healthy elevation of the standard of the whole of their social, economic, intellectual, and ethical life in harmony with their physical and psychical capabilities.[5]

This statement, although showed great concern for the all-round development of the Indonesian people, remained just a written one and was never put into practice. This example may be illustrated in one sector of the so-called promised reform, i.e., in the intellectual field. More than 25 years after the said statement was made public that

is, in 1940, Jeanne S. Mintz pointed out that there were still 93 per cent of illiterate Indonesian people. Only 240 Indonesians out of a total of seventy million, graduated from high school which offered a Western education. She went on to explain that it was not necessary to elaborate on the university education since it was only after the first World War that the college training became available and there again, the Dutch students were given preference. In this same year, there were only 630 Indonesians enrolled in the college registers and far much lesser if we compare this number to that of Indonesian students who studied at the universities in Holland.[6] Consequently, one may conclude that their promise of reforming was just a lip service and whatever effort made by the colonial rulers to promote the standard of life of their colonized people was, in fact, just for the sake of their own interest.

After undergoing the bitterness and uneasy feeling of their failure in resisting the Dutch colonial rulers by force, the Indonesian people then changed their tactics and strategy and opted for more effective weapons such as political organization, non-cooperation, political campaign and the like in their struggle to achieve Indonesian freedom. Their prior efforts like the Java, Aceh, Padri and Banjar wars were fruitless. Unable to attain their goals, they suffered mentally and physically. Most of the Indonesian leaders fell victims resulting from the brutality of the Dutch colonial measures. This situation affected the policy of struggle of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

It goes without saying that this new effort was mainly initiated by those who had Western education or at least by those who had contacts

with the Western world. In this context we can understand why one of the Western scholars wrote that the Indonesian nationalist movement was mostly urban in character rather than rural. Further more, he said that only in urban area one could benefit the Western education. Since only in these areas the spread of education and Western knowledge can clearly be observed. Here again, he continued, the growth of study group whose members were recruited from the young generation including those from the aristocratic class could be noticed. Through these study groups nationalist aspirations spread among the nation.[7]

To get more explanation about the character of the Indonesian city at the time of colonial period, the description given by Van der Kroef perhaps, is worth of noting. He says:

> In the colonial period the cities of Indonesia were politically and culturally dominated by the European element and came to constitute Westernized enclaves, where the native population perforce lived in altogether different circumstances from the rural areas. Special quarters for other Oriental groups such as the Chinese tended to emphasize the high degree of differentiation between the races.[8]

From the aforementioned statement it is obvious that only a small number of Indonesian people benefited from the city life with all its facilities and comfort. Most of these people belonged to the aristocratic class or were sons of civil servants. Hence, it is understandable that the first national movement appeared in Indonesia as the Budi Utomo or Noble Endeavor which was founded by those of the aristocratic class. Concomitantly the establishment of Perhimpunan Indonesia or Indonesian Association by Indonesian students in Holland, in 1908, was of prime importance. Though

this Association did not play a direct political role in Indonesia yet, its efforts advocating Indonesian nationalist aspirations abroad cannot be neglected. It can be proved by the fact that as early as 1927 it put forward a resolution in favor of the Indonesian nationalist movement which was adopted in the Anti-Colonial congress of Brussels; namely demanding Dutch colonial rulers to grant reforms for their colonized people in Indonesia.[9]

In fact, avidity for Western education and knowledge, was not only limited to the higher classes of the Indonesian society but also affected the middle classes. The latter were recruited mostly from the Muslim traders and civil servants. So if the Western knowledge then had found its secular expression in <u>Budi Utomo</u> and <u>Perhimpunan Indonesia</u>, it also manifested itself in the religious form in the founding of the <u>Muhammadijah</u> and <u>Sarekat Islam</u> in 1912.[10]

It was initially intended by the Dutch colonial rulers that by introducing the Western education to the Indonesian people that a new younger Indonesian generation can be formed. This new generation would then be freed from subservience to <u>adat</u> (Indonesian custom and practice) and Islam alike and as a result a new society would of course appear on the surface.[11] Unfortunately this plan, in fact, did not produce the desired effect. Without being aware, Western education also did play, said J. D. Legge, "its part in strengthening the modernistic strain within Indonesian Islam, which ... was concerned to strip from Islam the accretions which had come to obscure the purity of its doctrine, and to seek some kind of adjustment between the faith itself and modern

thought." In his final analysis Legge came to the conclusion that "the modernist movement in the end was to become a distinct and major threat to the colonial regime, for it was through modernism that Islam was able to contribute to, and to share in, nationalist thought and organization."[12] So in this respect we can comprehend why such organizations like the Muhammadijah and Sarekat Islam as had been mentioned above were regarded as the Muslim modernist movement. While the Muhammadijah operated in non-political field, the Sarekat Islam, conversely, directed its activities in the political one.

It is interesting to note that both Budi Utomo and Muhammadijah were intellectual in character because both of them sought to harmonize Western knowledge for the benefit of their own interest. This character was of course alien to the masses of the people and therefore it is understandable that both of them did not attract much appeal to the people. Fortunately this deficiency was remedied by Sarekat Islam who had a double character both rural and urban.

This Sarekat Islam had as a core a membership of merchants who chose religion as the basis for their organization; it is the reason why it succeeded in attracting the masses of the people of the lower classes, that is, farmers, industrial labourers as well as the middle class. In this respect it can be said that the religious concept strengthened the national sentiment enormously and it welded an effective form of solidarity embracing the whole complex of activities of that group. The rapid growth of Sarekat Islam can also be explained, according to Benda, by two factors: from its radical platform and from the fact that it happened to emerge "at

a time when its ill-defined and manifold appeals could serve to give expression to a multitude of forces at work within Indonesian society."[13]

If Benda pointed out that the radical attitude of Sarekat Islam was one of the factors that attracted the masses of the people, Von der Mehden, on the other hand, stressed that it was mainly because of its Islamic character that this Sarekat Islam, obtained a great deal of membership. Furthermore, he said that many reasons could be "assembled to explain the drawing power of Islam, including an increasing interest in Islam as religion." To the above reasons, he, then, mentioned also "the association of the ratu adil (belief in a coming Messiah) with Tjokroaminoto [the Chairman of Sarekat Islam] and Sarekat Islam, the use of Islam as a national symbol by the leadership of the S.I., the reaction to missionary activities, the concurrence of religious and economic interests among hadjis [returned Mecca pilgrims] , and reactions to Dutch clerical policies."[14] Finally he came to the conclusion that although it was true that the majority of the leaders of Sarekat Islam looked upon Islam more as a political instrument rather than as an ideal but it was also true that Sarekat Islam was able to "blind the desparate population of the Indies together through Islamic religion."[15]

Turning to the effect of Western education on the Indonesian young generation, as was touched upon previously, it can also be explained that if on the one hand Western education did succeed in alienating most young Indonesian generation both from adat and Islam, on the other hand they also, "torn between the harsh reality of colonialism

and the egalitarian and libertarian promises of Western education, turned into vociferous opponents of the colonial status quo."[16] Thus on the whole we can say that Western education created two groups of Indonesian leaders, one Westernised influenced, the other Islamic oriented. Both these groups were vehemently anti Dutch colonial rulers. These two emerging groups which we can also call the secular nationalists and the Islamic nationalists; however, despite large areas of common ground, they had still different basis. And against the background of the competition of the two groups to achieve their own interest, among other things, that the Muslim political parties, including Sarekat Islam and then the Masjumi, were created by the Muslim community.

How far the real position of Sarekat Islam in playing its role both in the Muslim community and in the society in general may be understood by the description of Benda when he says:

> Yet its vociferous protest against the colonial status quo, its loudly voiced economic and social grievances, and its impatient demands for increased autonomy did combine nationalist and Islamic aspirations, however vaguely elaborated, into a uniquely Indonesian, and increasingly militant, political platform."[17]

Until 1923 Sarekat Islam was the only mass Indonesian political party which became the symbol of the national Indonesian political movemement and unity as well as the outlet of accumulated tension of a decade of rural disturbances and urban proletariat's strikes. Also, through this Sarekat Islam, the Muslim community channeled their political aspirations. When in 1923 the left wing of the party was expelled from Sarekat Islam, the strength of national movement was automatically

divided. As a result Sarekat Islam most likely turned itself to the Pan Islamic propaganda and this was one of the reasons why its name was transformed into Partai Sarekat Islam. Under the strong influence of the ideals of Greater Indonesia, then it changed again its name into Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia or P.S.I.I. [18]

Because of internal dissension between its leaders it seemed that the unity within the party could no longer be maintained and as a result a split was inevitable. Thus, in 1932 a new Islamic political party called PARII or Partai Islam Indonesia was established by a former P.S.I.I. leader, Dr Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, and his followers. From that time the P.S.I.I. was no longer the only Muslim political party in Indonesia. In fact, the process of disintegration did not cease within the P.S.I.I. In 1936 another split occured when another prominent P.S.I.I. leader H. A. Salim, left the party and established his own party Gerakan Penjadar. In 1937 the PARII because of some reasons connected with the P.S.I.I., but in 1938 its leaders left again the P.S.I.I. for the second time. By this action the PARII party was revived however under the new abbreviated name i.e., P.I.I. rather than PARII. Its complete name did not change i.e., Partai Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic Party. In this same year P.S.I.I. underwent another split when one of its leaders i.e., Sekarmadji Kartosuwirjo left the party and set up a new party called Komite Pembela Kebenaran P.S.I.I. or K.P.K.P.S.I.I. [19]

Accordingly, it was obvious, that by 1938, there were not less than 4 Muslim political parties voicing the political aspirations of the Muslim community. Although, it is true that there was another Muslim

political party called Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia or Permi which was established in 1932 at Padang Panjang, West Sumatra. But because of the oppression of the Dutch colonial rulers toward its leaders, it disappeared from the political scene by the mid-1930's. So until the collapse of the Dutch colonial rulers in the earlier months of 1942, the above mentioned four Muslim political parties still operated until all of them were abolished by the Japanese occupation authority along with the other political parties and organizations.

It is interesting to note the fact that although the Muslim community became the majority of the Indonesian people they were under represented in the People's Council or Volksraad. Only one out of total number 60 members ~~who~~ represented the Islamic group. Compared with Muslim political parties with only one representative in this Council, the Christian political parties had 8 representatives.

From this fact one may observe how far the democratic system had been carried out by the Dutch colonial rulers and it is not far from exaggerating perhaps if we say that along with the Dutch colonial period, the Muslim community became the main victim of this colonial system. It is true that at least until 1939 the total number of the Indonesian members in this Council was more than that of Europeans and Foreign Oriental as the following margin shows: 30 Natives, 25 Europeans and 5 Foreign Oriental,[21] but the fact that the Muslim community was under represented indicates that the cause of Islam was totally neglected. In this case we can understand the explanation given by Benda when he says: "the ludicrous inadequacy of Islamic representation had been

forcefully brought home to Muslim leaders in the course of the <u>Volksraad</u> debates accompanying the passage of injurious ordinances ...." [22]

The fact that all the other <u>Volksraad</u> members had little interest to the cause of Islam strengthen the opinion among Muslim leaders that Islamic cause could only be fought by themselves. Viewed from the Islamic standpoint the majority of Indonesian members in the Volksraad had no significance at all. They were still disappointed with their political position within the Council and this disappointment seemed to be the desired result ~~as~~ which was intended by the genuine Dutch colonial policy toward Islam.[23]

Besides that, the fact that the Muslim community was always discredited, especially by the Dutch goverment, awoke in them self respect and self confidence leading to mobilize all their potentialities and strengths. Additionally, the positive effect of this disgraceful treatment drove them to unite to fight for the Islamic cause.[24] Against this background perhaps one can easily apprehend the setting up of the Muslim federation called <u>Madjelis Islam A'laa Indonesia</u> or M. I. A. I. in 1937, in which all important Muslim political and non-political organizations were affiliated ~~to~~. In this federation, Muslim leaders planned a strategy in line with the needs of the Muslim community struggle at that time. To carry out such a program it was regarded as necessary by the Muslim leaders to hold <u>Kongres al-Islam</u> in which all Muslim groups within the Muslim community could send their representatives whether they were members of the M.I.A.I. or not. In this congress the Muslim community interests were discussed.

This congress, among other things, took upon itself the task to protect Islam and Muslims from the attacks of their rivals. Two years after the establishment of the M.I.A.I. a new federation composed of all Indonesian political parties was also established. This federation was called Gabungan Politik Indonesia or Gapi. Muslim political parties also joined this new federation. It demanded, according to Kahin, "(1) the right of self determination for Indonesia, (2) national unity founded upon political, economic and social democracy, (3) a democratically elected Indonesian parliament responsible to the people of Indonesia; and (4) solidarity between Indonesian political groups and Netherlands in order to maintain a strong anti-Fascist front."[25]

Together with Gapi, the M.I.A.I. demanded Indonesian independence from the Dutch government. In this connection a program of Indonesia Berparlemen or a parliament for Indonesia was launched by Gapi; this program became its political slogan. The M.I.A.I. strongly backed this program but added that such program should also pay attention to Islamic interests. Therefore the M.I.A.I. requested that the membership of the proposed parliament must be composed of the majority of the Muslim leaders. Also, it claimed the establishment of a ministry for Islamic Affairs in the forthcoming Indonesian state; additionally it demanded that the head of that state should be a Muslim.[26]

The above Indonesian nationalist program was launched in 1940 but not until 1942 had a positive response received from the Dutch government. The only response got then was that such program was

considered too premature by the Dutch government. Consequently we may conclude by saying that, any sort of constitutional reform could not be implemented in the Netherland Indies.

Being frustrated by the Dutch colonial rulers, the Indonesian people then took an impartial position when the Japanese invasion threatened the survival of the Dutch colonial authority in Indonesia. By March 1942 the fate of the Dutch colonial rulers was sealed and as the result, Indonesia underwent a new phase in its historical and political development.

For the first years of the occupation, the Japanese initiated a mass movement under their own auspices by cooperating with the Muslim leaders. However, they adopted the same policy of the Dutch colonial period. Their policy implied the separation between the religious and political matters. To carry out their policy the Japanese from the very beginning had outlawed all the Indonesian organizations including Muslim political parties. In its place, the Japanese established all embracing and centralized organization in which all the Muslim leaders were integrated and through which the huge Muslim mass might easily be moved in the desired direction.[27] To meet this need they revived the prewar M.I.A.I. in 1942, however for various reasons the M.I.A.I. was banished by the Japanese and was replaced by the Masjumi or Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) in 1943. As was intended by its "founders", i.e., the Japanese, this Masjumi was not a political organization. It was a federation of Muslim non-political organizations

which were allowed by the Japanese authority to continue their activities under some conditions. These were the Muhammadijah with its headquarter at Jogyakarta, Nahdlatul Ulama or N.U. at Jombang in East Java, Persatuan Ummat Islam Indonesia or P.U.I.I. at Sukabumi in West Java and Perikatan Ummat Islam or P.U.I. at Ceribon (West Java).[28]

By the establishment of the Masjumi it seemed that the control of the Japanese authority was more intensive than ever before towards the Muslim community. The aims of this federation:

> to strengthen the ties between the Muslim organizations in Java and Madura, to lead their activities and take care of these, to improve cultural life so as to make the whole Muslim community help and give a real effort towards the realization of the Great East-Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere under Japanese leadership, in accordance with God's commandments.[29]

In short we can say that the aim of this federation was to strengthen the unity of all Islamic organizations and aid the Japanese or Dai Nippon in the interest of Greater East Asia.

Prior to the establishment of the Masjumi, in March 1942, the Japanese set up one separate body called the Religious Affairs Office in which, all religious matters were handled and settled. The activities of this Office penetrated so deeply into the Muslim community that it seemed that no Muslim activities could avoid its control. For this Office, the Muslim leaders who composed it, were mostly of the ᶜulamā' and kijahis. Through them the Japanese propaganda to mobilize the masses was carried out effectively. Thus, no wonder that the Japanese authority directed their attention

to these religious leaders in order to obtain a firm footing on the Indonesian soil. They hoped that this group would be utilized as, according to Aziz, the proper intermediary for re-interpreting Japanese ideas and aims into Indonesian idioms so that the masses of the people would be well informed.[30]

One of the Religious Affairs Office activities, for example, was to carry out the training course for the ^c^ulamā' and kijahis. The purpose of this training may be easily depicted, that is, to indoctrinate those religious leaders in order to get their fullest support, to defend the country and to win the 'Holy War' as was conceived of by the Japanese.

As time went by such training was not only limited to the ^c^ulamā' but also the Muslim youths were given the same training. Hence, in order to intensify their propaganda program and to mobilize the Indonesian people as many as possible, the Japanese set up a kind of a paramilitary Muslim youth corp called Hizbullah under the supervision of the Masjumi.The purpose of its establishment was nothing but to function as reserve units or as a religious vanguard for the Home defence Army.[31]

Therefore by creating the Religious Affairs Office, the Masjumi, the paramilitary Muslim youth corp and by incorporating rural religious leaders and teachers with the Japanese propaganda machine, the short-lived Japanese interregnum gave a tremendous shift in their colonial policy comparing to that of the Dutch colonial rulers. Whereas in principle both Dutch colonial and the Japanese occupation rulers had

the same theoretical basis, namely, the separation of religious and political affairs, its implementation by the Japanese initiated a bold political experiment which Dutch colonial rulers never dared to do. By adopting such a policy the Japanese provided the Muslim leaders, according to our some source, "unprecedented opportunities ... with enhanced stature and bargaining strength vis-à-vis other elite groups" both in Java and in parts of Sumatra. The real benefit for the Muslim community was, according to the same source that the Muslim leaders' activities "combined to steer into religious channels the increasingly turbulent movement toward independence that emerge in the last year of the Japanese interregnum,"[32] especially the movement to make Indonesia a Muslim state.

It seems that the co-operation given by the Muslim leaders to the Japanese military authority was to support the Japanese effort. In fact such co-operation was only a sort of political tactic by which the Muslim leaders could utilize the Japanese power to make social life, especially in Java and in Indonesia in general, conform more closely to the teachings of Islam. In a statement given by a prominent Muslim leader we can therefore justify the genuine intention of such co-operation on the part of the Muslim leaders. He said: "My great ambition is that as soon as possible an Asian Islamic religious conference shall be held so that Muslims all over Asia may be brought together to the idea of Great Asia. In this way Islam will certainly spread widely throughout Asia." [33]

After observing the Japanese activities to seek Indonesian support in the interest of their war effort, it is interesting to note the fact that the Japanese were more likely to cooperate with the Muslim leaders rather than the secular nationalist ones. Was it that the Muslim leaders were more anti Dutch and its Allies, and therefore were more willing to be their collaboration than the secular nationalist leaders? Whatever the reason may have been, the fact that the Muslim leaders continued to hold considerable influence over the mass population at the rural areas level after the collapse of the Dutch colonial rulers,[34] and that "the occupation forces," according to Benda, "included a small but energetic contingent of Japanese Muslims... who established the requisite contacts with leaders ... of the Islamic movement,"[35] is apt to be taken into consideration. But the plausible reason, the present writer thinks, is that which was presented by Aziz when he says: "The Japanese considered Islam as one of the most effective means to penetrate into the spiritual recesses of Indonesian life and to infuse the influence of their own ideas and ideals at the bottom of the society."[36]

To get more effective support on the part of the Indonesian people in their war effort, the Japanese then established in 1943 a sort of People's Council called in Japanese Tyoo Sangi In or the Central Advisory Board.[37] In many respect this new body, according to Anderson, unlike its predecessor the Volksraad, was not allowed to criticize the existing regime. Thus it can also be said that "it was supposed to act as a purely advisory body, answering 'question'

put to it by the military government."[38]

Until its seven session or more precisely until May 1945, this Tyoo Sangi In had 75 members, but surprisingly enough, the Islamic group was under represented. Only six of its 75 members could be regarded as the representatives of Islamic group. They were K. H. A. Halim, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, K. H. M. Mansur, K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, R. Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and R. Wiwoho Purbohadidjojo.[39] Compared to that of the Volksraad, however, this representation relatively shows some improvement. From the above Muslim representatives, perhaps only Wiwoho could be regarded as the Muslim political leader who had already got the political training and skills in the administrative matters. From the educational background of these leaders one can observe that the Japanese intentionally favored the choice of rural religious leaders and ignored that of Islamic urban elite.

The sympathetic policy towards the Muslim community in the first few years of the Japanese occupation period raised a sort of opposition on the part of the secular nationalist leaders, especially in Tyoo Sangi In. As a result several moves were launched by them to attack such a policy. The fact that one of the resolutions of this body which aimed at liquidating the autonomous right of the Masjumi was one of the manifestation of this attitude. This resolution of course was strongly opposed by the Masjumi on the basis that it may have lost its autonomy and it also meant that the Masjumi would have been placed under the control of the secular nationalist leaders.[40] Although Masjumi finally succeeded in their efforts to retain their

position. they failed to persuade the Japanese to enforce the latter's old policy.

Nevertheless, as time went on, in fact, the political development turned in favor of the Indonesian secular nationalist group. Consequently, a shift in the Japanese policy was inevitable. This change was due partly because of the deteriorating situation undergone by the Japanese force in the Pacific war and partly because of the continuing effort on the part of the secular nationalist leaders to consolidate their interest.

The change of the Japanese policy toward Islam was officially confirmed by a govermental decree read by the Head of the General Affairs Department, General Nishimura on May 13, 1945.

> As far as the position of religion in the new government is concerned, let me say that the attitude of the Military Administration with regard to this matter could be compared to a sheet of white paper. While we very clearly appreciate the bonds which exist between the Indonesian people and Islam, the Dai Nippon authorities have not the slightest blueprint or plan concerning the place which the Islamic religion should occupy in the government, or what the relationship should be between Islam an other religions. As I already explained to you, gentlemen, the Indonesian people must realize its own ideals in establishing its new state - Nippon will only lend its aid in these endeavors ... I believe that the Indonesian people itself fully understands and thoroughly appreciates what, in this connection, best suits and accords with the situation on Java ... and all over Indonesia at this time.[41]

By this declaration it is apparent that the Japanese Military Authority assumed complete neutrality on religious questions. In other words, it can be interpreted that since that time, the Indonesian people were given the responsibility to settle the question

concerning the place of Islam in the forthcoming independent Indonesia. For the Muslim community such decree was felt as a heavy blow because for it meant nothing. Their great hope of setting up an Indonesian Muslim State with the cooperation of the Japanese was over.[42]

In 1944 a new mass movement called Djawa Hōkōkai (People's Service Association on Java) was established by the Japanese. This movement was intentionally set up by the Japanese Military Authority to replace the former mass movement, the Triple A Movement or Pergerakan Tiga A which was established in 1942 and then abolished in 1943, the Putera movement which was set up to replace the Triple A in 1943 but then was also abolished in 1944. Both Pergerakan Tiga A and Putera were created by the Japanese to indoctrinate the mass Indonesian people in order to support them in their struggle against the Allies. Facing the fact that these two movements served the interests of the Indonesian nationalist rather than becoming the tool of the Japanese, thus both of them were abolished and replaced by the Djawa Hōkōkai.[43]

This new movement was comprised of all other organizations previously created by the Japanese except the Masjumi. It was not a nationalist organization but rather a conglomeration between all free inhabitants of Java and Madura and the Japanese authority could established. The purpose of this movement was the same as that of its predecessors, that is, to support the Japanese to win the "Holy War" and to protect the country.[44]

In September 1944, the Japanese Government in Tokyo by means

of its Premier Kuniaki Koiso, promised to grant Indonesia its independence. The reasons for giving such a promise among others were, according to Anderson, because of the necessity of the Japanese authority to get much more support and friendly cooperation from the Indonesian people and also because of the deteriorating situation in the Japanese Pacific war.[45] This promise, then, was again repeated but rather more explicitly on March 1, 1945, when the Japanese announced their decision to establish a committee called Badan Penjelidik Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence) or B.P.K.I. The purpose of this committee was to plan and make the necessary effort in facing the forthcoming of the independent Indonesia. As a reaction to above mentioned decree, the Masjumi called upon their members to prepare Muslims for the liberation of their country and religion. The committee which was set up following that announcement, was then instituted in Jakarta on April 1945. It numbered 62 members including Indonesian leaders who belonged to Islamic group. The Japanese appointed Dr Radjiman Wirjodiningrat as its chairman. In this body the Islamic group was represented primarily by 7 members out of the above 62 its total members.[46]

Realizing that their power and strength had increased considerably during the time of occupation, the Muslim leaders now had the task to defend Islamic interests in this committee. It was in this committee that the clash of interests between secular nationalists and Islamic group can be observed more clearly. This committee

had two plenary sessions that is, on May 28 - June 1, 1945 and on July 10 - 17, 1945. The questions that were discussed, among others, concerned economic and constitutional matters. The first session of this committee was devoted only to discuss one subject, namely, the basis of the forthcoming Indonesian state. In other words, the question of the relationship between state and religion. During this first session, it seemed that all efforts of its members were made to solve this main controversial problem. The question debated was: "Should the forthcoming Indonesian state be based on Pantja Sila[47] or Islam?" It became obvious that the two camps could not come into agreement in tackling such a question. As it was to be expected the Islamic group favored Islam as its basis in which the Sharī^{c}ah or Islamic law should regulate the forthcoming Indonesian state; while, conversely the secular nationalist group wanted Pantja Sila to be its basis.[48]

It is apparent that, at least for the time being, the conflict between these two groups was finally settled when both of them came to a compromise. This compromise was put in a charter which was called Piagam Djakarta or Jakarta Charter. This Piagam Djakarta was intended to become the Preamble of the Constitution or at least the working paper of it, based upon the provisions of the Pantja Sila, but also including an Islamic provision attached to the first principle, so it reads: "the belief in the Absolute God with the obligation of observing the Islamic teachings on its adherents."[49]

This agreement was the result of the compromise made by the

members of a small committee established by the B.P.K.I. to handle the above crucial problem. This small committee consisted of nine members in which both the Islamic and secular nationalist groups were represented by four and five members respectively.[50]

When this result was reported to the general session of the B.P.K.I., an attempt to modify the Charter was made by the Islamic group on the consideration that it was ambiguous. This modification was finally rejected by the B.P.K.I. during a session arguing that the Charter was a result of a compromise and that was final. So the B.P.K.I. session endorsed the original text without any revision.[51] This compromise, naturally, viewed from the Islamic interest did not satisfy the Muslim community, however it seemed that for the time being, they regarded that Charter as the possible result which could be brought about by the Muslim leaders. They made a promise that they would still continue their struggle in the forthcoming Indonesian state. Moreover in this connection they still felt optimistic of their victory when one of the secular nationalist leaders, Sukarno, according to Anderson, had assured them to give the concession to this direction in the last meeting of the B.P.K.I. [52]

To complete the last preparation for independence for the whole of Indonesia and to speed up the final measures to be taken to that direction, a new committee called Panitija Persiapan-Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) or P.P.K.I. was established by the Japanese in August 1945 to succeed B.P.K.I. This new committee was initially planned

to be inaugurated on August 18, 1945 and the total number of its members were 21 persons. Two of those members represented the Islamic group. Sukarno and Hatta were appointed to be the Chairman and vice-Chairman of this committee.[53] It was planned that the draft of the Constitution for the forthcoming Indonesian independent state will be discussed and then endorsed in this P.P.K.I. What will happen to the P.P.K.I. and how this plan was carried out in the coming P.P.K.I. session will be discussed in the following Chapter.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Mohammad Hatta, Portrait of a Patriot (The Hague and Paris: Mouton & Co., 1972), p. 105. This book contains selected writings of Mohammad Hatta as well as his speeches which ranged from 1923 until 1968. In his foreword for this book Deliar noer commented among others, that Mohammad Hatta can be regarded as the proponent of the socialist ideas. But different from that as advocated by Baars and Sneevliet and other communist leaders, Hatta, Noer stated further, derived his socialist ideas from three sources i.e., "Islam, Indonesia's traditional collectivism and Western democratic socialism." This book is one of the exposition of Hatta's ideas about socialism on which he based his political struggle since he was still a student and then became one of the most prominent Indonesian nationalist leaders. From this book one can also trace back the earlier history of the Indonesian nationalist movement when it was still in inception.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 189.

[4]Sartono Kartodirdjo,"Some Problems on the Genesis of Nationalism in Indonesia," Journal Southeast Asian History, III, No.1 (March 1962), pp. 70-79.

[5]A. W. Nieuwenhuis, "The Batak Institute at Leyden," in G. Spiller, ed., Papers on Inter-Racial Problems (London: P. S. King & Son, 1911), p. 259. This book then was reprinted under the title Inter-Racial Problems with a new introduction by Herbert Aptheker and published by The Citadel Press, New York in 1970. This reprinted book which is available to the present writer.

[6]Jeanne S. Mintz, Indonesia: a Profile (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1961), p. 67. As an introductory book towards the understanding of Indonesia this book gives us a valuable information.

[7]J. M. van der Kroef, Indonesia and the Modern World, vol. I (Bandung: Masa Baru, 1954), p. 63. This book is divided into 2 volumes. It contains collections of van der Kroef's writings which are viewed from a sociologist standpoint. It is composed of various essays ranging from historical, economic, social to political problems.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Dorothy Woodman, The Republic of Indonesia (London: The

Cresset Press, 1955), pp. 160-163.

[10]Leslie H. Palmer, Indonesia and the Dutch (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 14. In this book the author tries to interpret the political situation in Indonesia on the background of the existing conflict between the Javanese ethnic group and non-Javanese. It is stimulating but ought be read critically.

[11]H. J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 50. This book originally was Benda's Ph. D. dissertation at Cornell University. Perhaps this book is one of the best sources concerning the political situation of Indonesian Islam. Although this book centered its discussion on the Japanese occupational period, it also contains two very important chapters concerning Indonesian Islam in the previous decades. Also the analytical study of this book is based on major and full documented data.

[12]J. D. Legge, Indonesia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 122. Although small in size, this book is illumanating. A special chapter on the influence of Islam was devoted by the author in not less than 18 pages. His analytical study and the exposition of his opinion, which were vividly presented, causes this book most readable.

[13]Benda, op.cit., pp. 42-43.

[14]Fred R. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), p. 41. This book gives the important information about the relationship between religion and nationalism in three Southeast Asian countries, Buddhism in Burma, Islam in Indonesia and Christianity in Philippines. As far as Indonesia is concerned the writer also uses sources including English, Dutch, French and Indonesian material. It is a significant book.

[15]Ibid.

[16]See Benda, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

[17]Ibid., p. 43.

[18]Amelz, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto: Hidup dan Perdjuangannja vol. I (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), pp. 134-136. This book is divided into two volumes. Although this book devoted to discuss the history of the life and struggle of the P.S.I.I. leader and chairman, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, it contains valuable material about the history of Indonesian Islam in the Dutch colonial period. Apart from that, it also gives information about the role of P.S.I.I. in the Indonesian

politics especially in its efforts to free Indonesian people from colonialism.

[19]See Kepartaian di Indonesia, a political handbook edited by the Indonesian Ministry of Information in 1951, pp. 34-35. See also Benda, op.cit., p. 226, n. 92. Here, Benda explains that Salim cs left the P. S. I. I. in 1937 and S. Kartosuwirjo in 1940. As far as the reference which was given in Kepartaian Indonesia was derived from the official source of the P.S.I.I. the present writer inclines to rely his information upon this data.

[20]See Political Parties and Movements in the Netherland East Indies, a political study document published by Office of Strategic Services of the United States Government in Washington in 1945, pp. 73-75. Originally this data was classified as confidential but since June 18, 1946 its status was changed into unrestricted data by the Authority. This data was found by the writer at the Wason Library Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. when he was conducting his library research in June and July 1975.

[21]Ibid.

[22]See Benda, op.cit., p. 91.

[23]Ibid.; see also W. F. Wertheim, "Islam Before and After the Elections" in Oey Hong Lee, ed., Indonesia After the 1971 Elections (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 88-89. Here, Wertheim explains that the Dutch colonial rulers adopted the Islamic policy which "consistently relegated that faith Islam _ to a position of relative inferiority." Thus as a result of such policy, in practice put the Indonesian Islam "under strict control and Islamic political expression was viewed with unrelenting suspicion." Therefore, it is no wonder that the position of Islam in Indonesia was always defensive and its representation in the People's Council was under represented.

[24]See for example articles written by M. Natsir in Natsir, Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia (Bandung: Peladjar dan Bulan Sâbit, 1969), pp. 80-94. In these articles Natsir explains the discriminatory attitude on the part of the Dutch colonial rulers towards those who humiliated Islam and its Prophet and those who protected Islam from the attacks of its opponents. He points out how quick the Dutch took measures when some books or articles were written by the Muslim leaders in protecting their religion while such rapid action never been taken towards the non Muslim writers who humiliated Islam.

[25]George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 97. This book may be considered a masterly poineering study about the Indonesian

revolution and nationalism. Scholarly and detailed, it is done in readable fashion and gives the most complete picture of the events and people that have shaped today's Indonesia. It also contains important chapters concerning the prewar colonial society and the early history of nationalism. His accounts about Indonesian revolution were based mainly on his own experience when he was conducting his research there. Therefore it is understandable that his encounter with Indonesian leaders at the time of revolution gave him a lot of opportunity to get first hand sources. This was admitted by Dr Abu Hanifah, one of the Republic of Indonesian leaders, at that time, who says that "nearly everybody of some importance of the Republic of Indonesian leaders had given him some information about things they especially knew about. Possibly no other foreigner had such a golden opportunity to see the Republic from the inside." This account was given by Abu Hanifah in Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972), p. 289. Even though it does not mean that Kahin's book deserves no criticism. For example Bernhard Dahm made his remarks on some of Kahin's opinion and accounts. See Dahm's remarks on this book in B. Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), e.g., in p. 289, n. 45 and p. 276, n. 2. In his preface for the paperback edition of this book in 1970, Kahin responds some of his critics and admits that his book was not purely unbiased. He also explains the reasons leading him to take such a standpoint. Based on the consideration that a new complete book will be written by him about the same subject, Kahin left this paperback edition in its original text as it was published in 1952. The only addition he made is his above preface.

26 Jan M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesie in de Jaren 1930 tot 1942 (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1953), p. 182. This book was written in Dutch by a Dutch scholar. It contains a valuable information about the growth of Indonesian Nationalist movement from 1930 until 1942.

27 Jan M. Pluvier, Confrontation: A Study in Indonesian politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 20.

28 M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 205. Together with Benda's The Crescent ... this writing gives much information concerning Indonesian politics during the Japanese occupation period. This book also discusses the Islamic policy as was carried out by the Japanese authority in Indonesia. Some of its source material were derived from documented information as well as from reports and memoirs.

29 C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 155. This book

contains a series of essays written by an Islamic expert of the former Netherlands government. His accounts about the position of Muslim leaders at the time of Japanese occupation should be read critically.

[30]See Aziz, op.cit., p. 200.

[31]See ibid., pp. 207-208.

[32]See John Bastin and Benda, A History of Modern Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 145-146.

[33]This statement given by K. H. Mas Mansur, a prominent Muslim leader, when he was interviewed by a Japanese journalist as was related in A. Mu^{c}ti ^{c}Ali, "The Muhammadijah Movement: A bibliograhical Introduction" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, McGill University, 1957), p. 136. Wahid Hasjim, a prominent Muslim leader, also admitted that in spite of being the propaganda tool for the Japanese interest, the Muslim leaders succeeded in functioning as the channels for the people's grievances. See for example his account in Aboebakar, Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar (Djakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan Alm. K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957), p.730. This book perhaps a unique book in the sense that although its title suggests that it should deal with the historical life and struggle of Wahid Hasjim, it also covers the material concerning all Muslim social and political organizations. Additionally it also gives biographical data of some Muslim leaders. Besides that it contains material concerning the history of the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs and some of its regulation and instruction as well as it also contains the Masjumi and the N. U. Constitutions. In its first chapter it discusses the history of the coming of Islam in Java and the history of Islamic school or pesantren. Since it covers a variety of material it is no wonder that this book takes no less than 975 pages. In one sense this book can be regarded as a complete book concerning Islam and Muslims in Indonesia but in other ways it is poorly organized and some of its source material were derived from personal information or stories which is difficult to check. Even though, as far as it recorded the authentic data to be the basis of some of its information this book still gives its credit.

[34]J. M. Pluvier, Confrontation ..., p. 22.

[35]See Bastian and Benda, op. cit., p. 145

[36]See Aziz, op. cit., p. 200; see also Nieuwenhuize, op. cit., p. 117.

[37]See Aziz, op. cit., p. 213; see also Kahin, op.cit., p. 106

[38]See Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 10, n. 8. This book contains valuable material about the events concerning the critical situation faced by both the Indonesian leaders as well as the Japanese, when the Allies threatened the survival of Japanese authority in Indonesia. Although this book is a preliminary exploration, as was stated by the author, his discussion in this book is illuminating. By his analytical study, the author succeeded in stimulating the readers to secure the logical relationship between some important events which were neglected before. For example he tried to secure the information about the reasons leading the Japanese ruler to grant independence to Indonesia. Another example, he also tried to analyze the political position of the Muslim group at the time of this critical period.

[39]Ibid., pp. 10-11, n. 18, 19.

[40]Ibid., p. 13.

[41]As quoted in Benda, op. cit., pp. 188-189; see also Anderson, op. cit., p. 32.

[42]See Aboebakar, op. cit., p. 336.

[43]See Kahin, op. cit., p. 110.

[44]See Aziz, op. cit., pp. 222-223.

[45]See Anderson, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[46]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[47]Pantja Sila (Indonesian from Sanskrit). A formulation of five principles put forward by Sukarno on June 1, 1945 before the meeting of B. P. K. I. It was intended to guide and serve as the philosophical foundation of an independent Indonesia. The principles were: belief in one God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy and social justice. For the full contents of his speech, see Sukarno, Lahirnja Pantjasila or the Birth of Pantjasila (Djakarta: Indonesian Ministry of Information, 1960). For the discussion about Pantja Sila see for example, Van der Kroef's essay "Pantjasila" in Van der Kroef, op. cit., vol.II, pp. 198-261.

[48]See B. J. Boland, "The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia," Verhandlingen van het Koninklijk Voor Taal en Volkenkunde, 59 (1971), pp. 19, 23. This book contains the valuable information about the effort on the part of the Muslim community to achieve Islamic interests since the time of Sukarno until at least 1970 when the military group

took the leadership of the country since 1967.

[49] See Anderson, op. cit., pp 26-27; see also Boland, op. cit., p. 23.

[50] The members of this small committee were Sukarno, Hatta, Maramis, Subardjo, Yamin, Kahar Muzakkir, Wahid Hasjim and Agus Salim. The last four were Islamic leaders.

[51] For the complete account about this B. P. K. I. session see Mohammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (Djakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1959), pp. 273-395.

[52] See Ibid.; see also Anderson, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

[53] See Anderson, op. cit., pp. 21, 62-63.

CHAPTER II

THE BIRTH OF THE MASJUMI, ITS ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAM

1. The birth of the Masjumi.

A short description of the political events will be given here to shed some light on the political positions of both the Islamic and the secular nationalist groups at the time of revolution and shortly before the birth of the Masjumi.

It has already been discussed in the previous Chapter that by adopting a new policy toward Indonesian Islam, the Japanese held a neutral position with regard to the question of religion in the forthcoming Indonesian state and let the Indonesian people settle that problem among themselves. Under this new policy, the secular nationalist leaders seemed to feel that it was time for them to make considerable effort to strengthen their influence and power in directing the development of Indonesian politics. It is in this context that the members of the Indonesian delegation (recruited from the secular nationalist group) were sent to discuss the question of transferring Indonesian independence.[1] Also, because of their lack of capability and experience in handling the administrative and political affairs, the Muslim leaders were not able to compete with their rivals. The fact that, on the one hand, the Japanese encouraged the predominance of 'symbol manipulating' mass leaders to be their collaborators while ignoring the young Muslim-Western educated leaders who had the administrative skill and political

experience on the other, contributed to this decline.[2] Moreover, all leading positions given by the Japanese to Indonesians, whether in the administrative offices or in the legislative bodies, were recruited from the secular nationalist leaders. So it is understandable that the responsibility to arrange and prepare the coming of independence was held by men like Sukarno, Hatta and other Indonesian leaders of this group.

Because of their diminishing position in political affairs, the Muslim leaders, except some of them who were engaged in anti-Japanese underground activities,[3] seemed to be inactive in this field. This inactivity can be seen by the political events which took place around the time of proclamation. On 14 of August 1945, Hatta was met by Sjahrir, his old colleague who became an underground movement leader at the time of Japanese occupation. Sjahrir advised him that Indonesian independence should not be proclaimed by the Preparatory Committee but by Sukarno, as the leader of Indonesian people on behalf of the whole of Indonesia. A similar suggestion came also from the Marxist youth underground movement or the Pemudas. For this latter group the seizure of power was more important than the proclamation itself.[4]

Both suggestions were based on the consideration that the proclamation of Indonesian independence must be freed completely from Japanese sponsorship and for these two groups the Preparatory Committee was no more than a Japanese tool. Arguing that at the time of revolution the political decision should be made not only

on the basis of judicial considerations but also on the mature estimation of existing political situations and events, Hatta rejected both suggestions. His opinion was also shared by Sukarno.[5] Having failed to force their ideas on Sukarno and Hatta, the Pemudas kidnapped both of them early in the morning of August 16, 1945 and then released them later in the evening. This incident prevented the Preparatory Committee from holding its meeting which had been planned for the same day by Sukarno and Hatta as its Chairman and vice-Chairman respectively.[6]

After their release, both Sukarno and Hatta were taken back to Jakarta and there they presided over the suspended meeting of the Preparatory Committee later in the night. This meeting decided that Indonesian independence should be proclaimed in the name of the whole of the Indonesian people and that the proclamation - on the suggestion of the youth - should be signed by Sukarno and Hatta.[7] On August 17, 1945, Indonesian independence was proclaimed by Sukarno and Hatta on behalf of the whole Indonesian people. This proclamation was spread over Indonesia as well as the world.

On August 18, the Preparatory Committee met again after undergoing some change in its membership to meet the need of a new situation; thus, they included the representatives of the Pemudas. Its representatives then withdrew from that Committee.[8] This meeting made some major decisions. It was at this meeting that the secular nationalist leaders demonstrated their ability to win the game of competition with the Muslim leaders. It was also in this meeting

that the Muslim leaders realized that the concession given by the secular nationalist leader in the previous session of the B.P.K.I. was only a political tactics to tame their strong opposition.

At this meeting, the Committee approved the final draft Constitution as laid down by the small body of the former B.P.K.I., "while eliminating the obsolete passages with praising Japan's imperial ideals in Asia."[9]

It was agreed that the Jakarta Charter would serve as the Preamble of the Constitution at least as it was conceived of by the Islamic leaders. But what had really happened in the minds of the secular nationalist leaders, after giving their concession as was expressed by Sukarno, one can never be sure. The fact that the opening of this session was postponed by its Chairman, for several hours indicated that some serious attempts were being made by the secular nationalist leaders to solve this crucial problem.[10]

As a result of a compromise, the Jakarta Charter indeed neither satisfied the secular nationalist leaders nor the Muslim leaders. For the latter this compromise, perhaps, would function as a bridge to lead them to achieve their goals but for their contenders it was looked upon as a heavy burden on their shoulders which should be removed as soon as possible. In this light we can understand why Sukarno and Hatta launched their political move at this meeting by approaching one of the Preparatory Committee members i.e., Teuku M. Hassan, the Achehnese representative, and urged him to persuade Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, the strongest supporter of the Islamic position

in the Committee as well as the Chairman of the Muhammadijah at that time on this matter. Hassan then succeeded in convincing the latter that national unity was the most important matter at that time and persuaded him "to accept the virtual elimination of any mention of Islam in the Constitution." [11]

It seems that the latter was faced with the fait accompli presented by the secular nationalist leaders as if the unity of Indonesian people depended only on him. Moreover, the choice of Hassan to be the intermediary in this problem, according to Anderson, indicated the ability of the secular nationalist leaders to manipulate the psychological effect on Ki Bagus Hadikusumo. The Achehnese reputation, he further stated, for religious zeal especially in Java, was apparently enough reason to persuade a man like Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, and this political maneuver finally succeeded in gaining their goals; unanimity then was achieved.[12] So when the Preamble - in which the Islamic provision was omitted - was actually read by Hatta for approval, no protest was raised by the Islamic representatives.

There were several comments given in interpreting this negative reaction. One writer said that it indicated that Muslim leaders showed their new completely subordinate role in the political affairs. It also showed that Sukarno's concession to the Muslim sentiment at the last meeting of the B.P.K.I. was gone.[13]

The other comment came from the Muslim leader who said that the Islamic group did not raise a protest at that time because they

thought that the deep discussion of that matter would be inappropriate in view of the Japanese defeat and the landing of the Allied force.[14] The other possible answer to such a negative attitude can also be seen in the statement given by the wartime Masjumi leader, Wahid Hasjim who, about three months earlier, made his statement describing the position of the Islamic group when the crucial point was at stake between the secular nationalist leaders and the Muslim leaders. He said in his statement that if necessary the Muslim leaders were ready to compromise because, to put in his own words, "what we need most of all at this time is the indissoluble unity of the nation."[15] The other Muslim leader commented that the Muslim leaders at that time believed that Pantja Sila was the result of consultation among Indonesian leaders held at a time when the struggle for independence was at its peak. He said further, because the majority of the Indonesian leaders were Muslims, it was hard to believe that these leaders would draw up principles contrary to Islamic teachings.[16]

It seems to the present writer that the last comment is the surest interpretation in the light of what had been shown by Ki Bagus Hadikusumo's action at that meeting. It is on the basis of this belief that he had no objection of accepting the persuasion given by Hassan as mentioned above.[17]

This kind of comment, though different in character, shows the similarity of the viewpoints in that they all admitted that the secular nationalist leaders with all their capability were able

to direct the development of Indonesian politics in line with their political interest.

On the same day i.e., on August 18, 1945, the Preparatory Committee besides electing Sukarno and Hatta as the President and vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, also decided that the work of the presidency would be aided for the time being, by a National Committee.[18] On August 19, the Preparatory Committee made the decision to establish 12 Ministries in the first Indonesian Cabinet and on August 22, this Committee also decided to set up 3 new bodies i.e., 1. a National Committee, 2. an Indonesian National Party and 3. a People's Security Body.

On September 5, the President announced the composition of his first Cabinet in which two rather unimportant posts were entrusted to the Muslim leaders i.e., the Ministry of Communication and Public Works and the Ministry of State (without portofolio).[19] On August 29, the Central Indonesian National Committee or Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (K.N.I.P.) was inaugurated by the President. Out of 290 of its total members there were only 35 representing the Islamic group. The composition of this K.N.I.P. was made on the basis both of party and non-party representation.[20]

In the meantime, the Indonesian National Party or the P.N.I. which functioned as a government-sponsored party in line with the decision of the P.P.K.I., was established on August 27, 1945. This government-sponsored party which was backed by Sukarno and Hatta, indicated that the secular nationalist leaders had already consoli-

dated themselves to maintain their power and influnce. It is true that this new party included the representatives of all currents of thought existing in the Indonesian society, but it is also true that its representation was far from being equally balanced. Besides that, it also means that the government adopted a one party system in the Indonesian political organization.

The aim of the establishment of this government-sponsored party or P.N.I. was, in the words of Sukarno, to become "the motor of the people's struggle."[21] This P.N.I. state party was also planned to have the function of accomplishing a smooth transition from the Japanese period by absorbing the Japanese Hōkōkai and other propaganda bodies.[22] Because of leadership difficulties but more especially because of a desire to hinder the double function between the K.N.I.P. and this P.N.I. state party, Sukarno then suspended this plan and dissolved this new party before it had been fully established. The other reason for the dissolution of this P.N.I. state party, according to Anderson, was the severe criticism forwarded by both the Muslim group and the underground youth movement accusing the government of excluding the major figures of these two groups.[23] Anderson still insisted that the real reason of this dissolution was the existence of strong opposition of Sjahrir and his followers and also of its internal conflict. Sjahrir, he further said, accused the P.N.I. state party of being "dominated by political leaders who had enjoyed high positions and comfortable lives in the midst of the population suffering," and to Sjahrir those leaders were nothing

but "collaborators who on moral grounds alone had no claim to the leadership of a free Indonesia."[24] The internal conflict can be observed clearly when, shortly after its establishment, the difference of opinion between its leaders arose. This conflict resulted from personal and ideological difference as was shown by the conflict between Abikusno, a prominent leader of Islamic group, and Sartono, a prominent secular nationalist leader. Abikusno was the chief of the political section of this P.N.I. state party and Sartono was a member of its organizational section. So because of the external attack and internal conflict it "never had a chance to develop a life of its own."[25]

Following the dissolution of the P.N.I. state party as was decreed by Sukarno on August 30, 1945, the P.N.I. leadership gave its statement, signed by Sajuti Melik. The statement says that in line with the President's order, it was necessary to give an explanation to the P.N.I. branches in order to "avoid disappointment and doubts among comrades." The statement continues that "actually, the party had deeper aims and larger responsibilities than the National Committee." The most important thing to do now, the statement further says, in this critical situation was "the organization of Indonesian independence and its recognition by the international world."[26]

Rather than accepting a seat in the P.N.I. state party which he criticized bitterly, Sjahrir preferred to be a member of the K.N.I.P. and by the dissolution of that P.N.I., it seemed to him

that the only rival of K.N.I.P. now disappeared from the political scene and since he became the Chairman of the Badan Pekerja or the working Committee of this K.N.I.P. which functioned as its Executive Body, Sjahrir felt secure in exercising his influence and carrying out his plan. To strengthen his position, Sjahrir and the other members of B.P.K.N.I.P. succeeded in passing in the K.N.I.P. session a resolution that the government should adopt multiple parties system in the Indonesian political organization instead of one-party system. By this resolution, the chance for setting up political parties was given to the Indonesian people, or in other words, "the formation of competing political parties whose function would be to express the views of their members within the K.N.I.P.,"[27] at least soon could be realized. The K.N.I.P. resolution was then put into practice by the Government by issuing its decree on November 3, 1945, which runs as follows: "The Government favors the establishment of political parties because with the existence of political parties all currents of thought which are to be found in society may be canalized into a regulated course."[28] That decree though did not suggest that political parties then, in competing among themselves, had to neglect the national interests. Therefore the decree continued that those parties besides intending to achieve their own interests should also serve "to strengthen our struggle for the defence of our independence and the preservation of the security of the nation."[29]

Though the planning of establishing the P.N.I. state party

was finally cancelled as was explained above, the Indonesian masses - especially those who became the original mass backing of the pre-war time P.N.I. - believed the fiction that the <u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u> (the P.N.I.), which was then established after the dissolution of the P.N.I. state party, was the party of Sukarno and Hatta.[30] So when the P.N.I. was established following the above Government decree, on January 1946, most of the leaders of the residual local fragments of the P.N.I. state party became the leaders of this new born P.N.I., such as the P.N.I. Madiun, the P.N.I. Pati, the P.N.I. Palembang and the P.N.I. Sulawesi.[31] It is no wonder that it took a year or longer for the Indonesian people, according to Kahin, to become aware of this fiction and dissimilarity.[32] It is of course, a significant factor which contributed to the rapid expansion of this party.

The majority of this party's members were recruited from among the civil servants and a large procentage from amongst the peasantry, who looked for political guidance and directives from its traditional governors or the local chiefs of the administrative offices.[33]

It is true that the Indonesian political parties also existed in the time of Dutch colonial period but only some of them were revived after the Indonesian independence. Since the 1920's, it has been common for Indonesian to divide their political organizations into three main groupings according to the basis on which they used to rest i.e., whether religious, nationalist or Marxist.[34]

Because the party also represented the cultural group as was pointed out by Anthony Reid, it can also be said that "if Muslim parties spoke for santri [devout Muslim] community, abangan [nominal Muslim] Javanese and some non-Muslim outer islanders tended to seek a counter weight in nationalist parties." [35]

The growth of political strength shown by the secular nationalist group indeed stimulated the Muslim leaders to make considerable effort to consolidate themselves. They really felt that such a phenomenon, at that time, as a serious challenge to the actualization of the Islamic interests.

In response to this challenge, a series of discussions among the Muslim leaders were held at Jakarta, at the Balai Muslimin Indonesia building in September 1945.[36] These discussions concentrated on the political future of Islam in an Indonesian independent state and especially on the efforts that should be made to solve the problem's lack of representation in the government and lack of recognition in the Constitution.[37] To solve this problem the Muslim leaders decided to plan a congress and work out a new political organization into which the Islamic interests could be channeled. To meet this need they also decided to reactivate and transform the wartime Masjumi and convert it into a political party.[38]

As early as October 11, 1945,[39] a committee, headed by M. Natsir, was set up at Jogyakarta to put the above plan into practice. Its members included: Dr Sukiman, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso,

Wahid Hasjim, Wali al Fatah, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, Sri Paku Alam, A. Gaffar Ismail and many others. It was intended that the Muslim congress would provide a power base for the Muslim community, in order to protect the freedom of Indonesia.[40] This congress was successfully inaugurated at Jogyakarta on November 7-8, 1945, and was attended by the representatives of all the Muslim organizations as well as various un-affiliated Muslim leaders. Although only the Muslim leaders from Java and Madura participated, its resolutions in fact, influenced the other Muslim leaders and organizations outside Java and Madura.[41] After being involved in a heated debate among its members, the congress finally came to the following decision:

> In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.
>
> An Indonesian Muslim Congress held at Jogyakarta on 2-3 Dhulhijjah, 1364 (November 7-8, 1945) was attended by the representatives of all groups in the Muslim community from Java and Madura,
>
> After considering:
>
> That the struggle of Indonesian Muslim community to establish the religion of God and the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia can only be carried out completely by the firm strength and will of all of the Indonesian Muslim community which was arranged and pressed into one body for the political struggle,
>
> It then decided:
>
> That this body for the political struggle was established as a creation of the Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi) which up until now functioned as a central consultation organization for the Indonesian Muslim community and now will be transformed to be the only Indonesian Muslim political party, has its aims:
>
> a- To support the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and Islam.

b- To put into practice the ideals of Islam in the state affairs.[42]

By this decision, all the existing Muslim political parties were merged into the Masjumi and all the important socio-religious and educational organizations, especially in Java and Madura, became its members. Thus, the Masjumi, which was officially established on November 7, 1945 as the result of the above mentioned Muslim Congress, became the only Muslim organization through which Islamic political aspirations would be channelled.[43]

It is worth mentioning that, though the name Masjumi was adopted for this new organization, it was only by a narrow margin of 52 to 50; the Muslim Congress notables voted to retain the name Masjumi rather than the alternative proposal of <u>Partai Rakjat Islam</u> (Islamic People's Party). In addition the using of the name Masjumi here, according to one of its leaders, did not indicate the abbreviation of <u>Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia</u> rather, as was the case in wartime, Masjumi was used as a full name.[44]

This historical event made a significant impression on the memory of the Muslim community in the following days and it prepared itself to give its support. The result of the Congress was warmly received by Muslim leaders as the following examples shows:

Abikusno Tjokrosujoso said:

> Oh Muslim community! Let us struggle orderly, do not loosen your grip from complete ties. It is for this reason that the Masjumi Party was established to cover all the Muslim community. It is our task to adjust the character and activities of the Masjumi to the central

> unity on Indonesian Muslim community so that it can mobilize and lead the entire struggle of the Indonesian Muslim community.[45]

Another Muslim leader Sukiman also gave his comment when he stated:

> It is the Muslim community which should struggle seriously, because it is they [the leaders of the Muslim community] who have the sharply contradictory necessities between them and the colonialists.[46]

Why did this Muslim Congress and its decisions receive a warm welcome from the Muslim community throughout the country?

The answer perhaps can be given if we want to trace back the Muslim community situation in the Dutch colonial period during which time efforts had been made to unite the <u>ummat Islam Indonesia</u> (Indonesian Muslim community).

The first attempt was made by <u>Sarekat Islam</u> to set up <u>al-Islam</u> Congress (Islamic Congress) on October and November 1922 at Cheribon (West Java), at which the representatives from both the traditionalist and the modernist currents of thought in the Muslim community participated. This congress was designed to establish unity and cooperation in the Muslim community on Islamic matters.[47] It was held, according to Noer, at a time when the <u>ᶜulamā'</u> and religious teachers were deeply involved in high disputes and both of them discredited each other. For example, he further said, an N.U. leader "expressed agreement with the introduction of the modern school system in religious education, but were against any changes in the curriculum in which he still recognized the indispensability

of the madzhab [madhhab] books."[48] As a result, Noer continued that it seemed that the Congress finally failed to achieve its main goal.[49]

Several Kongres al-Islam (Islamic congresses) initiated mostly by the Sarekat Islam were also then held in the following years to discuss the interests of the Muslim community. It is perhaps because of this nearly unilateral sponsorship that the results of those congresses did not satisfy the whole Muslim community.

In 1937, as was also discussed in the previous Chapter, the M.I.A.I. was established. The objectives of this federation were: "to facilitate cooperation among Indonesian Islamic parties; to settle differences between Islamic groups; to strengthen the relations between the Islamic societies in Indonesia and in other parts of the world; in general to look after the interests of Islam and the Islamic group; and to hold an All-Indonesian Islamic Congress."[50]

It seems that the setting up of the M.I.A.I. could be regarded as the needed solution for the Muslim community to satisfy the sense of unity within the Muslim community at that time. This was enabled by the fact that "the questions presented to M.I.A.I.," according to Aboebakar, "were those which closely related to common ground of the Muslim community without taking into account the discussion about urusan i'tikad dan amal ibadatnja (lit., the matters concerning Islamic belief and its rituals)."[51] Therefore when the Kongres al-Islam was held in 1938 in Surabaya, the following resolutions were achieved almost unanimously then by the Muslim leaders, especially by those who became the M.I.A.I.'s members. Those reso-

lutions were, among others: " to oppose the proposed regulation of recording marriage by the Dutch government; to oppose the attitude of those who by their writings, sayings and doings looked down on the Prophet, al-Qur'ān and Islamic religion; to propose the improvement of the right of inheritance and raad agama (lit., religious judiciary); to unite the Muslim community opinion about the first day of puasa (lit., fasting) and lebaran [or in Arabic ᶜĪd al-fiṭr i.e., one of the chief feastdays of Islam] and ... many others."[52]

The rapid development of this federation can also be seen by the increasing number of its members. In 1937 it had only 7 members but in 1941 its members increased considerably that is, from 7 to 21 members.[53] Since then, the Kongres al-Islam was held under the auspices of the M.I.A.I. and in its congress in 1941, the name Kongres al-Islam was changed into Kongres Muslimin Indonesia or the Muslim Indonesian Congress.[54] It is still not clear for the present writer the reason for this change but perhaps its reason is to differentiate the following congresses from their predecessors in that this Kongres Muslimin Indonesia was no more dominated by Sarekat Islam, as was the case before with the Kongres al-Islam. Therefore, it is understandable that the decisions made in this congress were regarded as the voice of the Muslim community.

When the M.I.A.I. was re-established in the Japanese period and then abolished in order to pave the way for the Masjumi,

the Muslim community felt that both M.I.A.I. and the Masjumi at that time were always under the rigid control of the Japanese authority. One of Muslim leaders regarded the Masjumi, at the time of the Japanese period, as "the zoo" in which all its members composed of ^{c}ulamā' and zu^{c}amā were forced by the Japanese rulers to further their own interests.[55] Consequently they could not freely observe Islamic teachings, especially in actualizing its political aspect.

Facing the fact that Islamic interests could only be achieved by the strength of the Muslim community itself, the sense of unity among its leaders became strong. The realization of this fact was felt more strongly when the Muslim community realized that its rivals had long already consolidated themselves to achieve their own goals. Thus, by the establishment of the Masjumi it seems that the sense of Islamic unity had been properly channelled and it was in this new organization that Muslims placed all their hope and confidence that it would succeed in realizing their community interest. Through this background the present writer believes that the enthusiastic attitude shown by the Indonesian Muslim community throughout the country, with all its funds and energies to support spontaneously the Masjumi, can be properly apprehended.

Further, the choice of only one Islamic political party to become the tool of struggle for the Muslim community, as explained by one of the Masjumi leaders, was based on the bitter experience of the Muslim community at the time of colonial period.

The Muslim leaders realized that by establishing several Islamic political parties, the interest of the Muslim community was in fact, difficult to put into practice.[56]

By observing what has been discussed above, it becomes obvious that the Masjumi was designed to be the spokesman of the Indonesian Muslim community. To maintain this position, the Masjumi, from the very beginning, had adopted a new system of membership which differentiated it from that of other parties. So, by making itself "a party of indirect structure" according to Feith, it had, as a political party, a dualistic characters.[57] In this respect, Feith further said, it had, on the one hand, ordinary individual members and, on the other hand, special collective members composed of non-political organizations with socio-religious and educational aims.[58] Therefore, soon after its establishment, the former members of the Masjumi at the time of the Japanese occupation, i.e., the Muhammadijah, the Nahdlatul Ulama, the Perikatan Ummat Islam or P.U.I. and the Persatuan Ummat Islam Indonesia or the P.U.I.I. affiliated with the Masjumi as its special collective members; they were followed then by the other socio-religious and educational Muslim organizations both from inside and outside Java and Madura such as Persatuan Islam or Persis, al-Irsjad, Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Atjeh or PUSA, Serikat Muslimin Indonesia or Sermi, Djam^c^ijatul Washlijah and so on.[59] The Masjumi also allowed persons who became the members of the above organizations to join the Masjumi individually as ordinary members.[60]

By noticing the characteristics of the Masjumi membership, one perhaps could easily deduce the complex nature of this party from the very outset. Thus, in this respect we can apprehend why some Western scholars have said that "it was the largest political party in Indonesia but poorly organized."[61] or "it was in fact a deeply divided organization, so much so that its policies are most easily discussed in terms not of the party itself but of its constituent factions"[62] or in the words of one of its prominent leaders describing its nature as "the Masjumi was an elephant with beri-beri."[63]

It seemed that the maintenance of this membership system was desirable for both the Masjumi and the respective special collective members though some criticism was also launched against it.[64] For the Masjumi it was considered necessary to attract and gain the maximum support from its special collective members without forcing them to sacrifice their interests in socio-religious or educational activities, while for the organizations concerned, this system would provide them with the possibility of increasing their influence in the long run within the party.[65]

Besides establishing the Masjumi, the Muslim congress also resolved to set up a Muslim youth organization called G.P.I.I. or Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement). This movement in reality had been established two months earlier i.e., on October 2, 1945. Its aim was to defend both the sovreignty of the Republic of Indonesia and Islam. It was explained in its

constitution that G.P.I.I. operated under the supervision of the Masjumi. This organization was acknowledged as the only Muslim youth movement in the political field.[66] Both Masjumi and G.P.I.I. established branches for their women members which possessed their own Central Board and some degree of autonomy, although both of them entirely followed the political attitude held by the Masjumi and G.P.I.I. respectively.

Additionally, the Muslim congress made the important decision to set up a Hizbullah corps which was regarded by the Muslim community as the only Muslim youth movement in the military field, and Sabilillah corps which was considered the only Muslim adult movement in the same field.[67]

The establishment of these two corps was aimed at defending Islam and the Republic of Indonesia and also at strengthening the power and influence of the Masjumi in Indonesian politics. It seems that the latter corps, according to Anderson, never became an integral organization, but rather spontaneous armed bands within the Muslim community appeared at the time of the Japanese surrender to the Allies.[68] The number of Hizbullah corps was estimated to be between 20,000 and 25,000;[69] an even higher number is given by another source.[70] Both Hizbullah and Sabilillah were under the supervision of the Masjumi.

Besides that, to realize its aim in the economic field in line with Islamic teachings, the Masjumi felt it necessary to establish the Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Association

of Islamic Peasants) in 1946. Its main task was to collect zakāt (the Muslim religious levy) and organized it into a productive system which would benefit the Muslim community both individually and socially. This effort was made because the Masjumi leaders had the opinion that, according to Kahin, "the Qur'ān stresses that zakāt does not mean merely giving the funds collected to beggars, it must be an organized system to expand the economic wealth of the community as a whole and must not be sterile investment."[71]

A year later a new organization called the Sarekat Dagang Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Commerce Association) was also set up under the auspice of the Masjumi. If the S.T.I.I. task was to operate in the peasants and landowners circle within the Muslim community, this Sarekat Dagang Islam Indonesia or the S.D.I.I. directed its activities in the merchants circle. Both these organizations i.e., S.T.I.I. and S.D.I.I. had the function to collect, organize and utilize zakāt for the benefit of the Muslim community. So if the S.T.I.I. "utilized its zakāt funds for helping poor and landless peasantry," the S.D.I.I. made use of these zakāt funds "to establish a Bank Pembangunan Umat (Bank for the Reconstruction of Society)," which functioned "to advance credit at low price with minimum security requirements to small merchants and to worthy poor persons needing capital to start business."[72]

In line with its position as the spokesman of the Muslim community, it is no wonder that Masjumi mass backing was recruited

from the areas where the strength of the Muslim community was clearly observed. "The Masjumi's greatest source of strength," according to Feith, was mainly in the country side in which its supporters were recruited from "the local religious leaders, professional and semiprofessional, the ᶜulamā' and kijahis (religious teachers or scholars), hadjis (returned Mecca pilgrims), mosque officials, and religious functionaries of the village councils."[73] Besides that, the Masjumi said Kahin, "also attracted most of the vestigial Indonesian commercial and industrial middle class ...," as well as "the majority of the larger Indonesian landowners."[74]

2. The structure of the Masjumi organization.

Within the Masjumi, according to its Constitution,[75] the Muktamar Partai or Party Congress was vested with the highest authority. It decided the Constitution of the Masjumi Party and also elected the Presiden Partai or the President of the party and the Dewan Pimpinan Partai or the Party Leadership Council. It was held once a year and was composed of a. the Dewan Partai or Party Council and b. the representatives of the Masjumi branches. It was also attended by the members of the Madjelis Sjuro Pusat and representatives of the special collective members.[76] In this Muktamar Partai, every branch had the right to send no more than five representatives elected by the branch party meeting. The number of votes granted to every branch was equal to the number of its attending representatives but no more than three votes.[77]

The leadership of the Masjumi Party was entrusted to the *Dewan Pimpinan Partai* as the executive body of the party and *Dewan Partai* or Party Council as the legislative body of the party. Besides that, there was also the President of the party who functioned as the Chairman of both the *Muktamar Partai* and the *Dewan Partai*.[78] *Dewan Pimpinan Partai* carried out the policy and decided the struggle tactics of the party between the *Dewan Partai* sessions in line with the decisions of the *Dewan Partai* or *Muktamar Partai*. Within this *Dewan Pimpinan Partai*, an executive body was created to function as daily executive leadership. To carry out the leadership of the party, the *Dewan Pimpinan Partai* appointed a secretary to lead the secretariat of the party. This secretariat was divided into several departments in accordance with necessity.[79]

In leading the party, the *Dewan Pimpinan Partai* was assisted by the central *Madjelis Sjuro* which was created by the *Dewan Pimpinan Partai* it self and was composed of one Chairman, three vice-Chairmen and several prominent ^{c}*ulamā'*. The number of the members of central *Madjelis Sjuro* or *Madjelis Sjuro Pusat* was equal to the number of the Masjumi branches plus several ^{c}*ulamā'* appointed by the *Dewan Pimpinan Partai*. The branch *Madjelis Sjuro* elected one of its ^{c}*ulamā'* to be the member of the *Madjelis Sjuro Pusat*. This elected ^{c}*ulamā'* was to be taken from the ^{c}*ulamā'* of the respective branch.[80] The function of the *Madjelis Sjuro* was to give advice and *fatwās* to the *Dewan Pimpinan Partai* and in practice, until 1949 it seemed that it also functioned as the

legislative body within the party.[82]

To hold a Dewan Partai meeting a quorum of more than 1/2 of its members was required while a quorum of 2/3 of all of the branches was needed in holding a Muktamar Partai.[83] In a party meeting a vote was taken if the Chairman was of the opinion that there had been enough discussion. It was possible that no vote be taken on a particular matter. In this case it meant that the matter had been agreed upon by the meeting, while the resolution might be accompanied by a notation that one man was against it.[84]

Unlike the other party, the Masjumi Party maintained double structure in its membership i.e., the ordinary individual members and the special collective members. The individual ordinary members had to be Indonesian Muslim citizen - male or female - and not be members of other political parties while the special collective members were from Muslim non-political organizations.[85]

There were four requirements demanded from the Muslim organization to achieve the status of being a special collective members:

1. Possession of a well defined organization and clearly stated aims.
2. Acknowledgement of the truth of the Masjumi policy.
3. Acknowledgement of the Masjumi as the only Islamic political party in Indonesia.
4. Approval by at least 2/3 of the Masjumi's existing special collective members.[86]

According to the Masjumi Constitution, the rights and ob-

ligations of its special collective members were:

a. Special collective members shall have the right to propose tuntutans(lit., demands) which pertain to their particular fields of endeavor to the Dewan Pimpinan Partai so that all those demands can be worked out for their realization

b. The Dewan Pimpinan Partai is subject to take those tuntutans into account as long as they are not in conflict with the interests of any other special collective members.

c. A special collective member has the duty of carrying out all political plans of the party which fall within its field of endeavor.

d. At the request of the Dewan Pimpinan Partai, the special collective member wajib membantu dengan amal perbuatan (shall be obliged to assist by its actions) every party's effort as far as such assistance tidak merugikan (does not damage) the member concerned.[87]

To co-ordinate the activities of these special collective members it was necessary for the party to establish a sort of liaison body within the party through which all matters concerning these special collective members could be handled. So in every regency there was, under the direction of the Masjumi, a liaison committee established to handle the matters concerning its special collective members in its respective regency. This liaison committee functioned only as an intermediary body and it had no right to make decisions on its own. The activities of these liaison bodies were co-ordinated by and centralized in the department of the general affairs in the secretariat of the Dewan Pimpinan Partai.[88]

Officially the ᶜulamā' in the Masjumi had a special position. How far this position could provide them with a significant role

within the party, at least theoretically, may be seen in the party regulation.

The Madjelis Sjuro was intentionally created by the Masjumi Party in order to aid the Dewan Pimpinan Partai in leading the party. The creation of this Madjelis was also the result of the deliberation of the Muslim community when the Masjumi Party as a political party was established at Jogyakarta in November 1945. The task of the Madjelis Sjuro was to give advice and fatwās on Islamic matters to the deliberative bodies, whenever considered necessary within the broad lines of the party's work. This discussion will be elaborated in more detail in the following Chapter when we discuss the role of the ᶜulamā' in Masjumi leadership.

The Madjelis Sjuro held its meeting once a year and a plenary session could be held at any time regarded as necessary by the Dewan Pimpinan Partai, the Madjelis Sjuro executive committee or one fifth of the members of the Madjelis.[90] It was hoped that by creating the executive committee within the Madjelis, a quick decision could be made by the Madjelis Sjuro especially in case of emergency.

The party was to carry on its activities throughout Indonesia. It had a geographical division i.e., it had its branches, sub-branches and rantings which were located respectively in the district, under district and village throughout Indonesia. At the provincial level, the Dewan Pimpinan Partai had its Dewan Pimpinan Wilajah which was comprised of one Chairman, vice-Chairman, one

secretary and several of its members. They were appointed by the Dewan Pimpinan Partai to a one year term based on the suggestion of the Dewan Pimpinan Tjabang-tjabang or the Executive Council of the branches.[91] This regional Board had the right to decide its own policy concerning matters closely related to necessities of the branches under its control, as long as such policy does not conflict with Dewan Pimpinan Partai regulations.[92]

Concerning the party finance, it was stipulated in the Constitution that the income of the party was to consist of initiation fees and membership dues besides accepting donations and offerings from members and from other Muslims.[93]

Any Muslim citizen could become a member of the party by submitting his application either orally or in writing to the officers of the sub-branch. A person's membership was considered legal only after possessing a membership card.[94]

A member of the party could be expelled for his actions violating the discipline or regulations of the party, or discrediting the reputation of the party. The decision of expulsion had to be submitted in writing by the branch. Pending expulsion, such member was suspended temporarily in order to afford him an opportunity for defence, either in writing or orally, before a meeting of officers or a meeting of the branch. If an expelled member was not given an opportunity to defend himself, he might bring his case before the Dewan Pimpinan Wilajah.[95]

3. The program of the Masjumi.

Kahin rightly said that by mere reference to the Masjumi Constitution one could not properly understand the character of the Masjumi Party. Therefore one should look at the Masjumi program, in which the Constitution was translated and articulated in more vigorous and socially dynamic language.[96] This holds true because under the light and guidance of its program, every organization or party is directed to achieve its purposes and aims. Thus, after declaring that it aimed "to establish the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and Islam," and "to put into practice the ideals of Islam in the state affairs," [97] the Masjumi then made an undertaking:

> to awaken the conciousness and broaden the knowledge and competence of Indonesians in the political struggle; to organize and strengthen the ranks of the Islamic community for the struggle to defend religion and the sovereignty of the state; to realize a community way of life based on Iman (belief) and taqwa (Godfearingness), social, humanitarianism, brotherhood and equal rights in conformity with the teachings of Islam; to cooperate with other groups in the struggle to establish the sovereignty of the state.[98]

In these activities, which the Masjumi tried to carry out in realizing its aims, Masjumi leaders were well aware that the muslim community at that time was still weak and far from being able to participate fully in struggling to defend Islam and the sovereignty of the state. It needed to be completed and equipped by considerable knowledge and skill in political struggle as well as the necessity to strengthen and maintain unity within the Muslim community.[99] The leaders also realized that they were not the only Indonesian

group controlling the struggle for establishing the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and defending Indonesian independence, as one writer accused them of doing.[100]

Briefly, there were two kinds of effort which should have been made by the Masjumi in realizing its aims i.e., internally the Masjumi leaders had to maintain and strengthen the unity within the Indonesian Muslim community and externally they had to co-operate with other Indonesian groups to save the country from destruction.

A month after its foundation, according to Anderson, the Masjumi leaders launched a more detailed and urgent program for struggle encouraging the Muslim community to fight in the way of God. This was to be achieved by giving priority to mobilizing and arming the Muslim community. They were to be given military training, and the people's army should have been developed and expanded. Moreover, to guarantee the final victory "a general mobilization among all Muslims of energy, property and ideas to promote the interests of Hizbullah and Sabilillah armies" was required. "It called for an acceleration in the organizing, training, and equipping of the Hizbullah and Sabilillah every where."[101]

In the political field, this urgent program for struggle declared that the party's political objectives were, first: "a Republic of Indonesia based on Islam;" second, "the general and direct right to elect and to be elected;" third, "the formation of electoral bodies with the duty of a propaganda drive to convince the people of the truth and perfection of the demands

in the Masjumi program;" fourth, "to unite the voice of the people in electing the Muslim candidates for the representative and executive bodies in the Government."[102]

If the program of 1945 as mentioned above was centered mainly on the effort of defending the state and religion from the enemy, the program for struggle of 1946 stressed "the realization of the ideals of Islam in state affairs, so that a form of state which is founded on the basis of the people's sovereignty, and a society which is based on justice in accordance with Islamic teachings can be created." Therefore it was imperative for the Masjumi leaders, the program further said, "to solidify and complete the principles of the Constitution ... in order to realize an Islamic society and state." In order to defend the freedom of religion, country and people the program emphasized the concentration of the Muslim community strength within the party. It also strove "to carry out the general and direct right to elect and be elected."[103]

This program began with the statement: "Islam wants the realization of society's welfare as well as a peaceful life between the nations in this world. Islam opposes strongly the cruelty, brutality and the fallacy of capitalism and imperialism." It was further stated that the strong desire of the Indonesian people mainly within the Muslim community to defend themselves, their nation and religion, was a logical consequence resulting from the irresponsible actions and provocation launched by the British and Dutch armies who wanted to discredit the sovereignty of the

Republic of Indonesia and the freedom of nation and religion. Therefore, the Masjumi, as a body of struggle of the Muslim community in opposing the brutality, violation, robbery and cruelty committed by the colonialists, set up a program of action to carry out the military struggle. Besides a struggle militarily, the Muslim community also faced a political struggle domestically i.e., to gain power in government, or in other words to win seats in the representative bodies when the general elections would be established in the future. "Recent events which took place both abroad and domestically," the statement continued, "stimulated the Central Board of the Masjumi to set up a Struggle Council (Dewan Perjuangan) which now was planning to decide a specific program of action which should have been carried out by the Muslim community in all regions."[104]

In the social and economic fields the program runs as follows:

1. Enactment of laws which guarantee to workers minimum wages, maximum working hours, accident and old age allowance, protection as to security, health and housing;
2. Enactment of laws which guarantee for the peasant private ownership of land sufficient to support him and his family, protection on the sale of his products, and the general enhancement of his status.[105]

As far as the organization of economy was concerned, the urgent program maintained that: (1) The principal duty of the state must be to open the possibility to work and to have a job to all citizens; (2) The economy should be based upon collectivism in which individual initiative may not be detrimental to the gen-

eral prosperity."[106] Besides that, this economic program recognized the private ownership but on certain condition. It also opposed capitalism.

Concerning the social affairs, that program "enacted laws for the general welfare; prohibition of all kinds of gambling, opium, alcohol and adultery."[107]

Commenting on this Urgency Program, Kahin said that it was composed and planned by the "Religious Socialist" wing of the party leaders, [108] while in contrast to this view, the other writer stated that this program was similar to that of the prewar Sarekat Islam.[109] Another view said that a close similarity could be observed between the economic Masjumi program and that of the prewar Partai Islam Indonesia.[110]

Concerning the above comments, the present writer believes that those opinions are correct in the sense that both the program of Sarekat Islam and Partai Islam Indonesia were composed by their respective leaders, who then became the Masjumi leaders; while the opinion of Kahin, that it was the product of the "Religious Socialist" leaders within the Masjumi leadership, is also correct provided that he also included the old generation of the Masjumi leaders like Sukiman, Abikusno and many others to be the members of this "Religious Socialist" group. But if Kahin limited the members of this group just to the younger generation of the Masjumi leaders it seems to me that his opinion is subject to question.[111]

In 1947, the Masjumi Party published its political manifesto

in which it stated its political standpoint concerning both foreign and domestic affairs.

After noting that the Republic of Indonesia, the majority of whose population is Muslim, was a state possessing a Constitution which based its foundations on the principles approved by religion or not in contradiction to the teachings of Islam, and that the Islamic political party Masjumi, which undertook to represent the ideal of the Indonesian Muslim community about the structure and the growth of the state and struggled to actualize such an ideal, the Masjumi Party decided its struggle position and policy as follows:

Foreign policy:

To participate in realizing the ideal of world peace based on justice and humanity the Masjumi Party :

1. undertook in strengthening the friendship (tali persaudaraan) between the Indonesian Muslim community and those in other Muslim countries.
2. sought to co-ordinate their activities with Muslim communities in other countries.
3. strove to make the Muslim community in Indonesia influence the Indonesian government to link its policies with those of its neighboring democratic powers in the Pacific and oppose those which might hamper this policy.
4. agreed on the attitude of giving job opportunities in Indonesia to every one as far as it does not contradict the law of state and not stressed by force.

In domestic policy the same Manifesto also stated that the Masjumi Party undertook:

1. to broaden the activity for accelerating the gaining

of democracy guided by the wisdom arising from consultation in all administrative fields.

2. to enlarge the spreading of Islamic ideology within Indonesian society, without blocking the other groups who were in line in solidifying the principle of the Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa (the one and only God).

3. by the firm of will in the path of God to fortify the psyche of the Muslim community against the influence and infiltration of other ideologies which contradict Islamic teachings."[113]

According to Aboebakar, this Political Manifesto of the Masjumi Party was issued on July 4, 1947 as a result of the deliberation of three Masjumi leaders i.e., Dr Sukiman, Mr Sjamsuddin and K. Taufiqurrahman. It was launched, he further said, after those Masjumi leaders "surveyed the political situation both domestically and abroad, especially regarding the more rigid political attitude of both American and Sovjet governments." The above existing political situation drove the Masjumi to voice its own political standpoint on the consideration that "the Indonesian Muslim community functioned as the backbone (tulang punggung) of the state, and Masjumi was the only Islamic organization," representing that Muslim community.[114]

The significance of this statement, according to the present writer, may be seen from four points of view i.e., from the government of Indonesia, from foreign countries, from the Muslim countries and from the Indonesian Muslim community.[115]

1. From the point of view of the Indonesian government, this statement meant that the Republic of Indonesia was backed totally by the whole Indonesian Muslim community and therefore it was

stimulated to continue the struggle of defending Indonesian independence and its sovereignty.

2. From the view-point of foreign countries, the statement gave the impression that the Republic of Indonesia was really the product of the struggle of all Indonesian people and this automatically eliminated the accusation of the Dutch colonial rulers who always stated that Indonesian independence was only the will of a handful of fascist Indonesian leaders or that it was nothing but the gift of the Japanese occupation rulers.

3. From the view-point of Muslim countries, the above statement convinced them that their co-religionists in Indonesia were struggling to defend the sovereignty of their country and their religion. This statement, among other things, drove Muslims in other countries to acknowledge Indonesia as an independent state, at least de facto, early during the time of Indonesian revolution.

4. From the point of view of the Indonesian Muslim community, this statement meant that the Republic of Indonesia was its own state and only by maintaining and protecting the sovereignty could the Islamic interests be realized.

Besides that, this Manifesto also described the political standpoint of the Masjumi Party concerning democratic system of government. It implied that if the Masjumi Party gained power in the future, this party would base its government on that system.

To get a complete idea about the Masjumi program, the present writer thinks the principles espoused by the Masjumi Party

Council at the end of 1948 as was paraphrased by Kahin is worthy of notice. These principles were still held up to 1952 by the Masjumi Party:

(1) Complete independence of Indonesia.

(2) Following of, and emphasis upon, the principles of social justice and democracy found in Islam.

(3) The state must be governed according to the will of majority, with its principal officers being chosen through elections.

(4) Opposition to capitalism in principle, but acknowledgement of the necessity of its continuance for some time in certain spheres.

(5) A mixed economy should be followed - cooperative, socialistic, and capitalistic.

(6) Emphasis should be on the cooperative sector, with the state advancing credit to develop this.

(7) As the government acquires sufficient capital and administrative personnel, it should gradually nationalize transportation, communications, mining, oil production, large plantations, and any large scale industry as long as such nationalization is to the country's best interests. Nationalization should be accompanied by payment of reasonable compensation to those whose property is expropriated.

(8) Small-scale economic enterprise on an individual basis, so long as it is not uncontrolled, is socially healthy, in particular because it develops individual initiative and responsibility.

(9) Small-scale economic enterprise should remain in the hands of the individual. But only where it cannot be integrated into cooperatives should it remain on a purely capitalistic basis.

(10) Foreign capital is welcomed so long as it is non-political and so controlled that the Indonesian worker is protected and excessive profits are not taken out of the country.

(11) Wages must be equivalent to the social value of the work performed.

(12) In non-nationalized economic enterprises the government should insure the owners of the capital do not

take excessive profits and that the workers share in the profits.

(13) Absolute neutrality in the Cold War; alignment with neither U.S.S.R. or U.S.A.[116]

Closely related to the question of the Masjumi Party program is its religious socialist point of view. It is not out of place for some explanation of this viewpoint to be given here.

This movement actually emerged at the beginning of this century among the Christian religious thinkers and it was mainly developed in Germany as well as in Switzerland. Some of its prominent leaders were Paul Tillich and Karl Barth although the latter then made a break of it. The main reason for the emergence of this movement was to seek the way out in overcoming the problem of World crisis in this modern world especially in terms of social and economic crisis. It also tried to respond the challenge of socialism and communism accusing the religion of being irrelevant in this modern world to solve such problems. Therefore in this context we can understand why two of its leaders i.e., Hermann Kutter and Leonhard Ragaz, according to Tillich, "fought for justice and peace in the name of Christianity." The philosophical basis of this movement can be seen in its opinion about the relation of God and the world. To put it in Tillich's words "we emphasize that God is related to the world and not only to the church as a sociological entity. God is related to the universe, and this includes nature, history, and personality." In line with this thought is that they also "stressed the freedom of God to act apart from the church in

either its orthodoxy or pietistic form." In this respect this teaching can also be regarded as a reaction "against the ego-centricism of the individualistic type of religion which characterized pietistic Lutheranism at that time." The aim of this movement was, Tillich stated furtner, "a theonomous state of society" which means "the fulfilment of a whole society with the spiritual subtance, in spite of the freedom of the autonomous development, and in spite of living in the great traditions in which the Spirit has embodied himself.[117]

The above explanation can give us some understanding about the Religious Socialism as was conceived of by its original leaders within the Christian tradition. Now let us turn to the explanation given by an Indonesian Muslim leader who was also a Masjumi leader, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, about this same movement as he conceived of in line with the Islamic teachings.

Religious Socialism, according to him, had to be the ideology of the Indonesian national revolution, because it is suitable to Indonesian society and in harmony with the Constitution. This ideology, he said further, acknowledges individualism, individual initiative and individual responsibility. Therefore it guarantees both the freedom of the whole nation as well as that of the individual "without closing the door for possible nationalization of certain vital enterprises. However it is Islam as the basis of socialization i.e., the duty of man toward God, and not the historical materialism of Marx." He further stated that "socialization

is only a means to realize social justice and the people's prosperity." "Therefore," he continued, "to achieve socialization it is not necessary to eliminate a certain class or groups, and it is also not necessary to introduce an over-all socialization; it is enough if socialization is introduced when necessary ...." For him, it seems that the competition between private initiatives is needed to increase production and improve the quality of goods, and it was because of this private competition, he insists, that the progress of production and economy in Europe was possible. He also acknowledges that it does not mean that the liberal economy never tends to limit production. In this case he advises the government "to intervene by nationalizing certain private enterprises or establishing enterprises itself." He warned of possible danger resulting from introducing socialization "merely because of a desire to realize a certain theory," and ignored taking the proper time and circumstances into account. So it is necessary, he argued, that the government should organize its organs by applying capable personnel as much as possible, as well as to multiply home production to supply the needs of the people in the first instance, before going on to realize socialization. If this effort is not made, he continues, the destruction of the people can be easily predicted from the very outset.[118]

FOOTNOTES

[1]George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 127.

[2]Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961), pp. 15-16.

[3]See Kahin, op. cit., p. 113

[4]Mohammad Hatta, "Legende dan Realiteit sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus," in Osman Raliby, ed., Documenta Historica, Lampiran LXIV, pp. 656-657.

[5]Ibid.

[6]See Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 312-315.

[7]See Hatta, op. cit., p. 657

[8]Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 85-86.

[9]Ibid., p. 87.

[10]Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara dan Sebuah Projeksi, (Djakarta: Hudaya, 1970), p. 37.

[11]See Anderson, Java in a Time ..., p. 87.

[12]Ibid., p.88. It is interesting to note in this respect the contradictory narratives given by both Hatta and P. Mangkusasmito concerning the number of Muslim leaders attending the meeting on that day (Agustus 18, 1945). According to the former, all the three Muslim leaders who became the members of P.P.K.I. namely K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, Mr Kasman Singodimedjo and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo attended the meeting while the latter said that Wahid Hasjim was still on his tour in East Java. Besides that, Hatta explained that he and Mr Teuku M. Hassan together with the above three Muslim leaders held an unofficial meeting on the same day to discuss that crucial problem while according to P. Mangkusasmito, that unofficial meeting was only attended by three persons i.e., Mr Teuku M. Hassan, Hatta and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo. As long as both Hatta and P. Mangkusasmito are well known as dedicated and honest Indonesian leaders, it is difficult to decide which one of the two narratives is re-

liable. Moreover P. Mangkusasmito further stated that his information based on the written record about that event given to him by Mr Teuku M. Hassan. The above unofficial meeting was held before the official session of the P.P.K.I. began on that day. For further explanation see Prawoto Mangkusasmito, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

13 See Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics ..., p. 107 n. 323.

14 See the speech of Kasman Singodimedjo on the question of the foundations of the Indonesian state in Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante (Bandung: Sekretariat Konstituante, n.d.), vol. I, p, 187.

15 See Wahid Hasjim statement in Indonesia Merdeka (DJ.H.), No. 3 (May 25), p. 3 as quoted both in Benda, The Cresent and the Rising Sun (The Hague and Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1958), p. 189 and in J.D. Legge, Sukarno; a Political Biography (London; Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), p. 297.

16 M. Natsir, Capita Selecta (Djakarta: Pustaka Pendis, 1957), vol. II, p. 156.

17 The fact that Ki Bagus Hadikusumo was under psychological pressure by the secular nationalist leaders can be seen in his statement following that event. His disappointed statement was presented before the meeting of Madjelis Tanwir of the Muhammadijah organization which was held at Jogjakarta in August 1945 several days after the above P.P.K.I. session. In that Madjelis Tanwir meeting he expressed his uneasy feeling and the conclusion he took about that unforgettable event. He stated that, as related by K. H. A. Kahar Muzakkir, by "the elimination of the articles concerning Islam and the Muslim community in the 1945 constitution," it meant nothing but "the Muslim community in reality was still under the control of the colonial power." For more explanation see the speech of Kahar Muzakkir before the session of the Constituent Assembly in M. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan UUD 1945, vol. II/1960, pp. 701-707.

18 See Osman Raliby, op. cit., p. 14

19 Ibid., p. 33

20 See Kahin, op. cit., pp. 200-201.

21 See Legge, op. cit., p. 211.

22 See Anderson, Java in a Time ..., p. 95.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

[27] See Legge, *Sukarno:* ..., pp. 211-212.

[28] See Osman Raliby, *Documenta* ..., p. 529; see also Soedjatmoko, "The role of political parties in Indonesia," in Philip W. Thayer, ed., *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 130. This English translation is his.

[29] *Ibid.*, see also Soedjatmoko, *op. cit.*, p. 130

[30] See Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution* ..., p. 155.

[31] See Anderson, *Java in a Time* ..., p. 227.

[32] See Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] See Soedjatmoko, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

[35] Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution* (London: Longmans, 1974), p. 81. For further explanation about *santri* and *abangan*, see Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

[36] See Aboebakar, *Sedjarah Hidup* ..., pp. 449-450.

[37] See Anderson, *Java in a Time* ..., pp. 219-220.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[39] Tamar Djaja, "Masjumi 8 tahun," in *Hikmah*, VI, no.43 (November 1953), p. 8.

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] K. Taufiqurrahman, "Masjumi dimasa lampau (Lima tahun Partai Politik Islam Masjumi)," in *Indonesia dalam Pembangunan* (Djakarta: Panitya Muktamar Masjumi ke V, 1951), p. 11; see also Aboebakar, *op. cit.*, pp. 352-353.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43]See Aboebakar, op. cit., p. 350; see also Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972), p. 188.

[44]According to Abu Hanifah, the name Partai Rakjat Islam was initially proposed by him with a considerable support from the intellectual Masjumi leaders including Dr. Sukiman. The choice of that name, he argued, was based on the supposition that the Party would be "a party of all the Moslem people of Indonesia." See Abu Hanifah op. cit., p. 189. Corcening the name Masjumi was taken as a complete name, see Prawoto Mangkusasmito, "Quo Vadis," in S. U. Bajasut, ed., Alam Fikiran dan Djedjak Perdjuangan Prawoto Mangkusasmito, (Surabaja: Documenta, 1972), p. 64.

[45]See Tamar Djaja, op. cit., p. 8.

[46]Ibid.

[47]A. K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia, (Djakarta: Dian Rakjat, 1967), p. 34.

[48]Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 227.

[49]Ibid.

[50]See Political Parties and Movements in the Netherland East Indies (Washington: Office of Strategic Services, 1945), p. 72.

[51]See Aboebakar, op. cit., p. 315.

[52]Ibid.

[53]See D. Noer, op. cit., p. 242.

[54]Aboebakar, op. cit., p.316.

[55]See Isa Anshary, "Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam," in Hikmah, X, no.3 (January 1957), p. 16; zu^c^amā lit., it means leaders.

[56]Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, "Partai adalah alat," in Berita Partai Masjumi, V, nos. 5-6 (June-July 1950), p. 31.

[57]See Herbert Faith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953; a Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958), p. 39. In this book the writer concentrated his analysis on the political situation took place at the period of Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953. It is important as a penetrating and close study of the course of events.

[58]Ibid. See also B. Kees, "Observation on the political situation in Indonesia," in B. H. M. Vlekke, Indonesia in 1956: Political and Economic Aspects (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1957), p. 26.

[59]See K. Taufiqurrahman, "Sekitar Kisah Perdjuangan Ummat Islam Indonesia," in Mimbar Agama, I, no.4, (October 1950), p. 32; see also Deliar Noer, "Masjumi; Its Organization, Ideology and Political Role," Unpublished M.A, thesis, Cornell University, 1960, p. 65.

[60]See B. Kees, op. cit., p. 27.

[61]George McT. Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism" in William L. Holland, ed., Asian Nationalism and the West (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1953), p. 74.

[62]See Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet ..., p. 40.

[63]As quoted both in Kahin, op. cit., p. 74 and in Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," in Far Eastern Survey, XXVII, no. 9 (September 1958), p.134.

[64]See also the writing of Wahid Hasjim in Aboebakar, op. cit., pp. 735-737 and the writing of Jusuf Wibisono in Indonesia dalam Pembangunan (Djakarta: Panitya Muktamar Masjumi ke V, 1951), p. 23.

[65]See Anderson, Java in a Time ..., pp. 221, n. 37; see also the explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of adopting this attitude by the Masjumi Party as given by Jusuf Wibisono in Jusuf Wibisono, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

[66]See Prawoto Mangkusasmito, "Quo Vadis," in S. U. Bajasut, ed., op. cit., p. 64; see also Aboebakar, op. cit., p. 452. For more explanation about this G.P.I.I. and its relationship with the Masjumi Party see e.g., an article written by A. Harjono entitled "G.P.I.I. dan Masjumi," in Berita Partai Masjumi, V, nos. 5-6 (June-July 1950), pp. 8-9.

[67]See Aboebakar, op. cit., p. 452.

[68]Anderson, op. cit., p. 222, n. 40.

[69]See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution ..., p. 163.

[70]See Abu Hanifah, op. cit., p. 190; see also M. A. Aziz, Japan Colonialism ..., p. 208.

[71]See Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

[72]*Ibid.*, pp. 308-309.

[73]See Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 138. This book contains valuable materials about post-independent Indonesia. It tries to elaborate the Indonesian political system and to what extent that system effectively works in Indonesian society. In other words this book attempts to analyze Indonesia's experiment with constitutional democracy i.e., by adopting a parliamentary system between 1949 and 1957 and to point out the reasons why that system was abandoned.

[74]See Kahin, op. cit., p. 157.

[75]It is necessary to clarify here that there were two Masjumi constitutions prevailing when this Masjumi Party under the period of discussion i.e., the 1945 and 1949 Masjumi constitutions. The first constitution was found in *Masjumi* , a booklet published by the Central Board of the Masjumi Party at Jogjakarta but without mentioning the date of its publication. This explanation is given in D. Noer *op. cit.*, p. 41. Unfortunately the original text of this publication is not available to the present writer and therefore as long as the 1945 Masjumi constitution was concerned in this discussion, he based his data on the quotation or the explanation as given by D. Noer above. The English translation of this 1945 Masjumi constitution was Noer's. The 1949 Masjumi constitution was found in *Kepartaian di Indonesia*, a political handbook edited by the Indonesian Ministry of Information which is available to the present writer.The English translation is his. As long as the 1949 Masjumi constitution is the completion and abridgement of the 1945 Masjumi constitution, the present writer based his discussion about the Masjumi organization on this 1949 constitution. Even though some remarks on a specific question about the Masjumi organization based on the 1945 constitution will also be given if necessary.

[76]See Masjumi constitution article VIII. For practical reasons, this Masjumi constitution and articles are abbreviated into Const. and art. It also means that the above constitution is derived from the 1949 constitution. This method is adopted along with this discussion.

[77]See Masjumi Bylaws art. 6:5. This Masjumi Bylaws was also found in the above *Kepartaian di Indonesia*. This Masjumi Bylaws and its articles are also abbreviated into Bylaws art. The reason for adopting this method see n. 76 above.

[78]See Const. art. IX, X and XI. According to the 1945 Masjumi Const., the term Pengurus Besar or the Central Board was adopted in spite of using the term Dewan Pimpinan Partai as was adopted in the 1949 Masjumi Const. And the term Dewan Partai was also used in the 1945 Const. but with different meaning as it was adopted in the 1949 Const. In 1945 Const., the term Dewan Partai was referred to Madjelis Sjuro while in the 1949 Const., this term was used to refer to the legislative body of the party. According to Noer, since 1947 the structure of the Masjumi leadership underwent a change that is, a distinction was made between the Executive Committee and the Central Board as a whole. This effort was made to meet the need of the party in taking a quick political decision in case of emergency. See Noer, op. cit., p. 54.

[79]Const. art. XI.

[80]Bylaws art. 4:1 and art. 4:2.

[81]Bylaws art. 4:7.

[82]See Aboebakar, op. cit., p. 563; see also Muchtar Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party (1952-1955); An inquiry into the origin of its electoral success," Unpublished M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1960, pp. 11,14.

[83]Bylaws art. 6:7.

[84]Bylaws art. 6:9.

[85]Const. art. IV.

[86]Bylaws art. 5:1.

[87]Bylaws art. 5:3.

[88]Bylaws art. 5:5.

[89]Bylaws art. 5:6.

[90]Bylaws art. 4:4.

[91]Bylaws art. 5.

[92]Ibid.

[93]Const. art. XIII.

[94]Bylaws art. 2.

[95] *Ibid.*

[96] See Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution* ..., p. 306.

[97] Cf. Const. art. VII.

[98] *Antara*, Nov. 16, 1945 as quoted in Anderson, *Java at a Time* ..., p. 222. This statement then was put in the Masjumi Const. art. III under the title *Usaha* (lit., effort).

[99] See Prawoto Mangkusasmito, "Andil Angkatan Muda Islam tidak mengetjewakan," in S. U. Bajasut, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

[100] Walter B. Sidjabat, *Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith* (Djakarta: Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1956), p. 55.

[101] See Aboebakar, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

[102] See *Muktamar Masjumi ke VIII* (Djakarta: Pimpinan Partai Masjumi bgn Penerangan, 1956), p. 32

[103] *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

[104] See Aboebakar, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

[105] See *Muktamar Masjumi ke VII* (Surabaja: Panitya Muktamar Masjumi ke VII, 1954), p. 19; see also Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 307. This English translation is Kahin's

[106] Ibid.,pp.19-20; see also Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

[107] See Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 307; cf. Aboebakar, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

[108] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

[109] See Noer, *op. cit.*, p. 69

[110] See Anderson, *Java in a Time* ..., p. 225, n. 42. Here Anderson adopted the opinion of Sutter (Indonesianisasi, pp. 115, 327) who, according to Anderson, "shows how closely the Masjumi economic program coincided with that of the prewar P.I.I."

[111] Kahin himself stated that this Religious Socialist group exerted considerable influence within the party leadership since December 1948 and on while this Urgency Program was planned long before that time. See Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

[112] See Muktamar Masjumi ke VII, p. 23; see also Aboebakar, op. cit., pp. 361-362.

[113] Ibid.

[114] See Aboebakar, op. cit., p. 353.

[115] The official explanation of this Masjumi Political Manifesto, according to Aboebakar, was given by Mr Sjamsuddin at the radio station of the Republic of Indonesia at Jogjakarta on July 6,1947, Unfortunately, Aboebakar himself did not mention the contents of that explanation and the original text of this explanation from another source is not available to the present writer.

[116] See Kahin, op. cit., pp. 310-311.

[117] For more explanation see Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought (New York: Simon and Schuster,1968), pp. 530-535.

[118] See the excerpts of Sjafruddin's pamphlet entitled Politik dan Revolusi Kita in Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution..., pp. 309-310. This English translation is Kahin's. Unfortunately the original text is not available to the present writer.

CHAPTER III

MASJUMI LEADERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE ᶜULAMĀ'

1. The leadership of the Masjumi.

The Masjumi leaders were recruited from both special collective members and ordinary individual members. The latter group was mostly composed of former leaders of the prewar Sarekat Islam or the factions of the party. When the Japanese arrived in Indonesia, there were four groups into which the Islamic political movement had been organized. These groups were: first, the P.S.I.I. or Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Islamic Association party of Indonesia); second, the P.I.I. or Partai Islam Indonesia (Islamic party of Indonesia); third, the so-called Gerakan Penjadar (Penjadar Movement); and fourth, the so-called Komite Pembela Kebenaran P.S.I.I. or the Committee for defending the truth of P.S.I.I.[1]

The first group of the Masjumi leaders were recruited mainly from the leaders of the Muhammadijah and the Nahdlatul Ulama. The leadership of this party can also be regarded from another point of view. It was shared between the modernists and the traditionalists. Whereas the former associated themselves in the executive body of the party or the Central Board, the latter, consisting mostly of the ᶜulamā', operated in the legislative body of the party or the Madjelis Sjuro. To what extent the leadership was distributed amongst its members will be clearly illustrated by the following formation of its Pengurus Besar or Central Board.

When the Masjumi was officially established as a result of the Muslim Congress at Jogyakarta on November 7, 1945, the formation of the Masjumi leadership was announced as the following table shows:

Chairman: Dr Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (P.I.I.)
First vice-Chairman: Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (P.S.I.I.)
Second vice-Chairman: Wali al Fatah (P.I.I.)
First Secretary: Harsono Tjokroaminoto (P.S.I.I.)
Second Secretary: Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Muhammadijah)
Treasury: Mr A. Kasmat (P.I.I.)
Head of the Section Sabilillah and Hizbullah: K.H.A.Masjkur (N.U.)
Head of Finance Section: Mr A. Kasmat (P.I.I.)
Head of the Pemuda Section: M.Mawardi (Muhammadijah)
Head of the Information Section: Wali al Fatah (P.I.I.)

Members: K. H. A. Dahlan (N.U.); H. M. Faried Ma'ruf (Mohammadijah); H. M. Junus Anis (Muhammadijah); K.H. Fatchurrahman (N.U.) K. H. Faqih Usman (Muhammadijah); Dr Abu Hanifah (non-affiliation); M. Natsir (P.I.I.) R.M. Anwar Tjokroaminoto (P.S.I.I.); Dr Sjamsuddin (Muhammadijah); and Mr Mohammad Roem (Gerakan Penjadar).[2]

The bracketed information indicates from which organization the respective leader was recruited.

At the same time the composition of the Madjelis Sjuro was also issued following the announcement of the composition of the Central Board. The leaders who were elected to fill this position were as follows:

Chairman: K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari (N.U.)
First vice-Chairman: Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Muhammadijah)
Second vice-Chairman: K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim (N.U.)
Third vice-Chairman: Mr Kasman Singodimedjo (Muhammadijah)

Members: K. H. R. Mohammad Adnan (Persatuan Pengulu dan Pegawainja); H. A. Salim (Gerakan Penjadar); K. H. A. Wahab (N.U.); K. H. Abdul Halim (P.U.I.I.); K. H. A. Sanusi (P.U.I.); and Sjech M Djamil Djambek (M.I.T.).[3]

By observing the above table, one could easily suggest that

the weight of the party leadership was falling into the hands of the prewar Islamic political party leaders rather than the former leaders of the war-time Masjumi at the time of Japanese occupation period.[4] In addition, it is obvious that the key positions within the party were all held by leaders like Dr Sukiman and Abikusno who belonged to the older generation, rather than by men like Natsir, Roem and Prawoto who were regarded as the emerging leaders at that time.

The table also shows that only two chairs were given to the Muhammadijah and one was entrusted to the Nahdlatul Ulama in that important positions i.e., as the Second Secretary, the Head of the Pemuda Section and the Head of the Section Sabilillah and Hizbullah respectively. It seemed that the positions given to these two organizations in the Central Board were not commensurate with their positions amongst the mass following within the Muslim community. Fortunately, this lack of recognition was balanced by the important positions entrusted to both of them in the Madjelis Sjuro. In this Madjelis it was hoped that they could still play a role in steering the party. As long as the general policy of the party was determined by the Central Board, the executive body of the party, however, it seemed that the initiative would most likely come from this body. In other words, it is not far from the truth if one Western scholar says that the leadership of the party "by no means represented the broad mass of the santri community," but rather by its social and educational background, this leadership more represented the urban and modernist Islamic community.[5]

However, this situation does not mean that the existing leadership had not been previously agreed by the leaders of both Muhammadijah and Nahdlatul Ulama as well as by leaders of the special collective members of the Masjumi. Since the decision of the Muslim Congress at Jogyakarta was the result of the deliberation among the representatives of the Muslim community who attended that Congress - whether individually or on behalf of their respective organizations - such a decision was justified and viable. The only reason, the present writer thinks, which can be given to explain to this situation is the acknowledgement on the part of the ᶜulamā' of their bitter experience at the time of the Japanese occupation, when they were forced to compete with the secular nationalist leaders in their struggle to achieve Islamic interests. This kind of disappointment forced them to acknowledge honestly the capability of their fellow Muslim political leaders who were more accustomed to dealing with political matters and with secularly oriented nationalist leaders. If the Congress decided to entrust the leadership of the Masjumi Party not to them but to Western educated Muslim leaders, they regarded this decision as an acceptable one and they had no objection to abiding by it.

Furthermore, it seems that they were satisfied to confine themselves to religious matters in their role as the members of the Madjelis Sjuro of this party, due to their expertness in those matters. Thus, the uneasy experience they underwent during the last periods of the Japanese occupation, and especially in their struggle in the

representative bodies to achieve Islamic interests as was discussed in the previous Chapter, made them aware of their real weakness and lack of experience and skill in political matters. This awareness was, of course, welcome by the Muslim community in the sense that although the ^{c}ulamā' did not have important positions in the Central Board, they had still a significant role within the party. They had the task of preventing the party from going in undesired direction, and to guide it by Islamic teachings.

Before discussing the leadership of the Masjumi in more detail, it is useful to note what Feith said about the categories of leaders within political parties i.e., the 'administrators' and the 'solidarity makers'. By the first he meant "men with administrative, legal, technical and foreign language skills, such as are required for running the modern state." [6] His second group is composed of those who are "leaders skilled as mediators between groups at different levels of modernity and political effectiveness, as mass organizers, and as manipulators of integrative symbols." [7] Elswhere, Feith used other terms to indicate the same concept i.e., the 'intellectuals' and the 'mass leaders'.[8]

From the revolutionary period on, Feith remarked, the country's situation created between these two groups in Indonesia. This conflict, he further insisted, was not limited to the political parties but also existed between groups of governmental leaders.[9]

Although not all writers agree with Feith's terminology and categorization of political leaders,[10] his opinion perhaps is useful

in discussing the Masjumi leadership.

Since the foundation of this party in November 1945, it had encompassed two main streams of thought within the Indonesian Muslim community that is, the modernist and the traditionalist. The first stream was represented by the Muslim intellectuals who acted as administrators within the party, and the second was represented by the <u>ᶜulamā</u>' who acted as the solidarity makers of the party. Kahin called these two groups the 'religious Socialist' or the left wing of the party and the conservative or the right wing of the party.[11] The first was composed of men with higher Western education who wanted the party to be "a stabilizing and consolidating factor in political life," while the second was recruited from "former leaders of Muslim guerilla formations, and men of traditional authority in particular regions."[12]

Abu Hanifah, a prominent Masjumi leader, said that there were three groups of leaders in the Masjumi i.e., "the conservative group mainly consisting of Muslim religious leaders; the moderate group composing of Mohammad Natsir, Sjafrudin, Roem; and the more Western thinking religious Socialists such as Dr Sukiman, Jusuf Wibisono and myself."[13] Another Masjumi leader said "that it was no longer a secret that there were two schools of thought in the Masjumi."[14] His opinion was shared, to some extent, by Prawoto, another prominent Masjumi leader.[15]

The two latter Masjumi leaders combine the second and third groups described by Abu Hanifah. In the following years and even

during the first years of the revolution Abu Hanifah pointed out that "the moderate group was linked politically more to Sjahrir while the conservative group and the religious socialists, happened to fight more side by side."[16] Thus, politically, the conservative leaders followed the policy held by Dr Sukiman rather than that of Mohammad Natsir. The difference of opinion between these two wings within the 'administrators' and its influence on the subsequent development of the party will be discussed in more detail below.

In its earliest years, the Masjumi seems to have maintained an equilibrium between the two main streams of its leadership. But by the end of 1948, as Kahin pointed out, the modernist followers of Dr Sukiman and Mohammad Natsir had come to "exercise more influence over Masjumi's policy than the remainder of the Council's members combined."[17] The difference between these two groups i.e., the modernists and the conservatives or traditionalists, Kahin further remarked, was rooted in the dissimilar "interpretation of what Islamic social principles and how they should be applied in Indonesia."[18] The first group, continued Kahin, derived their inspiration partly from the early leaders of Sarekat Islam in the prewar period and partly from their own experience as the result of "the impact of the Indonesian revolution upon sincere young Muslims possessed of enlightened minds and strong sense of duty to society."[19] The significant role of this group can be seen, as he observed, in the creation of the party's Urgency Program, of which they were the architects.[20]

In this latest grouping, it was clear, according to Feith,

that factional divisions in the party did not follow the lines of religious cleavage only. In the group of administrators, he further explained, there were also two main factions, that of Natsir and that of Sukiman.[21] In his conclusion, Feith said that at least two important lines existed in the leadership of the Masjumi, "one between groups of different religious orientation ... and another between cliquelike factions within the 'administrators' leadership in the party."[22]

2. The role of the ᶜulamā' in the Masjumi leadership.

A short description of the role of the ᶜulamā' in Indonesia will be given here before discussing the role of them in the Masjumi Party.

From the coming of Islam up to the present time, the influence of the ᶜulamā' has been observed and strongly felt in Indonesia. Those ᶜulamā' became the Muslim leaders in guiding the Muslim community concerning both their religious matters and daily life. Compared to the present leaders, Natsir wrote, "the ᶜulamā' had been functioning a far longer time in guiding the Indonesian Muslim community." Those ᶜulamā' whom they called by different names in accordance with their respective regions in Indonesia, such as Kijahi Guru, Angku Sjech or Sjech (Shaykh) were "the men in whom they put their credibility." Natsir further said, "the fatwā of an ᶜālim whom they trust fully is final." To substantiate his opinion Natsir argued: "It is not infrequent that the government cannot enforce its

regulation properly in a certain region if the ᶜulamā' at the respective region rejected such a regulation."[23] In this respect the government had to be cautious in exerting its power. The other Muslim leader, Munawar Cholil gives also his opinion on this when he says: "Because the ᶜulamā' became the transmitters of the words of God to subsequent generations following the death of the Prophet, their role in the Muslim community had considerable respect."[24] Then he further argued that "it was they who bravely preached Islam in the remotest parts of the world. And therefore they were actually the leaders of the Muslim community and simultaneously they were also parts of them." Because of their special position as explained above, he further stated "that the ᶜulamā' had built up considerable respect amongst Indonesian Muslims and therefore it is no wonder that the lay Muslim would often respond to their words rather than obey similar orders given by the government officials."[25]

According to Naim, the role of the ᶜulamā' in Indonesia, especially in Java, is not limited to that of spiritual leaders in rural areas; they also have a significant influence in economic, social and political fields. In the economic field, he further stated, their role was long felt, since the power of businessmen over the economic life of the country people increased gradually. This can be explained, he continued, by the fact that Muslim merchants played a part in spreading of Islam from coastal areas to the interior regions. They used the pesantren, the religious schools, as halting place. Frequently the santris themselves were engaged in this merchant

activity and as a result, the relationship between the merchants, the peddlars and the santris grew steadily. When the Dutch colonial rulers introduced the new economic system into the Indonesian life especially in the rural areas, it most likely brought about more sufferings to the village people than benefits. Consequently most of them became poor and had to sell their lands to the santri-merchants in order to survive. In other words it can be said that in many cases the economic life of the peasantry was heavily dependant on the santris. In this respect the santris had no competition except from the Chinese and Arab commission agents who were moving in and out of the villages. This fact of course, contributed to the growing influence of the santri class in the economic field in Indonesian society.[26]

In the religious field, Naim further explained that the kijahis exercised their influence through pesantren, madrasah, langgar and mosque.[27] Both langgar and mosque besides being places for prayer, are also used for holding meetings for tabligh or pengajian.[28] The kijahis taught the Muslim community their religion and began to spread the concepts of orthodoxy first to their santris and then to the mass of ummat.[29] Some of kijahis also practiced the work of dukun (curing) and engaged in mystical activities.

In the political field, Naim stated that the ᶜulamā' exerted their power by becoming the government officials in the Ministry for Religious Affairs. With this new position, he further argued, the kijahis now not only functioned as the civil leaders because of

their personal or traditional charismatic authority but also in their capacity as the representatives of the government with legal authority. In other words, if formerly the kijahis or ᶜulamā' introduced Islamic teachings to the wider world, especially to the mass of peasantry in Indonesia, now, in Naim's words, they "also sit at the table of government and concern themselves with the political problem of the country."[30]

From the foregoing brief and incomplete description of the role of the ᶜulamā' in Indonesia, we will turn to discuss the role of the ᶜulamā' in the Masjumi leadership.

Theoretically the role of the ᶜulamā' in the Masjumi leadership was significant enough to steer the party in keeping with Islamic teachings. This function was stipulated in the Masjumi constitution, which indicated that by creating a special body within the party i.e., the Madjelis Sjuro, the ᶜulamā' were also given responsibility to lead the party. To what extent the ᶜulamā' exercised their influence, at least theoretically, may be seen in the Masjumi constitution, which runs:

a. The Central Madjelis Sjuro has the right to propose political matters to the Executive Council of the Party (Dewan Pimpinan Partai).

b. The Central Madjelis Sjuro has the obligation to answer the questions on religious matters posed by the Dewan Pimpinan Partai.

c. The Dewan Pimpinan Partai has the obligation to ask for fatwa to the Central Madjelis Sjuro on political matters which was considered to be closely related to hukum agama (lit., religious law).

d. A decision made unanimously by the Central Madjelis

Sjuro on hukum agama shall have final authority.[31]

In short it can also be said that the Madjelis Sjuro had the right and duty to: (1) respond to requests and give fatwās to the Dewan Pimpinan Partai concerning political matters which are closely related to hukum agama and also give religious consideration about general matters. (2) demand the Dewan Pimpinan Partai to put the decision of the Madjelis Sjuro into practice.

From the constitution it seemed that the Masjumi political leaders had given the Masjumi ᶜulamā' a significant role within the party, in accordance with the considerable respect they received from the Indonesian Muslim community. But unfortunately in practice those stipulations were not applied fully by the Executive Council or the Central Board. This situation created a kind of uneasy feeling on the part of the Masjumi ᶜulamā', who then looked upon the constitution as ineffective. "This ineffectiveness," Saleh Suaidy, a leading Masjumi ᶜulamā', says, "was caused by several factors. The first factor resulted from the Madjelis Sjuro and its own members who are inactive in contemplating, discussing and presenting their suggestions, proposals and concrete opinion about the principal and non principal political problems to the Central Board ... whether because of lack of materials given by the Central Board or because of lack of initiative on the part of Madjelis Sjuro itself."[32] The second factor, he further explained, was caused by the Central Board whose leaders, to put it in his own words, "had shown an unsympathetic attitude towards the Madjelis Sjuro members by considering them insignificant, al-

though in their speech ... they respected the ʿulamā' and praised them highly."[33] This unsympathetic attitude, though it can not be proved scientifically, he further insists, was deduced from the following data:

1. The Madjelis Sjuro will be consulted only when the Central Board faced difficulty. But if not, it will be neglected.
2. In meetings, congresses etc., it is not still clear about the real position of the Madjelis Sjuro.
3. In the Central Board meeting, whether in the central level or regional level, the Madjelis Sjuro sometimes was invited and sometimes not.
4. The administrational facilities of the Madjelis Sjuro both at the central and regional level, has never been completed by the Central Board.
5. The unconscious expressions given by the Central Board members, though in jest, tended to disdain the Masjumi ʿulamā' leaders.[34]

Suaidy added one more factor to justify his opinion. He said that the limited power possessed by the Madjelis Sjuro - namely that it has only the right to give fatwās concerning hukum agama which related to the political matters - contributed to the situation.[35]

Whether Suaidy's argument is strong enough or not to prove the validity of his opinion, in fact his feeling was shared by another prominent Masjumi ʿālim, Munawar Cholil who, after admitting the lack of knowledge on the part of most ʿulamā' both in general and political knowledge and in administration skill, suggested that the ʿulamā' hold firmly their position by showing their skill and expertness in their specialization. "This is important," he argued, "because there are still many politicians who claimed that they fought for the Islamic

cause, but in reality they discarded the ^culamā' and put them aside." To make clear his statement, Munawar Cholil pointed out that in a critical situation many ᶜulamā' sacrificed their lives and fell victim to save the country, but when the crisis was over, they enjoyed nothing.[36] It seemed that in a critical time most of the ᶜulamā' were manipulated by politicians who promised them rewards such as good positions, political power etc., in recompense. But unfortunately when such a crisis disappeared and no more danger threatened the security of the politicians, none of the promises had been materialized.

Perhaps the most open and severe criticism about the negative attitude of the Masjumi political leaders towards its ᶜulamā' was frankly expressed by a young Muslim leader who referred to the "arrogant attitude of several leaders of the ruling class, that is they who because of their knowledge or university degree feel that they have a monopoly over general knowledge and therefore maintained that the santris and kijahis ... should operate in surau ... and confine themselves to religious duties."[37]

This uncomfortable situation was also admitted by Jusuf Wibisono, a prominent Masjumi leader, who says that the difference of opinion between the Masjumi ᶜulamā' and the Masjumi political leaders was rooted in their different educational backgrounds. For example he points out that when the government accepted the Renville agreement between the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesian rulers, the Madjelis Sjuro considered it forbidden, while the Central Board of the party

held the opinion "in order to prevent our state from ruin caused by such an agreement," the Masjumi party had to take part in the Cabinet which would carry it out.[38]

So it is obvious that the difference of opinion between the intellectuals and the ^c^ulamā' within the Masjumi was unavoidable. This is because each group had a difference of frame of reference, or more precisely, in the words of Jusuf Wibisono, because of "the structure of thought (denkstruktuur) of the ^c^ālim (Masjumi) member is the denkstruktuur of a religious man." [39] To clarify his point, Jusuf Wibisono points out that at the time of revolution, one of the Masjumi ^c^ulamā' accepted the offer to be the Minister of Religious Affairs in the Cabinet of the Pasundan state, a state established by the Dutch government in Western Java to weaken the political position of the Republic. According to him, the policy of the Masjumi at that time in prohibiting its members from joining such a Cabinet was unacceptable to the said Masjumi ^c^ālim because, Wibisono insisted, that Masjumi ^c^ālim based his judgment only on religious considerations.[40]

However, this does not mean that the situation was unsurmountable. The fact that the Masjumi ^c^ulamā' held their position until the banning of the party in 1960 indicates that the crucial points could finally be settled within the party. It goes without saying that personal ambitions and interest sometimes also contributed to the differences of opinion as a general phenomenon within every party.

In short we can say that although the role of the ^c^ulamā' in

the Masjumi was significant at least theoretically, in fact, due to many causes, that significant role could not be fully played by the ᶜulamā'. At least until 1952, the end of the period for which this party is under discussion, it was felt by the Masjumi ᶜulamā', that their political co-leaders emphasized political considerations rather than religious one in decision making.[41] They also complained that most of their suggestions were set aside or ignored by the Masjumi political leaders. This uneasy feeling also resulted from the unsympathetic attitude on the part of some of the Masjumi intellectuals who unconsciously showed their superiority.[42] To what extent this situation could affect the party will be discussed below.

3. The internal dissension within the Masjumi leadership and its effect on the role of the ᶜulamā'.

It is not necessary to say here that the internal dissension within party leadership is a natural phenomenon in the political party tradition. This internal dissension is generated by various factors, one of which is caused by the everlasting struggle between older and younger leaders.

While the older leaders generally are conservative and orthodox in their outlook, the younger leaders are regarded as more dynamic and pragmatic in their approach. They looked upon the older leaders as the men who are out of date and unable to lead the party in gaining its goals. In turn, these younger leaders are considered by the older ones serious contenders who always threaten the secu-

rity of their key position within the party. Therefore, in this context, it is understandable that the older leaders always try to make every possible effort to maintain their influence and power. In the mind of their competitors these younger leaders are nothing but the trouble makers who are inclined to lead the party in an undesired direction, rather to make it stronger in constructive ways.

Another reason is the arrogant attitude which is usually shown by the older leaders, who regard themselves as superior to the others. In this respect we can understand the explanation given by Robert Michels, who said that "those who have long been in possession (and this applies just as much to spiritual and psychical possession as to material) are proud of their past, and are therefore inclined to look down upon those whose ownership is of more recent date." [43]

As long as the effort of the older leaders to retain their power and influence is justified and backed by the masses of the party, their old position is unshakeable; but once such an effort fails to attain their aims, these older leaders have to decide whether, as Michels put it, "they are willing to yield to the opinion of the rank and file" of the party and resign, or if they have "to share their power with the new arrivals."[44]

After analyzing the causes leading to struggle between the two groups of leaders, Michels explained further that there are two categories of motives which created the tension. The first resulted from the "objective differences and differences of prin-

ciple in general philosophical views, or at least in the mode in which the proximate social evolution is conceived, and consequent divergences of opinion as to the most desirable tactics ...," and the second is the motives which can be sought in the "personal reasons: antipathy, envy, jealousy, a reckless attempt to grasp the first positions, demagogy."[45] Perhaps we can say that this second category covers both personal reasons and ambitions. To clarify this latter category Michels felt necessary to quote the speech given by one of the two contending leaders who described his opponent by saying: "He hates me because he thinks there is not room for the two cocks in the same foulhouse."[46]

In short, it may be said, according to Michels, motives can be found in both personal and impersonal areas. Frequently, these two types of motive are intertwined and confused, so that they appear on the surface as if one overshadowed the other. This possibility will occur if the circumstances surrounding the leader prevents him from showing his basic motives. To put it in Michels' words:

> In most cases the two series of motives are somewhat confounded in practice; and in the long run we find that those of the former series tend to be replaced by those of the latter, inasmuch as differences of principle and of the intellectual order soon become personal and lead to a profound hostility between the representatives of the various theories. Conversely it is clear that motives of the second series, since those who are influenced by them are ashamed to display them in their true colors, always endeavor to assume the mantle of theory; personal dislike and personal hostility pompously masquerade as differences of views and tactics.47

This struggle rarely ended in the complete submission and defeat of the older leaders, and usually compromises were reached between the two competitors. This situation is understandable because this "is not so much a circulation des élites as a réunion des élites, an amalgam, that is to say, of the two elements." [48]

This discussion about the internal conflict within party leadership, as put forward by Michels, will provide us with some light on the same question within the Masjumi party, to which the following pages are devoted.

Since the time of its establishment, the Masjumi Party was a party of complexity. It was a "party of indirect structure", [49] or in the words of Duverger, "a mixed party in which individual members are found side by side with affiliated members." [50] Besides that, its leadership was composed of Muslim intellectuals as well as of the ᶜulamā'. These leaders were found in both the younger and the older groups. In addition, they differed in their approaches to solving problems in both political and religious matters. Isa Anshary, a prominent Masjumi leader, said that there were three currents of thought in approaching the religious matters. First, there are the representatives of the conservative-reactionary current of thought or muqallidīn. This group, according to him, hold the opinion that the established Islamic teachings formulated by the ᶜulamā' in the Islamic medieval period are final and unquestionable. This group seek "to reject every thought and belief leading to the change of their old opinion and belief into the bounder

ones." Second are those who belong to the moderate-liberal group, who hold the opinion that "to discuss the bid^c^ah (religious innovation), furū^c^iyyah (matters concerning non-doctrinal importance in religious teachings) and khilāfiyyah (the dispute concerning the correct use of taqlīd and ijtihād in religious matters) is nothing but to destroy the unity of the Muslim community." Therefore, this group, Anshary said, regard such discussions as worthless and unproductive. Third are those who can be called the revolutionary-radical group. This group intend to change the Muslim community radically. This last group, he stated further, can also be called those who belong to "aliran Qur'ān dan Sunnah" (lit., the current of Qur'an and Tradition).[51]

Although Anshary discussed this problem in relation to the general situation within the Muslim community, his opinion can be applied to the situation within the Masjumi itself because it mirrored the real situation in the Muslim community. This opinion was shared by H. Feith, who suggested that there were three currents of thought within the Masjumi Party in approaching religious matters: first the traditionalist, second the modernist, and third the radical fundamentalist.[52] In the opinion of the present writer, the second and third groups can be combined because there is no principle difference between them. So we can say that as far as religious matters are concerned, there are only two main currents of thought within the Masjumi Party i.e., the traditionalist and the modernist. The former were mainly represented by the Nahdlatul Ulama leaders and the other

conservative leaders, while the latter were represented by Muslim intellectuals including the Muhammadijah and the Persis leaders

As far as political matters were concerned, the above division seems to be no longer relevant, because in fact some of the modernist leaders of the older generation aligned themselves with the traditionalists in competing with the younger leaders to gain key positions within the party. Therefore we can understand that when Kahin said there were only two main currents of thought within the Masjumi leadership, he meant the Religious Socialists and the Conservatives. This distinction began to come into being when, as Kahin stated, the issue of "the interpretation of what Islamic social principles were and how they should be applied in Indonesia ..."[53] became the subject of discussion in the party meeting. This Religious Socialist group, which he also called the left wing of the party, was contrasted to its right wing. This latter group was, Kahin insisted, "based on the Nahdlatul Ulama and the more conservative elements of the Muhammadijah ...." However, Kahin explained that these two groups were mediated by a third small group which was composed of "the more progressive members of the Muhammadijah,... the party's Chairman, Dr Sukiman, and ... Prawoto Mangkusasmito."[54]

Kahin's remarks cover just one of the controversial issues over which the Masjumi leaders disagreed. Another political issue which caused the Masjumi leaders to come into conflict was the question of completing the Indonesian revolution, whether the Masjumi Party should adopt the policy of peaceful settlement or that of

force. This became the most controversial issue not only between the Masjumi leaders at the time of the Revolution, but also between the leaders of other parties.

When the Linggarjati agreement draft was signed by the representatives of both the Indonesian and the Dutch governments on November 15, 1946, to settle their arm and political conflict, the attitudes of the Indonesian leaders were not the same. Some were in favor of that agreement while others rejected it. Within the Masjumi itself this situation can also be observed. Officially the Masjumi Party, by means of its Central Board, had decided to reject the Linggarjati agreement draft while some leaders seemed to support it.

The Central Board of the Masjumi, whose Chairman was Dr Sukiman and which was dominated by the Muslim leaders belonging to the older generation, had a great influence within the party. Because of their more vehemently nationalist and more anti-Western attitude compared to that of the younger leaders, they succeeded in getting support from the masses of the party. Together with the P.N.I. party and some other parties, the Masjumi formed the united front which was called Benteng Republik Indonesia (lit., the fortress of the Republic of Indonesia) whose aim was to conduct the campaign against the Linggarjati agreement. This front found that the agreement was more likely to benefit the Dutch government than the Republic, and made every possible effort to influence the people in order to reject it.[55] This attitude of the Masjumi Party Central Board was strongly backed by both the Muhammadijah and the Nahdlatul Ulama as well as by the

G.P.I.I.[56] Surprisingly enough this official policy of the Masjumi Party was opposed by the men like Natsir, Roem and Sjafruddin, who happened to be the representatives of the younger leaders. It seems that these younger leaders, according to B. Kees, were more pragmatic and realistic in their outlook. They realized, Kees further said, that separation from the West would mean damage to the Republic.[57] It is only in the light of this that their joining the Sjahrir Cabinet in October, 1946, can be understood properly, in spite of the fact that their own party opposed the Sjahrir policy.[58] Thus, it was not because of some Masjumi leaders lived in Jakarta and others lived in Jogyakarta;[59] rather, the different outlook goes beyond the apparent differences of environmental situation. In addition, the fact that the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadijah could cooperate in backing the Masjumi Central Board despite their differences in religious matters, proved that as long as the common ground existed, the unity between them was still could be retained.

In summary, we can say that, concerning the political matters, the Masjumi leaders were divided into two groups i.e., the "administrators" and the "solidarity makers" as Feith termed it,[60] or "the administrators" and the "ideologists" as B. Dahm preferred to put it,[61] or the "progressive wing" and the "conservative wing" as Kees described it.[62]

Whatever terms have been used to refer to such a situation, the core of the problem still remained the same. The differences of opinion amongst the Masjumi leaders still existed and affected the

subsequent development of the party.

The two currents of thought in approaching political matters as described earlier were frankly admitted by one of the prominent Masjumi leaders, Mohammad Roem, who belonged to Natsir group. He stated that in his party one could observe the existence of two currents of thought.[63] Though he did not explain in more detail, one can easily guess which currents he meant. His statement implicitly justified the assertion from outsiders that within the Masjumi leadership there were two factions, one was headed by Dr Sukiman, and the other was led by Natsir.

Concerning this question, Natsir himself, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Executive Council of the Masjumi Party, gave his reaction to the statement of Roem. He said that he did not believe that Roem had made a statement of much consequence. However, he also said that he did not deny the existence of differences of opinion within the Masjumi Party; such a case was natural in any party. He further explained that although one could observe the existence of differences of opinion within the Masjumi Party, it did not bring about, as D. Noer related it, "an antagonism which could be called currents of thought"[64] Whenever difficulties arose Natsir argued, the solution was always achieved by the deliberation of the Masjumi in the party conference and, therefore, all the Masjumi leaders subject to obey it.[65]

Natsir's opinion was shared by another prominent Masjumi leader, Prawoto, who also denied the existence of faction within

the Masjumi Party. He gave his opinion before the Masjumi cadres' course. After pointing out the current circumstances surrounding the Masjumi Party and starting some preliminary dialogue between himself and his audience, especially concerning the widely-rumoured split within the Masjumi Party he then said:

> <u>Alhamdulillah</u>, Masjumi got the graciousness of God. It is true that there are differences of opinion within the Masjumi Party. However the important thing now is whether we have channelled it [or not]. We do remember the democratic foundation in Islam which reads: <u>Wa amruhum shūrā baynahum fa idhā ʿazamta fa tawakkal ʿalā Allah</u>. If we are smart enough to apply it, [I believe] we will win in this ordeal, if not, we will lose. To win or to lose facing that ordeal is a natural thing. If we observe the Masjumi situation by the Islamic point of view it is not necessary for us to get panicky. The very important thing now to do in our effort to win [is to find the answer to the following question]: "What is our next attitude and action?[66]

It is useful to note in what situations the above mentioned statements were issued by those Masjumi leaders. These statements were made after the resignation of the Natsir Cabinet and when the Sukiman Cabinet had just begun to function. The Natsir Cabinet resigned in March, 1951, and Sukiman Cabinet took its place in April 1951. Ironically, the resignation of the Natsir Cabinet was called for among others by a prominent Masjumi leader, Jusuf Wibisono, who belonged to Sukiman group.[67] From this period on, the tension between these two groups can easily be observed. This situation became worse when Sukiman, in his effort to form a new Cabinet, accepted the extension of his <u>formateur-ship</u>, contrary to the decision of the Masjumi Executive Council ordering him to give back

the *formateur*-ship mandate to President Sukarno if he failed to compose a new Cabinet within five days. His acceptance was interpreted by the Natsir's group that Sukiman, in Feith's words, "was allowing himself to be used to split the Masjumi."[68] Feith further explained that such feeling was strengthened by the fact that Sukiman also agreed to accept the offer of President Sukarno to be the next Prime Minister. According to Feith, the tension between these two groups could not be avoided.[69] How far this difference of opinion played its part in disintegrating the unity of the Masjumi leadership is indicated by the fact that "only a few hours before the formateurs took their completed Cabinet list to the President, the Masjumi executive body (led by Natsir) issued a statement to the effect that Sukiman's actions as *formateur* were not valid as actions taken on behalf of the Masjumi."[70] However, just before the Sukiman Cabinet was to be confirmed in June 1951 in the Parliament, the Executive Council of the Masjumi Party in its meeting on May 19, 1951, agreed to "give the Cabinet an opportunity to implement its program."[71] With this decision it seemed that the rumour predicting the splitting of the Masjumi began to disappear.

This rumour was intentionally spread to the public by political opponents anxious to weaken the political position of the Masjumi. As long as the Masjumi Party still was united and in a strong political position, the interests of political opponents were difficult to realize. In this connection, Guy J. Pauker says: "Much of the political history of independent Indonesia could be

written in terms of the efforts of other political groups to weaken the Masjumi and to postpone elections until its chances to consolidate itself as the country's leading party had been reduced."[72] One of the elements of the rumour was the prediction of the establishment of a new Masjumi, called Masjumi Merdeka (Free Masjumi). Fortunately for the Masjumi, Mr Kasman Singodimedjo, a Masjumi leader who belonged to Sukiman group, made a statement to deny the establishment of a new Masjumi.[73]

In short, it is obvious that the competition between the older and the younger leaders within the Masjumi camp was unavoidable because the rise of the younger generation to the political scene in the period after the Second World War was, as acknowledged by G. S. Massanat, a general phenomenon in the developing countries. He says: "Since the end of the Second World War, the politics of the emergent nations have been directed by new and relatively young persons."[74] About the quality of these new young leaders, Massanat further remarked: "They tend to emphasize competence, performance, and ability rather than ascriptive rights ... as the sole criteria for public service."[75]

It is no wonder that in the Masjumi the younger leaders began to ascend to power. In 1949 the Masjumi congress, at which the election of a new Chairman was carried out, the younger leaders headed by Natsir won a tremendous triumph over the older ones. According to D. Noer, in this congress Natsir gained far more votes than Sukiman in their competition for the top position in the party

leadership. And as a result, it was Natsir and not Sukiman who was elected to be the Chairman of the Executive Council of the Party. Although Sukiman was also elected at that time to be the Chairman or the President of the party as well as the Chairman of the Legislative Council, his influence within the party began to decrease.[76]

Since 1949 the policy of the Masjumi Party was increasingly directed by these younger leaders, whose outlook was in line with that of the P. S. I. or Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party). Therefore, the cooperation between these two parties can be observed more clearly since this time on. However, this does not mean that the power of Sukiman and his followers was completely diminished. Frequently in his capacity as the President of the party, he issued political statements contrary to those of the Executive Council. This situation arose from the absence of clear-cut division of authority between the President and the Chairman of the Executive Council of the party in the Masjumi regulations. It seems that this confusing situation more likely benefited political opponents than the Masjumi itself. With the existence of the contradictory statements given by its leaders, the door was opened for political opponents to discredit the Masjumi.

It is apparent that whatever terms might be used to clarify the situation within the Masjumi leadership, it seems to the present writer that the differences of opinion existing in the Masjumi were described both by the Masjumi leaders and the outsiders as well. Those Masjumi leaders who admitted differences of opinion

did not agree whether or not this difference of opinion constituted perpecahan (faction).

It is true that this term was intentionally utilized by political opponents for the sake of their own political interests. This situation in any political struggle is natural and normal. If political opponents made every possible effort in this direction it is quite understandable and logical. It was up to the Masjumi itself to launch its counter-attack for the sake of its own survival.

Further explanation about the internal dissension within the Masjumi leadership is given by Feith. He said that as far as economic affairs were concerned, the two groups within the Masjumi leadership had no difference of opinion; but when political matters were being worked out, the differences of opinion can clearly be observed when "the important issue of the President's power and his right to a say in cabinet affairs," became the subject of discussion within the party. In dealing with this issue, he said, "the Natsir group took the narrow view of his prerogrative and the Sukiman group was prepared to justify his playing a political role and to co-operate with him in this."[77] As a logical result, Feith insisted, the President was at odds with the Natsir Cabinet while he backed the Sukiman Cabinet strongly.[78]

In connection with the subject of this discussion, it is useful to observe that the differences of opinion within the Masjumi Party were in evidence as early as 1947, when the third Sjahrir

Cabinet had ceased to function and the new Cabinet was still in preparation. The role of the formateur of the new Cabinet was entrusted by the President to Amir Sjarifuddin, a colleague of Sjahrir, Failing to cooperate with the Masjumi in forming a new Cabinet, he finally succeeded in persuading some of the Masjumi leaders (who consisted mainly of former P.S.I.I. leaders of the prewar time) to join him in his Cabinet. Because of this arrangement, those Masjumi leaders had to revive their old P.S.I.I., and as a result, the split of the Masjumi became inevitable. This separation resulted, according to B. Dahm, "partly from political opportunism and partly because it had always looked askance at the liberal philosophy which was gaining ground in that body."[79]

It is also necessary to explain here that most of the Masjumi leaders who were recruited from the old P.S.I.I. were of the older generation. They felt that their role as initiators in the Islamic political experience at the time of the Dutch colonial period was not properly appreciated by the existing Masjumi leaders. Fortunately for the Masjumi, the split off of the P.S.I.I. was not felt as a heavy blow because "the P.S.I.I. influence remained limited, as its Islamic interests were more effectively represented by the orthodox and the reformists, and its political ones by the ideologists ...."[80]

We can now turn to the question of the effect of the internal dissension within the Masjumi leadership on the role of the <u>ᶜulamā</u>'.

It has already been explained in the preceding Chapters that there were two main streams of thought in the Masjumi leadership i.e., the traditionalist and the modernist. The traditionalists were mainly composed of the ^culamā' and the modernists were mainly represented by the Muslim intellectuals.

The prevailing controversial issue was whether the ^culamā' or the Muslim intellectuals were most likely had the right to steer the party. Both groups had their own reasons to justify their right to that direction. The ^culamā' contended that they were the actual Muslim leaders who had the privilege to interpret the words of God and the sayings of the Prophet. They argued further that they really knew and understood completely and unmistakeably the Islamic teachings and that therefore it was their full right to have a say in this matter. Moreover, they were prepared, educated, equipped and nurtured in that atmosphere, so it was a logical consequence, according to them, that the leadership of this party should be entrusted in their hands.

The Muslim intellectuals had their own opinion on this matter. They stated that they did not deny the right of ^culamā' to guide the Muslim community toward the correct way as designated by Islamic teachings. Likewise they also acknowledged the truth of the ^culamā''s claim about the latter's expertness in religious matters. They also agreed fully to the right of ^culamā' to interpret the Islamic teachings as was embodied in the Qur'ān and Tradition in accordance with their special training and educational background.

However, the only thing that they wanted to convey to the ^c^ulamā' was that all the reasons put forward by the ^c^ulamā', did not automatically mean that they had the privilige to monopolize the party leadership. According to the Muslim intellectuals, the expertise of the ^c^ulamā' should not prevent other Muslims from taking part in leading the party. They agreed, as far as the religious matters was concerned, that the ^c^ulamā' held the top leadership within the Muslim community; but when political matters or a mix up of these two matters was concerned, this was another question.

To justify their opinion, the Muslim intellectuals explained that the political party was not only the business of the ^c^ulamā', but it was the business of the Muslim leaders in general. So, they argued, although the Masjumi was an Islamic political party this did not necessarily mean that only the ^c^ulamā' had the right to steer the party. Moreover, they argued, unlike the ^c^ulamā', they had been trained in political matters since the colonial period. They also argued that they were the Muslim leaders who had enough skill and experience to compete with other party leaders to fight for Islamic interests. Thus if the party leadership was entrusted to them by the Muslim community, they contended, it was quite reasonable.

Wahid Hasjim, a prominent Masjumi leader and ^c^ālim, explained that there were two groups of Muslim leaders that is, Muslim political leaders and Muslim religious leaders. The first group he said, was generally composed of Muslim intellectuals who gained their

knowledge from the Western educational system while the Muslim religious leaders got their training from Islamic traditional education. As a result, the first group was superior in general knowledge but very poor in their religious knowledge. Conversely, the religious leaders were professional in the religious knowledge, but their general knowledge was no more than the secondary school level. Therefore it was understandable that this group, according to him, had no idea at all about political matters.[81]

Perhaps it is also necessary to mention here that within the Muslim intellectual group we could find leaders who had received their political and general knowledge not directly from the Western educational institution but from the modern Islamic educational system as was developed in Cairo by the Modernist Islamic movement. This new movement was usually associated with the teachings of Muḥammad ᶜAbduh and his disciples, and it was developed in the late 19th century. One of his chief disciples was Rashid Riḍa who edited al-Manar magazine, by which he spread and voiced the teachings of his teacher. These new teachings also had influence in Indonesia, thanks to al-Manar and students of ᶜAbduh. The chief reason why this new movement attracted the Indonesian Muslim leaders was "its particular concern for social and political justice"[82] as well as its effort to make "some attempt to restate the principles of Islamic ethics in terms of social values."[83]

These ideas finally had found their political expression, first in Sarekat Islam movement,[84] and then in Masjumi itself.[85]

Concerning this modernist movement A. Samson writes: "Contending that a renewed Islamic faith was eminently capable of providing a religious and philosophical base for rapid economic and social development, modernists have advocated the mastery of science and technology and in other ways promoted the reconciliation of Islam with the world of the 20th century."[86]

To further explanation this new movement, it is useful to know who the modernists are and what their main concern is. Gibb said that the term "modernists" refers to:

> those who do care, and sometimes care deeply, about their religion but who are, in various degrees, offended by the traditional dogmatics and by the insistence of the conservatives upon the sanctity of the traditional social institutions in the Muslim world. For the majority the issues in dispute are mainly those relating to the practical duties and the social institutions of Islam.[87]

Turning to the question of the Masjumi leaders, Wahid Hasjim further explains the characteristics of those two groups. He said that both had their strengths and weaknesses, and that the weaknesses of the one group were balanced by the strengths of the other group. Therefore the cooperation of these two groups was necessary to form the leadership of this party. He said that the first group had the ability to work out a plan, knowledge of organization and a lot of manpower, but they lacked influence over the mass of people. On the other hand the <u>ᶜulamā'</u>, because of their direct and close relationship with the mass of the people, had a tremendous influence upon them. Unfortunately they had no special training in

either political theory or knowledge. Therefore, Wahid Hasjim argued that their influence was limited to their respective regions and their organizations were un-coordinated.[88]

Based on his own experience, Wahid Hasjim describes the influence exerted by the <u>ᶜulamā'</u> over the people, especially at the time of the Indonesian revolution:

> At the time of the proclamation of the Indonesian independence (1945) the <u>ᶜulamā'</u> were the most powerful group in Indonesia surpassing the influence of the Government .... A lot of people crowded in front of the <u>ᶜulamā'</u>'s houses asking for their blessing and instruction [in order to go] to the battle field. The government officials asked for their guidance and beg for their <u>sawab</u> (lit., reward) and it was not infrequent that a person changed his mode of life into the mode of <u>santri</u> life completely in one day. Military leaders asked for their <u>ilhām</u> (lit., inspiration) to arrange the tactics of struggle and, the bodies for struggle showed their obedient attitude to those <u>ᶜulamā'</u> without reserve.[89]

From this it is obvious that the influence of the <u>ᶜulamā'</u> was most felt at the time of crisis in which spiritual guidance was badly needed to settle a compelling problem. From the writings of Wahid Hasjim perhaps one could easily assume that he tried to make a plea for the <u>ᶜulamā'</u> group which he considered had been the "victims" of the "political-play" of the political leaders. In this respect we can understand that the "silent competition" within the Masjumi leadership not only took place between the political leaders but also between the <u>ᶜulamā'</u> as one group and the political leaders as the other group.

As far as the interests of the <u>ᶜulamā'</u> group concerned, it

seemed that all Masjumi ᶜulamā', regardless from which organization they were recruited, formed one front to face the Muslim political leaders. They were composed of the modernist ᶜulamā' from the Muhammadijah, the traditionalist ᶜulamā' from the Nahdlatul Ulama and the fundamentalist ᶜulamā' from the Persis.

Although all the ᶜulamā' were represented in the Masjumi Party, in reality most of those ᶜulamā' were recruited from the Nahdlatul Ulama leaders. This is understandable because almost all of the Nahdlatul Ulama leaders were composed of the ᶜulamā'. And it was these ᶜulamā' who represented their organization in the Masjumi leadership, either in the Central Board of the party or in its branch or sub-branch leadership level.

From the time of the Masjumi establishment until 1949, it can be observed that the influence of the ᶜulamā' within the Masjumi Party was extremely great. This was caused by, among other things, the existence of Madjelis Sjuro within the Masjumi Party whose function was "to review the Leadership Council's decision and policies against Muslim legal standards."[90] One of the famous fatwās issued by this Madjelis Sjuro at the time of Indonesian revolution was that concerning the jihād fī sabīl Allah (fighting for the sake of religion). By this fatwa, the Muslim community was stimulated to make every possible effort to defend the country and religion. Thousands of young Indonesian Muslims responded to this fatwā spontaneously and sacrificed their lives in resisting the Dutch and Allied armies on the battle field.

It seemed that this Madjelis Sjuro either in its central level or in its branch and sub-branch level was dominated by the ᶜulamā' of the Nahdlatul Ulama. When in the Masjumi congress in 1949, at which a resolution had been passed to reorganize the party, the Nahdlatul Ulama leaders felt that this effort was planned by those who were from "the Western educated and modernist-inclined faction ..."[91] within the Masjumi leadership. The reorganization of the party was intended to change the status of the Madjelis Sjuro from its legislative status to a kind of advisory one. This decision was regarded by the Nahdlatul Ulama leaders as a heavy blow and was interpreted by them as " a subordination of religion to politics."[92] Surprisingly enough this complaint, especially concerning the changing of the Madjelis Sjuro status, as far as the present writer knows, was not heard from the other ᶜulamā'. Perhaps this is because only in this Madjelis Sjuro did the Nahdlatul Ulama function effectively as a pressure group within the party.

Whatever the case, it is obvious that by the reorganization of the party which was begun in 1949, the influence of the ᶜulamā' within the Masjumi party underwent a shift. As a result, according to Aboebakar, most of those ᶜulamā' became inactive because they realized that the Masjumi party emphasized the political point of view in handling all problems; it was only on a very few occasion that it "took as its guidance the fatwās and the amanats (instructions) given by the ᶜulamā' of the Madjelis Sjuro or of the other

institution."[93] In other words, all questions within the Masjumi Party, according to those <u>ᶜulamā'</u>, were viewed only from the political point of view without taking into consideration their religious guidance.

The inactivity of the most of <u>ᶜulamā'</u> within the Masjumi Party allowed the Muslim politicians to be more free to carry out their program in line with the political considerations, while for the <u>ᶜulamā'</u> it meant that the Masjumi Party did not function properly any more as it had been designed....

With this shift of power, the political leaders now dominated the scene. Subsequently these political leaders, who can now be termed the "administrators" of the party, began to divide among themselves. This situation which was noticed by one of the Masjumi leaders, can be observed clearly since 1951, when two currents of thought began to appear within the leadership. The first inclined to cooperate with the socialist group and the second more likely supported the nationalist one.[94] It is obvious that the above Masjumi leader meant nothing but the Natsir group and the Sukiman group as was elaborated in the previous discussion.

The Masjumi congress of 1949 not only brought about a change of status for the <u>Madjelis Sjuro</u> as was explained above, but it also marked the new shift of power within the Masjumi leadership from the older political leaders to the younger ones. In other words it can also be said that the older generation headed by Dr Sukiman underwent a considerable set back. Indirectly this stua-

tion also effected the political role of the ᶜulama' who, according to Abu Hanifah, had come to good terms with the Sukiman group since the first year of the revolution.[95]

Although Wahid Hasjim as a Nahdlatul Ulama Chairman and a Masjumi leader, he seemed to take a neutral position between these two contending political groups, as can be observed in his criticism; but practically he and his followers from the Nahdlatul Ulama camp would have liked to support the Sukiman group in this occasion. This situation can clearly be seen, as Feith pointed out, when Sukiman Cabinet was still functioning and Wahid Hasjim became its Minister of Religious Affairs.[96] Because of Hasjim's failure in this capacity in handling the Mecca pilgrimage problem, he was severely critisized both in public and in Parliament.[97] This matter "led to a personal disagreement between Wahid Hasjim on the one hand and Natsir and Sjafruddin on the other ...."[98] As a result, each of them tried to strengthen his own power within the party. Whereas one group tried to block the other from getting the powerful position in the central level leadership, the other group made a considerable effort to strengthen their position in the sub-branch or village level leadership.[99]

This situation worsened when Sukiman Cabinet resigned in February, 1952, and the formation of the new Cabinet was still in progress. Realizing that the fall of Sukiman Cabinet was more or less caused by the Natsir group, the Nahdlatul Ulama leaders declared a kind of ultimatum toward the Executive Council

of the Masjumi Party, declaring that they would withdraw from the Masjumi Party if Sukiman was not returned as the next Prime Minister and Wahid Hasjim as the next Minister of Religious Affairs in the forthcoming Cabinet. Surprisingly enough this ultimatum was issued after one of the Nahdlatul Ulama prominent leaders, K.H.A. Wahab Hasbullah, had a meeting with President Sukarno.[100] This fact at least suggested that the President had already known the above ultimatum before it was issued. But how far he had a say in this matter it is difficult to define. However, the assertion that President Sukarno encouraged the N.U. leaders to take such a political action is hard to deny.

This Nahdlatul Ulama attitude is understandable because, for them, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was the only stronghold in the government in which they could exercise their influence, and for them it was a question of survival.

Faced with the demands of the Nahdlatul Ulama leaders the Masjumi Executive Council leaders explained that the right to appoint a Prime Minister belonged to the President and since the role of formateur had been given to the P.N.I. leader Mr Wilopo, it seems that the possibility of returning Sukiman to the prime ministership was impossible. The only question left was the question of appointing the candidate for the Minister of Religious Affairs. In answer to the Nahdlatul Ulama claim, the Masjumi Executive Council gave a list of candidates to the Cabinet formateur including the leaders of both Nahdlatul Ulama and the

Muhammadijah, but in fact excluding the name of Wahid Hasjim. Finally Wilopo chosed Faqih Usman of the Muhammadijah to be the Minister of Religious Affairs in his Cabinet.[101]

This decision of course disappointed the N. U. leaders and they regarded "the refusal to allow Wahid Hasjim to be appointed as another in a series of modernist discriminations against the traditionalist elements of Masjumi ...."[102]

The N. U. leaders had to carry out their intention as expressed in their ultimatum, that is, to withdraw from the Masjumi. Continuing affiliation with that party, they argued, "would lead to the total neglect of the N.U.'s principal duties in its own field, the field of religion."[103]

As a result, on August 30, 1952, N. U. officially declared itself to be a new autonomous Islamic political party at the same time in which the new federation of Islamic political parties, which was called Liga Muslimin Indonesia (League of Indonesian Muslims), was established.[104]

From the above discussion it is clear that the internal dissension within the Masjumi leadership had effected the role of the ᶜulamā' to a considerable extent. Due to their lack of experience and knowledge in political matters, these Masjumi ᶜulamā' believed that they were looked upon by their co-political leaders as the immature leaders especially in handling political matters. This is why they were represented in the Government office only by a Minister of Religious Affairs. Only in the modernist camp within

the Masjumi Party can we find, as Federspiel put it, "an abundance of persons with Western-based education who were interested in authority and, in Indonesian terms, capable of exercising it."[105]

The existence of differences of opinion among the Masjumi political leaders, put the ᶜ*ulamā*' in a difficult position to make a choice. This was expressed by Wahid Hasjim when he criticized both groups of the Masjumi political leaders.[106] Establishment of a new political group was undesirable because, on the one hand, it would worsen the existing situation within the party and on the other, the ᶜ*ulamā*' were not sure of their capability to handle it. The only thing left was to take a side with one of the two competing groups or to remain neutral. In this respect it seems that the N.U. ᶜ*ulamā*' most likely preferred, for various reasons, to be on the side of Sukiman group, while the other ᶜ*ulamā*' were inclined to support the Natsir group or remained neutral.

In its congress in 1952, the N.U. leaders also agreed on a resolution "declaring that Muslims must follow a *madzhab* ... and that Muslims could only enter political parties that followed the teachings of the *madzhabs*."[107]

With this resolution, the N.U. gave the public the impression that it was in the vanguard of Islamic teachings and that its withdrawal from the Masjumi was based on religious reasons and that its action was justified by religious teachings. Hence, the N. U. hoped that the Muslim community would give their support. To this religious argument one of the prominent Masjumi ᶜ*ulamā*', Ahmad

Hassan, in one of his writings, gave his reaction. He stated that the N. U. withdrawal from the Masjumi was not based on the religious considerations but in reality on political reasons. This Masjumi ^{c}alim argued as follows: Since the establishment of the Masjumi in 1945, the N. U. Chairman, K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari, "knew and knew quite well" that in the Masjumi Party, the religious decision was made by the Madjelis Sjuro whose members were composed of the prominent ^{c}ulamā' recruited from the various Muslim organizations. Some of these ^{c}ulamā' were followers of a madhhab and some of them were not. As a matter of fact, he insisted, the decision of this Madjelis was always obeyed by both the Masjumi leaders, including the N. U. leaders, and its members. If this were the case, Hassan further contended, why did the N. U. not withdraw from the Masjumi from the very outset? The six years from 1945 until 1952 was certainly a long enough time to make a decision in that direction. If the resolution of the N. U. were justified, the N. U. leaders who were responsible for affiliating the N. U. with the Masjumi in the first place "were guilty of sin, at the very least." [108]

The opinion of Hassan was supported by the fact that after the withdrawal of the N. U. from the Masjumi Party, the traditionalist current of thought within the Muslim community was still represented by the traditionalist ^{c}ulamā' from the non-N. U. camp.[109] Therefore it is obvious that the real reasons motivating the political action of the N. U. leaders were, as far as the existing data can show, nothing but political ones. In other words, the

political interests of the N. U. leaders - whether as a group or as individuals - were not able to be put into practice as long as their organization remained affiliated with the Masjumi. In this connection we can observe how the personal and impersonal motives became closely intertwined and confused. Moreover, in this case, the political interest was closely related to a personal one which was not displayed in its true colors.[110]

Whatever the case, it is clear that the internal dissension within the Masjumi leadership had its effect on the role of its ^{c}ulamā' and as a result the process of disintegration within the Masjumi Party could not be blocked by its leaders. This experience was also undergone by the Sarekat Islam during the colonial period, although for different reasons. So as far as political interest is concerned, the present writer believes, the possibility of such a situation can often be traced.

FOOTNOTES

[1]According to Kepartaian di Indonesia (see also n. 19 on Chapter I of this study), pp. 34-35, the last three above parties were factions of the P.S.I.I. The Komite Pembela Kebenaran P.S.I.I. was set up in 1938 when the P.S.I.I.'s fanatical wing headed by Sekarmadji Kartosuwirjo left the party and established his own i.e., the above Komite Pembela Kebenaran. Unlike the P.S.I.I. this new party wanted "to establish a Hidjrah ummat, an isolated ummat which separated from the dirty society."

[2]See Aboebakar, Sedjarah Hidup ..., pp. 351-352; see also Tamar Djaja, "Masjumi 8 tahun," p.8. There is a slight difference of information about the Masjumi leader Dr Sjamsuddin as was given by Aboebakar and Tamar Djaja on the one hand and that was given by D. Noer and Anderson on the other. According to the last two writers this Sjamsuddin was not Dr Sjamsuddin of Muhammadijah but another Mr Sjamsuddin of the other Muslim organization. See Noer, "Masjumi; Its Organization ...," p. 60 and Anderson, Java in a Time ..., p. 220.

[3]Ibid.

[4]The names of the wartime Masjumi executive members, according to Benda, can be found in Soeara Muslimin Indonesia, I, 1 (December 1943), p. 18. Based on such data, Benda further said that the composition of the wartime Masjumi leadership was as follows: Chairman: K.H.Hasjim Asj'ari; vice-Chairmen were K.H.Mas Mansur of Muhammadijah and K.H.Wahid Hasjim of Nahdlatul Ulama. Both chairmen of Muhammadijah and Nahdlatul Ulama at that time i.e., Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and K.H.A.Wahab Hasjbullah became special advisers of the executive board. The members of this executive board, excluding its Chairman and two its vice-Chairmen, were K.H. Muchtar (N.U), Zainul Arifin (N.U), K.H.M.Sadie (N.U), K.H. Faried Ma'ruf (Muhammadijah), Abdul Mukthi (Muhammadijah), T. Kartosudharmo (Muhammadijah), K.H. Hasjim (Muhammadijah) and Nachrawi Thahir (N.U). See Benda, The Crescent ..., pp. 262-263, n. 6.

[5]See Anderson, Java at a Time, p. 221.

[6]See Herbert Feith, The Decline ..., p. 24

[7]Ibid., p. 113

[8]See H. Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet ..., pp. 19-20.

[9]H. Feith, The Decline ..., p. 114.

[10]See for example the remarks given by Dahm. about the using of these two terms in B. Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century(London: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 152.

[11]See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution ..., pp. 157-158.

[12]See Feith, The Decline ..., p. 135.

[13]See Abu Hanifah, Tales of ..., pp.161-162.

[14]See the statement of Mohammad Roem about the internal dissension within the Masjumi Party leadership as related in Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet ..., p. 43. n. 43.

[15]Prawoto Mangkusasmito, "Pesan Empat Pasal" in Bajasut, ed., Alam Fikiran dan Djedjak Perdjuangan Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Surabaja: Documenta, 1972), pp. 38-39. This book contains useful material about the life and the works of a prominent Masjumi leader, Prawoto Mangkusasmito who died in 1970. From this book one can follow the latest development of the Masjumi Party before it was banned by Sukarno regime in 1960. Besides recording Prawoto's efforts to maintain the survival of his party, this book also contains information about his efforts to revive his party at the time of post Sukarno period. Some documental materials about the Masjumi Party and Parmusi Party, a party which was established by the former leaders of the supporters of the Masjumi Party at the time of Suharto period, can also be found in this book.

[16]See Abu Hanifah, Tales of ..., p. 162.

[17]See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution ..., p. 306.

[18]Ibid., p. 157.

[19]See Kahin, "Indonesian Politics ...," pp. 76-77.

[20]See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution ..., p. 306.

[21]See Feith, The Decline ..., p. 137.

[22]Ibid.

[23]See M. Natsir, Capita Selecta (Bandung and The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1954), vol. I, p. 133.This book is a collection of a selected writings of Muhammad Natsir, one of the prominent Masjumi leaders. It is composed of two volumes. In the first volume, the selection covers his writings about various subjects ranging from religious, philosophical and political matters to literature. These articles

were written at the time of Dutch colonial period. His articles about Islamic policy as was carried out by the Dutch colonial rule in the Netherlands Indie deserved special attention from H.J. Benda. The second volume covers his writings and speeches after the Second World War. Some of these speeches were delivered by him in his capacity both as Chairman of the Masjumi Party and Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia.

[24] See Moenawar Chalil, Funksi Ulama dalam Masjarakat dan Negara (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1957), p. 27.

[25] Ibid.

[26] See Muchtar Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama ..., pp. 176-179.

[27] pesantren is a campus where religious education is given; madrasah is a school combining both the religious and general courses in its curriculum; langgar is a place for prayer. It is smaller than the mosque.

[28] tabligh or pengadjian is public religious gatherings.

[29] See Muchtar Naim, op. cit., pp. 180-187.

[30] See ibid., pp. 189-192.

[31] See Masjumi constitution and Bylaws in Kepartaian di Indonesia, pp. 20-21. (see also n. 75 on Chapter II of this study). The above stipulation was mentioned in Masjumi Bylaws art. 4(a). In its 1952 Const., a new stipulation had been made to complete that article so that this new addition runs: "If the Party Congress or Party Council hold a difference of opinion from the decision made by the Madjelis Sjuro, the Party Congress or Party Council may send its representative to discuss such a decision together with the Madjelis Sjuro. The result of that discussion will then be final." It seems that this stipulation was intentionally made by the Madjelis Sjuro in its effort to strengthen its position within the party. See the 1952 Masjumi constitution in Pedoman Perdjuangan Masjumi (Djakarta: Pimpinan Partai Masjumi bgn. Keuangan, 1955), pp. 6-30.

[32] See Saleh Suaidy, "Kedudukan Madjelis Sjuro/Ulama dalam Masjumi," in Muktamar Masjumi ke VII, p.56.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., p. 57.

[36]See Moenawar Chalil's speech in Buah Kongres Muslimin Indonesia (Jogjakarta: Badan Usaha dan Penerbitan Muslimin Indonesia, 1949), p. 33.

[37]H. M. Sjafa'at Mintaredja, Masjarakat Islam dan Politik di Indonesia (Djakarta: Permata, 1972), p. 17. Surau is a place for prayer.

[38]Jusuf Wibisono, "Masjumi dimasa datang" in Indonesia dalam Pembangunan (Djakarta: Panitya Muktamar Masjumi ke V, 1951), p. 22.

[39]Ibid., p. 21.

[40]Ibid.

[41]See Aboebakar, Sedjarah Hidup ..., p. 563. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Masjumi political leaders, according to S. U. Bajasut, held the opinion that as far as the politik praktis (the technical aspect of politics) was concerned, their decision in this matter was not subject to question. In other words that decision was not necessary to be endorsed by the Masjumi ᶜulamā'. Even though, Bajasut further stated, "the Madjelis Sjuro had always shared in making political decisions of the party." Perhaps the difference of opinion between the Masjumi political leaders and its ᶜulamā' arose in defining what politik praktis really meant. This information is given by S. U. Bajasut in his correspendence with the present writer on June 20, 1976.

[42]In connection with the disappointment on the part of the ᶜulamā', kindly see the articles written by Wahid Hasjim criticizing the Masjumi political leaders who, in his opinion, still neglected religious considerations in their political decision making. These articles are found in Aboebakar, op. cit., pp. 721-727 entitled "Ummat Islam Indonesia Dalam Menghadapi Perimbangan Kekuatan Politik Daripada Partai-Partai Dan Golongan-Golongan," (The Indonesian Muslim community faces the balance of political power between parties and groups); pp. 735-737 entitled "Masjumi lima tahun"(Masjumi in five years) and pp. 783-786 entitled "Ummat Islam Indonesia Menunggu Adjalnja Tapi Pemimpinnja Tidak Tahu" (The Indonesian Muslim community is expecting its fate but its leaders do not realize it). In fact the feeling of disappointment among the Masjumi ᶜulamā' did not end by the withdrawal of N.U. leaders from the Masjumi in 1952. At least until 1956 such a feeling could still be observed. This can be proved by the fact that in the 1956 Masjumi congress, according to Bajasut, a resolution was presented by two prominent Masjumi ᶜulamā' i.e., K. H. Isa Anshary and K.H.Moenawar Chalil, demanding that the Masjumi Chairman should be recruited from the Masjumi ᶜulamā'. This resolution was rejected by the congress on the ground that the existing

Chairman at that time i.e., Muhammad Natsir was really a Masjumi ᶜālim. This information is given by Bajasut to the present writer in his above mentioned letter. See n. 41 above.

[43]Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 176. This book is a ystematic study of political parties which contains a combination of sociological and psychological analysis in studying political phenomena. It is a classic study of social science, its influence is felt until the present time. S.M. Lipset stated in his introduction to this book that through this study, Michels has proved himself to be one of the most influential figures in Political Science in this century.

[44]Ibid., p. 172.

[45]Ibid., p. 175.

[46]Speech made by Enrico Ferri at Suzarra on his opponent Filippo Turati, reprted in "Stampa" anno xivii, No. 358 (December 27, 1909) as quoted in ibid.

[47]See Michels, op. cit., pp. 175-176.

[48]Ibid., p. 182.

[49]See Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet ..., p. 39.

[50]Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Mithuen, 1967), p. 7. This book contains valuable materials, among others, the variations in party organization, in the party's aims and interests and also in its social composition. It is a good book.

[51]Isa Anshary, "Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam" in Hikmah X, no.3 (January 1957), p. 16. Taqlīd is accepting the already established religious teachings uncritically; ijtihād is the right of individual interpretation about religious teachings.

[52]See Feith, op. cit., p. 42.

[53]See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution ..., pp. 157-158.

[54]Ibid.

[55]See Republik Indonesia; Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan R.I., n.d.), pp. 176-177.

[56]Ibid., pp. 169-171.

[57]See B. Kees "Observations ..., p. 29.

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] See D. Noer, "Masjumi; ..., p. 65.

[60] See Feith, *The Decline* ..., p. 135.

[61] See B. Dahm, *History of Indonesia* ..., p. 152.

[62] See B. Kees, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[63] See his statement as quoted in Feith, *The Wilopo Cabinet* ..., p. 43, n. 43.

[64] See D. Noer, *op. cit.*, p. 239, n. 12.

[65] *Ibid.*

[66] Prawoto Mangkusasmito, "Pesan Empat ..., pp. 38-39.

[67] See Feith, *The Decline* ..., p. 168. Jusuf Wibisono stated in this connection that he was not afraid of being expelled from his party because of his severe criticism toward the cabinet which happened to be headed by the chairman of his own party.

[68] Ibid., p. 179.

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 183

[72] G.J. Pauker, "The Role of Political Organizations ..., p. 134.

[73] See his statement as quoted in Feith, *The Wilopo Cabinet* ..., p. 43, n. 43.

[74] G. S. Massanat, *The Dynamic of Modernization and Social Change, A Reader* (California: Good Year Publishing, 1973), p. 329.

[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 329-330.

[76] See D. Noer, "Masjumi; ..., p. 80.

[77] See Feith, *The Wilopo Cabinet* ..., pp. 43-44.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 44

[79]See Dahm, History of Indonesia ..., p. 154.

[80]Ibid.

[81]See Aboebakar, Sedjarah Hidup ..., p. 817.

[82]See Kahin, "Indonesian Politics ...," p. 74.

[83]See H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends ..., pp. 52-53.

[84]See Kahin, op. cit., p. 74.

[85]A. Samson, "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesia" in R. W. Liddle, Political Participation in Modern Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1973), p. 116. This article is written by Samson in his elaboration to study the latest development of Indonesian Islam in country's politics especially after Indonesia held its second general elections in 1971. In this writing, Samson tries to analyze to what extent religious belief had a say in directing the political action of the government. He points out that there are still reasons for the government to maintain the balance of power between social and political forces within the country. Further more he holds the opinion that in its political action, the Indonesian government still maintains the opinion that Islam as a religious expression should be differentiated from that as a political expression. In his other writing Samson said that, to some extent, the Indonesian government in fact has been adopting the Dutch Islamic policy as was initiated by Snouck Hurgronje several decades ago.

[86]Ibid.

[87]See Gibb, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

[88]See Aboebakar, op. cit., p. 869.

[89]Ibid.

[90]Howard M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam; Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), p. 160. This book contains valuable materials about Islamic reform in Indonesia as was carried out by Persatuan Islam. Because Persatuan Islam was one of special collective members of the Masjumi, its leaders' activities contributed considerably toward the improvement of the Masjumi Party. Two of its leaders i.e., Muhammad Natsir and Isa Anshary, became prominent Masjumi leaders and had considerable influence and following within the party.

[91] *Ibid.*

[92] See H. Feith, *The Decline ...*, p. 234.

[93] See Aboebakar, *Sedjarah Hidup ...*, p. 563.

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 725.

[95] Abu Hanifah, *Tales of ...*, p. 162.

[96] See H. Feith, *The Decline ...*, p. 235.

[97] See Aboebakar, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

[98] See H. Feith, *op. cit.*, p. 235

[99] *Ibid.*

[100] *Ibid.*

[101] *Ibid.*, pp. 235-236.

[102] See Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam ...*, p. 161.

[103] See H. Feith, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

[104] *Ibid.* For further explanation about *Liga Muslimin Indonesia* see Aboebakar, *op. cit.*, pp. 563-590.

[105] See Federspiel, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

[106] See his article criticizing the Masjumi political leaders in Aboebakar, *op. cit.*, pp. 721-727. In this article, he seemed to take a neutral position and called for both competing groups to pay their attention to the Islamic teachings in leading the the party. In his opinion both of them were responsible to the diminishing power of the party.

[107] See Federspiel, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

[108] See Hassan's writing *Risalah al Madzhab* (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1956), p. 117 as was related in Federspiel, *op. cit.*, p. 162. Unfortunately the original text of this writing is not available to the present writer.

[109] When the Masjumi Party was banned by Sukarno in 1960, one of its special collective members i.e., *Al Djami'ijah al Washlijah*, still joined the party. This organization belongs to *Shāfiᶜi*

madhhab. One of its leaders became the member of the Central Madjelis Sjuro of the Masjumi. For further explanation about this organization see Aboebakar, Sedjarah Hidup ..., pp. 209-216.

[110] See the remarks given by R. Michels in Michels, Political Parties, pp. 175-176.

CONCLUSION

What can we conclude from our previous discussions?

First, it is obvious that the Masjumi Party was established by its founders for the purpose of expressing the political aspirations of the Muslim community, including both the Muhammadijah and the Nahdlatul Ulama. At that time this party was designated as the only Muslim political party in Indonesia in which all Muslims' strength and efforts could be consolidated.

The choice of its organizational structure and the diffusion of two different streams of thought within the Muslim community in the party leadership - a thing never accomplished before - could be regarded as a new and bold political experiment in the Muslim political party tradition of Indonesia. It is not yet clear whether or not the Muslim leaders who founded this party were fully aware at that time of the political consequences of such a choice for the subsequent development of this party. The fact that this structure was still maintained by the Masjumi leaders at least until 1952 indicates that they felt keeping such a structure was most likely to benefit the Muslim community.

It is apparent that all the founders of the Masjumi Party had the same goal, namely, that the achievement of Islamic interests was far more important than reviving their old differences. This kind of awareness was strengthened by the fact that the Indonesian people at that time were still involved with their revolution, while the Dutch and their Allies were undertaking to liquidate the Republic of Indonesia. In this context

we can understand why the sense of unity and responsibility towards the safety of the state and religion strengthened the cohesiveness of the Muslim community. This sense of unity in fact not only grew stronger among the Muslim community, but was also felt among the Indonesian people as a whole.

It has already been discussed that during the first years of its development, the Masjumi Party, as a political experiment to achieve Islamic interests by Muslim leaders, could be regarded as successful in terms of maintaining unity among Muslim leaders. But this unity could no longer be retained as time went on. The splits in the party which took place in 1947 and 1952 indicate to what extent the divisive factors within the party influenced its further development.

From the above events we observe that merely being the only political party within the Muslim community does not automatically guarantee that unity among Muslim leaders can be maintained for a relatively long time. There are several other factors necessary for maintaining such unity. Among these factors we may mention the political and personal interests of the members - whether as a group or as individuals - and these interests should also be taken into consideration. The existing conflicts of interest within the Masjumi Party seemed to be ignored both by the Masjumi leaders and by previous writers. However, it seemed to me that the real reason for the internal dissension within the Masjumi Party leading to its split could be sought not in the contradictory opinions among the leaders about political issues but in terms of the failure of some of the leaders to gain power and good position within

or outside the party. It is true that internal dissension resulted from the different systems of thought among the leaders, and played a role in strengthening the process of disintegration. However, it is also true that such a process was accelerated by the existence of unresolved conflicting interests within the party itself.

The fact that the ^{c}ulamā' felt that their position within the party had been relegated to an insignificant one by the Muslim political leaders and that the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama regarded the modernist Muhammadijah and Muslim political leaders as always dominating the party leadership as well as the party's representation in the Indonesian cabinets indicate that conflicting interests within the party often had an ideological bias. Moreover it was not impossible within the Masjumi Party that personal interest and ambition had a say in creating internal conflict and that this situation obviously added the complexity of the problem.

In other words we may say that from the very outset it became apparent that the real nature of the Masjumi Party had already nurtured the possibility of the emergence of internal conflicts among its leaders. This situation had already been shown in our discussion by the fact that the split of the Masjumi both in 1947 and in 1952 took place while the preparation of establishing a new Indonesian cabinet was in progress. It can be surmised that some concessions were given out in order to get the position in the coming cabinet among the Masjumi leaders. So when the time came, the question of fulfilling conflicting interests came to the fore and overshadowed all other considerations. And it is under-

standable that in this condition the necessity to maintain unity among the Muslim leaders had faded away and was replaced by other necessities, that is, the necessity to achieve one's group's interest at the expense of their common goal. Against this background we would say that the split of the P.S.I.I. and the Nahdlatul Ulama from the Masjumi Party was more likely based on the group's interest considerations rather than on an ideological basis.

However, it does not mean that different ways to approach political problems and make political decisions did not play any role in creating such a conflict. But since in practice these differences of opinion were exposed to the public, so it appeared that on the surface the real reason for the split of the Masjumi Party was caused by unresolved ideological conflicts. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the maintenance of unity among the Muslim leaders was a difficult problem. Is it because Muslim leaders were more likely to quarrel among themselves or because there was something wrong within the leadership of this party; it is difficult to determine. If the second assertion is correct then the real problem facing the Muslim community does not lie in the absence of affective political organization but because they experienced an absence of strong leadership within the Muslim community on which all the Indonesian Muslims could rely. In other words it can also be said that the crisis of leadership within the Muslim community was felt more as the main factor why the unity among the Muslim leaders was difficult to realize.

At any rate, from the experience of the Masjumi Party it could be expected that the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama remains the spokesman

of the traditionalist stream of thought within the Muslim community while the Muhammadijah still retains its position as the modernist socio-religious educational organization. Both organizations have continued to be the most influential organizations within the Muslim community until the present time. It is not exaggerated to say here that the question of maintaining unity within the Muslim community was closely related to the question whether or not the cooperation between these two organizations could be established. As far as the political question was concerned within the Muslim community it could be said that all the Muslim leaders had undergone a valuable experience with the Masjumi Party, and this experience will of course have a considerable influence on their political activities in the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aboebakar, H. Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar. Djakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan Alm. K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957.

[c]Ali, A. Mu[c]ti. "The Muhammadijah Movement: A Bibliographical Introduction." Unpublished M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1957.

Amelz, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto: Hidup dan Perdjuangannja. 2 vols. Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation, 1944-1945. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961.

________, Java in a Time of Revolution. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972.

Anshary, Isa. "Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam," Hikmah, Nos. 1-2 (January 12, 1957) through no.6 (February 9, 1957).

Aziz, M. A. Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955.

Bastin, J. and Benda, Harry J. A History of Modern Southeast Asia. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.

Benda, Harry J. The Crescent and the Rising Sun. The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958.

Boland, B. J. "The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia," Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 59 (1971).

Buah Kongres Muslimin Indonesia. Jogjakarta: Badan Usaha dan Penerbitan Muslimin Indonesia, 1949.

Chalil, Moenawar. Funksi Ulama dalam Masjarakat dan Negara. Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1957.

Dahm, Bernhard. Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969.

________, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century. London: Preager Publisher, 1971.

Djaja, Tamar. "Masjumi 8 tahun," Hikmah, VI, No. 43 (November 1953) pp. 8-10.

Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties. London: Methuen & Co., 1972.

Federspiel, Howard M. Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970.

Feith, Herbert. The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953; A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958.

________, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Gibb, H. A. R. Modern Trends in Islam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947.

Hanifah, Abu. Tales of a Revolution. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972.

Harjono, Anwar. "G.P.I.I. dan Masjumi," Berita Partai Masjumi, V, Nos. 5-6 (June-July 1950), pp. 8-9.

Hasjim, Wahid. "Ummat Islam Indonesia Dalam Menghadapi Perimbangan Kekuatan Politik Daripada Partai-Partai Dan Golongan-Golongan." In Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar, edited by H. Aboebakar. Djakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan Alm. K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957. pp. 721-727.

________, "Masjumi Lima Tahun." In ibid., pp. 735-737.

________, "Ummat Islam Indonesia Menunggu Adjalnja Tapi Pemimpinnja Tidak Tahu." In ibid., pp. 783-786.

________, "Perguruan Tingga Agama Islam Negeri." In ibid., pp.812-818.

________, "Kedudukan Islam di Indonesia." In ibid., pp. 866-870.

Hatta, Mohammad. Potrait of a Patriot. The Hague and Paris: Mouton & Co., 1972.

________, "Legende dan Realiteit sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus." In Documenta Hsitorica, edited by Osman Raliby. Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1953.

________, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945. Djakarta: Tintamas, 1969.

Kahin, George McT. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970.

________, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism." In Asian Nationalism and the West, edited by William L. Holland. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1953.

Kartodirdjo, Sartono. "Some Problems on the Genesis of Nationalism in Indonesia." Journal Southeast Asian History, III, no.1 (March 1963), pp 70-79.

Kepartaian di Indonesia. Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1951.

Legge, J. D. Indonesia. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

________, Sukarno: a Political Biography. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972.

Mangkusasmito, Prawoto. Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara dan sebuah Projeksi. Djakarta: Hudaya, 1970.

________, "Quo Vadis." In Alam Fikiran dan Djedjak Perdjuangan Prawoto Mangkusasmito, edited by S. U. Bajasut. Surabaja: Dokumenta, 1972, pp. 63-74.

________, "Andil Angkatan Muda Islam tidak mengetjewakan." In ibid., pp. 339-344.

________, "Pesan Empat Pasal." In ibid., pp. 38-40.

Massanat, G. S. The Dynamic of Modernization and Social Change, A Reader. California: Good Year Publishing, 1973.

Michels, Robert. Political Parties. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: The Free Press, 1966.

Mintaredja, H. M. Sjafa'at. Masjarakat Islam dan Politik di Indonesia. Djakarta: Permata, 1972.

Mintz, Jeanne S. Indonesia: a Profile. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1961.

Muktamar Masjumi ke VII. Surabaja: Panitya Muktamar Masjumi ke VII, 1954.

Muktamar Masjumi ke VIII. Djakarta: Pimpinan Partai Masjumi bgn. Penerangan, 1956.

Naim, Mochtar. "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party (1952-1955): An Inquiry into the Origin of Its Electoral Success." Unpublished M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1960

Natsir, M. Capita Selecta. 2 vols. Bandung and The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1954 and 1957.

________, Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia. Bandung: Peladjar dan Bulan Sabit, 1969.

Nieuwenhuis, A. W. "The Batak Institute at Leyden." In Papers on Inter-Racial Problems, edited by G. Spiller. London: P.S. King & Son, 1911. This book was reprinted under the title Inter-Racial Problems and published by The Citadel Press, New York in 1970.

Noer, Deliar. The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973.

________, "Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology and Political Role." Unpublished M. A. thesis, Cornell University, 1960.

Palmer, Leslie H. Indonesia and the Dutch. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Pauker, G. J. "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XVII, no. 9 (1958), pp. 129-142.

Pedoman Perdjuangan Masjumi. Djakarta: Pimpinan Partai Masjumi bgn. Keuangan, 1955.

Pluvier, Jan M. Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesie in de jaren 1930 tot 1942. The Hague and Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1953.

________, Confrontation: A Study in Indonesian politics. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Political Parties and Movements in the Netherlands East Indies. Washington: Office Strategic Service, 1945.

Pringgodigdo, A. K. Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia. Djakarta: Dian Rakjat, 1967.

Raliby, Osman. Documenta Historica. Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1953

Reid, Anthony. The Indonesian National Revolution. London: Longmans, 1974.

Republik Indonesia; Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta. Djakarta: Kementrian Penerangan R.I., n.d.

Samson, Allan A. "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesia." In Political Participation in Modern Indonesia, edited by R. W. Liddle. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1973.

Sidjabat, W. B. Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith. Djakarta: Badan Penerbit Kristen , 1965.

Soedjatmoko, "The role of political parties in Indonesia." In Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia, edited by Philip W. Thayer. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1956.

Suaidy, Saleh. "Kedudukan Madjelis Sjuro/Ulama dalam Masjumi," Muktamar Masjumi ke VIII. Djakarta: Pimpinan Partai Masjumi bgn. Penerangan, 1956.

Taufiqurrahman, K. "Masjumi dimasa lampau (Lima tahun Partai Politik Islam Masjumi)" Indonesia dalam Pembangunan. Djakarta: Panitya Muktamar Masjumi ke V, 1951.

________, "Sekitar Kisah Perdjuangan Ummat Islam Indonesia," Mimbar Agama, I. no. 4 (October 1950), pp. 29-32.

Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante. 3 vols. Bandung: Sekretariat Konstituante, n.d.

Van der Kroef, J. M. Indonesia and the Modern World. 2 vols. Bandung: Masa Baru, 1954.

Van Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O. Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia. The Hague and Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1958.

Von der Mehden, Fred R. Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968.

Wibisono, Jusuf. "Masjumi dimasa datang," Indonesia dalam Pembangunan. Djakarta: Panitya Muktamar Masjumi ke V, 1951.

Wertheim, W. F. "Islam Before and After the Elections." In Indonesia After 1971 Elections, edited by Oey Hongg Lee. London: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Wirjosandjojo, Sukiman. "Partai adalah alat," Berita Partai Masjumi, V, nos. 5-6 (June and July 1950), p. 31.

Woodman, Dorothy. The Republic of Indonesia. London: The Cresset Press, 1955.